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ESSENTIALISM AND QUANTIFIED MODAL LOGIC:
QUINS'S ARGUMENT AND KRIPKE'S SEMANTICS
Abstract
Quine's argument that quantified modal logic (QML) is com-
mitted to essentialisn is considered. It is concluded that although
essentialism seems to be the basis for a natural account of certain
0f the formulas of Qj'!L, Quine has not shown that essentialism is
an inevitable commitment of QML.
Parsons seems to have shown that Kripke's semantics for QML
allows one to avoid essentialism. It is argued, however, that at
^ast within the framework of the system S5 any interpreted theory
which is anti-essentialist makes no indispensable use of quantifying
m. The expressive resources of QML are reducible to those of un-
quantified modal logic with respect to the models for such theories.
This result is at least a partial vindication of Quine's original
claims that the semantics for QML requires essentialism.
It is shown that a claim made by von Wright about the lack
of need for quantiiying in can be vindicated by a proof very similar
to that given to show that anti-essentialism makes quantifying in
dispensable. In fact, von Wright's Principle of Predication appears
to be consistent with certain limited forms of essentialism, yet
it still leads to the eliminability of quantifying in.
Since at least some connection between quantified S5 and
v
essentialism can be demonstrated, those who find importance in the
metaphysics associated with QML should be ready to support essentialism
The metaphysical doctrines associated with QML are distinguished
trom other doctrines which, despite similarities of title, are not
linked with the standard interpretations of QML. It is argued that
once the appropriate form of essentialism is distinguished in this
way, it should be recognized that the resources for its defense are
scarce
.
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SECTION I
QUINE'S ARGUMENT
CHAPTER 1
QUINE'S ARGUMENT
i
In inree Grades of Modal Involvement"^ Quine distinguishes
three different degrees to which we may allow our logic, or semantics,
to embrace the notion of necessity
.
2
The first two grades employ the
notion of necessity only to distinguish an elite class of true closed
sentences. For example, we might single out all logical truths as
necessary. A statement would be said to be necessary if and only if
it were a logical truth. More typically, necessity is explicated
in terms of analyticity. The important thing is that necessity
applies only to sentences or formulas which are closed. In the first
grade, necessity is predicated of statements or closed formulas. In
the second, necessity operators attach to statements or closed for-
mulas to form new more complex formulas. The first grade involves
meta-linguistic claims applying the predicate ’is necessary 1 to sentences.
The second incorporates necessity into the object language (in the modal
operator )
.
Some examples should make clear just what is involved.
Consider
:
(l) ’Every man is either married or not married’ is necessary.
The logical truth of ’Every man is either married or not married’
2
3warrants the use of the semantical predicate 'is necessary' in this
case. Necessity is predicated of the statement 'Every man is either
married or not married. 1
One who is comfortable with analyticity might want to go a
step further, attributing necessity to all analytic statements. He
still involves himself to only the first degree when he employs
(2) 'All bachelors are unmarried' is necessary
as another way of saying that 'All bachelors are unmarried' is ana-
lytic. The attribution of necessity is precisely as clear as the
attribution of analyticity because it is merely a stylistic variant of
it
.
Nothing importantly different is introduced when necessity
is embodied in a statement operator (an operator on closed sentences
or formulas). Thus, using for necessity,
(l') n(every man is either married or not married)
is not importantly different from (l). The truth conditions of
r
oA~
1
can be given in the obvious way, based upon the notion of logical
r
truth or analyticity. nA is true if and only if A is a logical
truth (is analytic). Such statement operators are the core of modal
logic, distinguishing it from the explicitly semantical discourse
that characterizes the first grade of involvement. But if the two
grades are treated in the way discussed so far, they are merely
stylistic variants. There is no important philosophical difference
between them.
A long tradition connects the semantical predicate 'is
necessary' and the statement operator ( and '<)' for possibil-
ity) with logical truth and analyticity. C. I. Lewis and C. H.
Langford explain '<}' as follows:
„
Self-consistency or possibility: <>p. This may be read
P is self-consistent" or "p is possible" or "It is possible
that p be true.” ... ^p is equivalent to "It is false
that p implies its own negation" ...
This suggests that is to be interpreted as signifying logical
truth, but their examples suggest the broader notion of analyticity as
the proper explicatum. For example, they pick 'Today is Monday,
July h oh and tjuly 5^h is not Tuesday' as inconsistent propositions,
and they entertain the idea that 'All men are mortal' is necessarily
,
k
true
.
Quine deplores the introduction of any context whose truth-
conditions are given in terms of the notion of analyticity. 5 His
c
attacks on the analytic-synthetic distinction are well known.
But in "Three Grades of Modal Involvement," in "Reference and Modality"
Q
and in other places
,
Quine argues that there is a metaphysical dif-
ficulty with the third grade of modal involvement which goes beyond
any difficulties with the first two grades. The alleged difficulty
is Aristotelian essentialism.
The third grade of modal involvement occurs when modal
operators are allowed to appear before open formulas, and quantifiers
binding the free variables are applied to the longer open formulas
created by such applications of modal operators. In other words,
quantifiers to the left of a modal operator are allowed to bind
variables to the right of it.
5it we use a modal operator before an open sentence or formula
we can not explain its applicability in terms of the necessity or
analyticity of the sentence or formula that follows it. Only closed
sentences can be necessarily true or analytic. An operator on open
i ormulas is importantly different from a semantical predicate.
(o) D ( it x is a bachelor, then x is not married)
can not be construed as
(^+) ii x is a bachelor, then x is not married' is necessary
(logically true; analytic).
The open sentence 'if x is a bachelor, then x is unmarried' can not
be true, and so of course it can not be necessarily true, logically
true or analytic.
We can put unis point another way. The third grade of modal
involvement allows quantification into open sentences like ( 3 ) to
make
(3') (3x)o(if x is a bachelor, then x is unmarried).
9But (3'
)
can not be explained as
(V) (3x)['if x is a bachelor, then x is unmarried' is
necessary]
.
(U') is incoherent. Quantifiers bind free variables, but the letter
'x' appears in (it) as a part of a complex expression referring to
an open sentence. It is not used as a variable in ‘(it). So the attempt
to quantify in (it') makes no sense. (it’) is like
(5 1 ) (3x) (xylophones sound nice).
The 'x' in 'xylophones' is a part of a noun. It is not a variable
6-which is bound by the quantifier.
ii
But if the use of the modal operator before open formulas
can not be explained in terms of the semantical predicate 'is ne-
cessary', how is this use to be understood? Quine says that in such
cases necessity no longer "resides in the way in which we say things."
Now it resides in "the things we talk about." 10 How can we make sense
of such necessity?
Quine argues that we can make sense of such locutions only
if we adopt Aristotelian essentialism. According to this doctrine
objects have a more intimate association with some of their properties
than with others. We can say that sentences of the form
(6) BxnFx
are true whenever there is something which has the property of being
F necessarily or essentially, or whenever there is something with
the property of being necessarily (essentially) F. But Quine claims
that since essentialism is a repugnant doctrine, the explanation of
sentences like (6) in terms of it must be rejected. There is, if
Quine is right, no unobjectionable way to make sense of the third
grade of modal involvement.
Quine believes that by associating essentialism with QML he
can discredit QML . Like Lewis, Carnap and others, Quine would re-
ject essentialism as an incoherent doctrine. He concludes that if
quantifying in must be explained in terms of essentialism, then
quantifying in can receive no adequate explanation.
71 1As Quine points out:
Essentialism is abruptly at variance with the idea, favoredby Carnap, newis and others, of explaining necessity by
analyticity
.
'
Their program was to use to mark logical or linguistic neces-
sities, the truths that are made true just by the way in which we
12
use words
.
Accepting essentialism is directly contrary to at least one
goal of tnis approach. It was thought that metaphysics could be
eschewed m favor of logic and linguistics by giving a linguistic
account of necessity. A metaphysical doctrine like essentialism,
the view that some properties are more closely linked to the being
of an object than are others, was to be regarded as meaningless
(or, at best, plainly unacceptable because of a lack of acceptable
foundation). Only some logical or linguistic counterpart of the view
could be seriously considered.
iii
Quine believes himself to have associated essentialism and
QML in a strong way. He has given an argument intended to show that
any normal quantified modal system must involve essentialism. 1 ^ He
says that a system is essentialist if some properties of a thing
are singled out for special status. Thus if there a.re two one
place open sentences ' Fx ' and ' Gx' such that
(11) ( 3x) (aFx.Gx.~QGx)
ll+
is true, then the interpreted system is essentialist. Quine
then demonstrates that all normal modal systems will involve this sort
8of essentialism. Let ' p
' stand for any closed formula which is true
hut not necessarily true. Then
(12) (3x) (a(x=x)
.
(p.x=x) .~o(p.x=x)
)
will be true. Ev^rj/ ohing satisfies the open formula following the
quantifiers, so in non-empty domains, something does. And (12)
is an instance of the essentialist schema (ll).
As we shall see, 15 Quine's criterion of essentialist commitment
(ll) is inadequate, since a semantics can be given which makes some
formulas of the
-orm of (ll) true but which relies upon an unprob-
lematic, solely logical account of the satisfaction of open modal
formulas
. Thus this argument fails to show that a.ll modal systems
must embrace a problematically metaphysical doctrine. A part of
this dissertation will be concerned with the development of a more
suitable characterization of essentialism. The major portion of the
dissertation will explore the relationship of. -essentialism, so
characterized, to QML.
This sketch of Quine's polemic against QML has, in outline
at least, followed the exposition in "The Three Grades of Modal In-
volvement.” We will turn now to a more detailed discussion of other
papers in which Quine discusses the problems of combining quantifiers
with modal operators
.
1^
iv
It has been over thirty years since Quine first pointed out
9referential peculiarities that occur when non-truth-functional state-
ment operators occur in a formal language. In "Whitehead and the Rise
of Modern Logic" he formulated a principle of truth-functionality
adhered to in Frincicia Mathematica1 ^
:
one statement is capable of containing other statements truth-func oionally only
; i . e
. ,
in such a way that the truth value(truuh or ialsehood) of the whole remains when a true partis replaced by any other truth, or a false part is replacedby any other falsehood.
He then noted that in all departures from this principle of
which he had knowledge, a "sacrifice" was made with regard to "the
admiss ability of a certain cmmmon-sense mode of inference: inference
by inter-changing terms that designate the same object." 18 In a
19footnote, he cites, as an example, the use of '9' by Lewis and
20Langford.
-ney employ this sentence operator in such a way that
0 (number of planets in solar system<7
)
is true but
0 ( 9<7 )
is false, although both '9' and 'number of planets in solar system'
designate the same object.
21In several later writings, Quine returns to a consideration
of how co-designative terms behave in modal contexts. He connects
the "common-sense mode of inference" discussed above with some more
general observations about designation and quantification, and he
concludes that any attempt to explain existential generalization of
statements beginning with modal operators conflicts with the program
of explicating modal- operators ('o' and '<>') or modal terms
10
( necessarily', 'possibly') solely in terms of the notion of analy
ticity (or logical truth). Thus he says that22
referential opacity afflicts the so-called modal contexts
Necessarily ' - -and 'Possibly at least when they
are given one sense of strict necessity and possibility asm Lewis's modal logic.
he general idea of strict modalities is based on the putative
notion of. analyticity as follows: a statement of the form
Necessarily
. .
.
' is true if and only if the component
statement which 'necessarily' governs is analytic.
. .
Quine attempts to show that there is conflict between the
attempt to freely combine quantifiers with modal operators when they
are explained in this way. Accepting such an explanation, one will
say that
(1) (9 >7)
is true, but that
(2) n(the number of planets>7)
is false, since
( 3 ) 9>7
is analytic, but
(4) The number of planets>7
is not.
As we have seen, this conflicts with the principle that co-
referential singular terms are interchangable
,
salva veritate . But
conflict with this principle will not, by itself, occasion discomfort
for the modal logician. The modal logician needs to worry only if
this principle is an indispensable part of his logical system
—
i.e., an indispensable aspect of the interpretation of formally
11
stated theories
.
Quine attempts to create worries for the modal logician by
connecting the principle of interchangeability of co-referential
singular terms with the fundamental semantics of quantifiers.^ In
ordinary first-order quant ificational logic, the following principle
holds
:
(8) If a denotes u, then u satisfies ..x..? if and only if
r m r
...a... is true, and u fails to satisfy
. ..x...
if and only if '...a...' is false.
An equivalent version of (8) takes explicit account of co—referential
terms
(8') If a and 3 both denote u, then u satisfies r
. ..x..?
if and only if f ...a...' and r. .. 3 ..? are both true
and u fails to satisfy '...x...' if and only if r . ..a..?
and r . .. 3 ..^ are both false.
On the basis of this
,
we can make explicit the restrictions on uses
of EG.
(9) ( 3x) ( . . . x. . . ) follows from
r
. ..a..? only if for every
singular term3, if 3 denotes what a denotes, then the
truth-value of '...3..^ is the same as that of r. ..a.. 9 .
r ~i
This is justified on the basis of (8') since (3x) ( . . .x. .
.
)
follows
from r . ..a..? if and only if r ...a..? is true if and only if the
r n
thing that a denotes satisfies ...x... . Thus in the first-order
logic there is a link between the proper use of existential generaliza-
tion and the inter-changeability of co-referential terms.
12
In English we can find contexts which do not allow existential
generalization. For example, we can not quantify into quotational
contexts
.
( 3x) ( ' x' has five letters)
is not inferrable from
'nine' has five letters.
Also
,
( 3x) (John believes that x is a spy)
is not inferrable from
John believes that the tallest spy is a spy.
Substitution of co-referential terms is not truth-preserving in
eitner case a symptom of the referential peculiarity of such sentences.
lhus Quine connects existential generalization with the apparatus
of reference, saying that the principle embodied in existential
generalization is "simply the logical content of the idea that a
• 2bgiven occurence is referential." ' The general principle is that
( 3x) ( . . . x. .
.
)
can be inferred from r . ..a.. 7 if and only if ’x'
occurs in purely referential position in r . ..x..? . One indi-
cation that’x’is not in purely referential position in r . ..x..7 is
that there are two co-referential terms, a and 3, such that
r
...a...'
7
and r . ..3--71 differ in truth value.
This connection between reference and existential generaliza-
tion can be given the following defense. Failure of substitutivity
salva veritate of co-referential terms in a context shows that something
other than reference is involved in determining the truth-value of
13
substitution instances of that context. But with variables, nothing
other than reference can matter. Each object either satisfies or
fails to satisfy an open sentence. It is only in terms of bare
satisfaction that we evaluate open sentences. The singular terms
that refer to an object make no difference in considering whether
that object satisfies an open formula. So, if singular terms with
the same reference force different truth-values in a particular
context, then something other than reference makes a difference in
evaluating ohat context
. To form an open sentence by replacing
a singular term oy a variable in such a context is not permissible,
since in that context more than reference must be evaluated; but
there is nothing more to the context to evaluate when a variable
occurs there.
Put another way, we are arguing that the semantics for quan-
tifiers is given in terms of the satisfaction of open formulas. An
open formula is satisfied (or not) by an object, irrespective of
what means are available for referring to that object. But if a
r
“1 r- 1
and 3 are co-referential, and ...a... is true but ... 3 ... is
not, then the way they refer, not merely their referent, is relevant
rm that context. Determining whether an object satisfies ...x...
is problematic in such cases because the context has such referential
peculiarities. But evaluation of the open formula in terms of objects
r
,
~i
is what a proper evaluation of ( 3x ) ( . . . x. . .
)
would require. The
semantics for quantifiers requires that existential generalization
be used only on "purely referential" occurences of singular terms.
As we observed above, co-referential terms can not, in general
be interchanged in modal contexts, if modality is explicated in
terms of analvticity (or some similar notion). 'd9>7' is true
but 'Dthe number of planets>7’ is false, according to the traditional
interpretation of But those who wish to quantify into modal
contexts must hold that it is coherent to speak of objects satis-
fying Dx>7 even though the truth of rna>7~1 depends upon things
other than what the referent of a is. The link between inter-
changeability of co-referential terms and satisfaction is broken.
v
In this section we will explore some ways in which one can
restrict singular terms or their referents in an attempt to formulate
a modal system in which the quantifiers function in an ordinary
way, so that the semantics will guarantee that existential generaliza
tion is a sound inferential' procedure. The problem is to reconcile
the account of necessity as analyticity with the ordinary semantics
for the quantifiers.
For a time, Quine thought that one could save QML by restrict-
ing the domain over which quantifiers ranged to intensional entities.
Following a suggestion of Church,^ he held that by paying the onto-
logical price of such a restriction we could save QML, from the
referential problems outlined above.
The problems involving co-referential terms can be avoided
if, for any singular terms a and 3? if a and 3 are co-referential,
than '"Fa 1 and r aF3
_1
have the same truth-value. Substitution into
15
modal contexts is then warranted. In particular, if ra =p 1 is true,
then so is raa=3'
1
(since r na=oT' is).
If a and b are inters ional entities then they themselves are
necessarily co-referential if co-referential at all. So it was
thought that restriction to such entities would satisfy the demands
of QML.
But, as Quine later saw, this expedient is, byt itself, inade-
quate. No matter what the objects of our domain are, they can
always be contingently specified. Let us suppose that our quanti-
fiers range over intensional objects (individual concepts). 27
Let '
p
1 stand for an arbitrary sentence which is true but not analytic.
Define a function f in the following way:
x if p.
f(x) = j 0 if ^ and x^O.
1 if ^ and x=0.
Since 'a=a' is analytic
(T) D (a=a)
is true. So,
(8) f(a)=a
since p is true. By substituting in (7), which is what is supposed
to be allowed by our restriction to intensional objects,
(9) o(f(a)=a).
But ' f(a)=a* is not analytic, so
(10
)
~a(f (a)=a)
.
l6
Thus any language which allows the free use of function
23
symbols m forming singular terms can not allow inter-substitu-
tivity oi expressions denoting identicals and at the same time have
it that rnq1 is true if and only if q is analytic.
Restriction to intensional entities is not an adequate remedy.
We need to restrict the singular terms in such a way that if a and
3 are singular terms, then if ra=f is true, then rcFcT has the same
truth-value as raF3^
. But that restriction works, if at all, even
if no restriction is placed on the range of the variables. 29
.\
Te should tnen explain the method of restricting the singular
terms. We pick our singular terms so that for any terms a and 3,
if ra=3n is true, then ' aFcT1 has the same truth value as rnF3~!
.
A fortiori
,
if ra=3~ is true, so is W=3"T . Any two co-referential
terms are necessarily co-referential.
on
But Quine has given an argument that we can use
to show that if definite descriptions are among the singular terms
of language and if any two co—referential terms are necessarily
co-referential, then modal distinctions break down. Any closed
formula p is true if and only if r njTl is true, under these conditions.
A consequence of the requirement on singular terms is the
following
:
(1) If (ox) Fx = (ax) Gx, then d(ox) Fx = (ax) Gx.
It follows from (l) that
(2) If (ax) Fx = (ax) Gx, then a(w) (Fw if and only if Gw).
The following is in turn a consequence of (2).
(3) If (3x)((w)(Fw if and only if w=x) and (w)( Gw if and
IT
only if w-x))
s then a(w)(Fw if and only if Gw ). 31
Any modal system with descriptions among its primitive singular terms
must, it seems, satisfy this condition, if quantifiers and modal
operator s are to be xreely combined. 3_
But let ' p
' stand for any true sentence and suppose that
u=v. Then
(^) (w)((p and w=v) if and only if w=u)
( 5 ) (w)(w=v if and only if w=u)
(6) (ax) ( (w)((p and w—v ) if and only if w=x) and (w)(w=v
if and only if w=x))
(T) By (3), d(w)((p and w=v) if and only if w=v)
(8) m((p and v=v) if and only if v=v)
( 9
)
3-2
nv=v
(10)
ap
Thus from the assumption ohat p is true we have deduced that it is
necessary. Since the converse also holds, we can conclude that
rp=DP is a theorem, thus vitiating modal distinctions.
Quine seems to believe that this argument applies to all
QML systems
. We actually have only an argument that shows that cer-
tain assumptions about descriptions lead to a breakdown of modal
distinctions. But if we formulate our quantified modal system without
making the assumption that descriptions are a part of its primitive
vocabulary, we may be able to avoid this disastrous consequence.
If descriptions are always eliminated contextually, for example,
3b
perhaps we can have a viable QML.
18
What we should try to formulate, then, is a quantified modal
system which does not have descriptions'35 among its primitive singula
terms and which is such that if ra=|3 7 is true then r aFa'1 has the
same truth-value as raF$
,
for any primitive singular terms a and
Quine claims that what is needed to give such a semantics
for QML is essentialism. If r aFa is read as saying that the object
that a denotes is necessarily, or essentially, F, then if ra=3~’ is
true then ? 3 will have the same truth-value as 'Fa'
. Necessity
is now of things, not of words; the uses of can not be explained
in terms of linguistic or logical rules. 37 Rather than marking a
prized category o± expressions, the modal operator now indicates
a special intimacy between the subject and what is predicated of
it . The claim that there is such a special intimacy" between some
objects and some of their properties is the metaphysical doctrine
of essentialism.
Essentialism can serve as a basis for severing the tie
between 'o' and analytic,ity. The essentialist semantics for
provides us with a way to make existential generalization possible.
Variables and singular terms within its scope can have purely referen-
tial occurence; since sentences in which 'a' occurs are evaluated
in terms of whether the properties predicated in the sentence
governed by 'o' are essential. The properties of the object denoted
by a (in particular, whether it is necessarily or essentially F) are
what count in evaluating roFa —not the formal properties of rFa"
1
.
19
One might respond at this point that even if ve hold that
essentialism can provide a semantical basis for QML, we are not forced
to give such a metaphysical semantics. There may be other ways of
fulfilling our condition that ra=3^( Fc^aF3)~' be made valid by any
adequate semantics for QML. For example, we could restrict our sin-
gular terms so that for any two terms a and 3,
r
o=f? is true if and
only if ro=3' is analytic. Since we have removed descriptions and
functions from our basic singular terms, and since two different
proper names or constants a and 3 are presumably never such that
P • 38
a-3 is analytic, this suggestion amounts to a proposal to make
sure that no two constants of the language refer to the same object.
Such a proposal can be implemented. For example, let 'O',
’1', '2', etc. be our only singular terms. Then ra=3
_5
is false
unless a=3
,
and if a=3 then rQa=|? is true since ra=3~! (i.e., ra=(? )
is analytic
. Since no two terms are co-referential, inter-substitu-
tivity principles are vacuously true. We can stipulate that r aFa’:
is true if and only if rFcT is analytic. ¥e will say that r oFx'1
is satisfied by n if and only if the singular term a denoting n
is such that
r
Fa is analytic. Thus if '‘9>7 / is analytic, 9 will
satisfy r ox>7‘. 9 will not satisfy rax numbers the planets"1
,
since
v
9 numbers the planets'' is not analytic. An account of satisfaction
based on analyticity can be given in this way.
More simply, we could satisfy our semantical requirements
on singular terms by abolishing singular terms, using only variables
and quantifiers as our referential apparatus. We could then stipulate
20
that for any closed formula A, raA1 is true whenever A is analytic.
Several explanations of the satisfaction of raA~1 when A is open
(in one free variable) seem plausible. One that seems particularly
promising is to allow that something satisfies rnA l if and only
j-
. ,
~i
if (x)A is analytic (where A is a formula with 'x' as its sole
free variable).
As we shall see later, these suggestions can serve as the
basis for a semantics for QML. But they do so only by making the
uses of the resources of QML trivial in certain ways .
^
For now
we shall ignore such possibilities
,
concentrating on traditional
explanations of what it is for an open formula r aA? to be satisfied.
vi
We would do well now to see what more can be said to support
the contention that the semantics for QML requires essentialism.
As we have already seen, in a language with singular terms and or-
dinary quantificational rules (in particular the rule of existential
generalization), it must be that any two co-referential terms a and
3 are such that
r
aa=3’ is true and such that r ciFof is true if and
only if raF3 is true. But it is not true in general that if a and
3 are co-referential then
r
cx=f is analytic or that Fa is analytic
h0
if and only if F 3 is analytic. Thus it seems that if quan-
tifiers and singular terms are combined, then the use of can
not be explained in a natural way solely in terms of tha analyticity
of what follows it. As we have already mentioned, essentialism pro-
vides a natural basis for understanding uses of 'o' in QML.
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But since Quine favors banishing singular terms from the
primitive vocabulary of formal languages
,
1,1
it is important to his
argument that it be possible to show that essentialism is involved
even if singular terms are eliminated. The satisfaction of open
formulas like 'Fx'1 receives a natural explanation in terms of
essentialism whether or not there are singular terms. We can say
that something satisfies r D Fx" if and only if it is essentially or
necessarily F. It must, in other words, bear a special relation-
ship to that particular one of its properties. But so far we have
found no argument that shows that systems without singular terms must
rely upon essentialism.
Quine has argued extensively , although somewhat cryptically,
that even though most of his examples showing that QML involves
essentialism exploit singular terms, the presence of singular terms
is not crucial to the failure of attempts to explain uses of in
QML in terms of analyticity. Thus he says that**2
this expository reversion to our old singular terms is avoid-
able
,
as may now be illustrated by re-arguing the meaningless-
ness of
(30) ( qx ) ( x is necessarily greater than 7)
in another way. Whatever is greater than 7 is a number, and
any given number greater than 7 can be uniquely determined by
any of various conditions, some of which have 'x>7' as a
necessary conseuqence, some of which do not. One and the same
number x_ is uniquely determined by the condition:
( 32 ) x. = + ^ 21 + ^ y~x
and by the condition
(33) There are exactly x. planets,
but (32) has ’x>7' as a necessary consequence while (33)
does not. Necessary greaterness than 7 makes no sense as
applied to a number x; necessity attaches only to the connec-
tion between 'x^ 1 and the particular method (32), as opposed
to (33), of specifying x_-
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What can we make of this argument? The use of the notion of
necessary consequence suggests that what Quine means to say is that
although
(A) o(x = fx + 'V'1c + Vx t -\Tx x > T
)
is always satisfied
(B) (NP}px>7
)
is not (where 'NPx' means 'x numbers the planets’). In particular,
since there might have been only 5 planets, it is possible that 5
numbers the planets but is not greater than 7.
Thus
,
0(NP5.~(5>7)),
i.e.
,
~a(NP5z>(5>7)).
So far this poses no problem for the modal logician. The
tact, that there is a logical relation between the antecedent and con-
sequent of (A) but there is no such relationship between the ante-
cedent and consequent of (B) is not, by itself, any difficulty. But
in a passage shortly after this one, Quine makes a remark that
suggests where he sees the problem.
But the important point to observe is that granted an under-
standing of the modalities (through uncritical acceptance,
for the sake of argument
,
of the -underlying notion of anuly-
ticity), and given an understanding of quantification ordi-
narily so called, we do not come out automatically with any
meaning for quantified medal sentences such as (30)
((3x.)(x_ is necessarily greater than 7)).
The point seems to be that although we can understand (A) and
(B) in such a way that (A) is always satisfied but (B) isn’t (because
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there is a logical relation between the antecedent and consequent
of (A) "but not of (B)) w^ ™ vn
' n not
’
on the basis of that, understand
(30). That we can deduce ’x>7' from one open formula specifying
the number 9 does not warrant our claiming that 9 satisfies 'Ux>7
' ,
Since we can not deduce 'x>7' from some other ways of specifying 9.
To say that 9 satisfies 'ox>7' would be to favor one way of speci-
fying that number over others. But that is essentialism. Thus the
remark that analyticity (or, in this case, the related notion of
analytic consequence) is not an adequate basis for determining
whether 9 satisfies 'mx>7'.
™ s argument leaves something to be desired. It is simply
an argument that an understanding of (A) and (B) provides no obvious
way of understanding ( 30 )
.
It is not adequate to show that analyti-
city can not be used to give an understanding of (30).
On the other hand, Quine's conclusion that even if we under-
stand analyticity and quantification "we do not come out automatically
with any meaning for quantified modal sentences such as (30)" is not
without merit. As we have seen, an explanation of in terms of analy-
ticity which was adequate for the first two grades of modal involve-
ment is not extendable in any obvious way to the third grade. We also
saw that the inferential principle EG (which applies, of course,
only in languages with constants) runs into difficulties in modal
logic. But tnat principle seems to be a very natural outgrowth of the
ordinary semantics for quantifiers and constants. Quine's attempts
to find such problems in languages without constants are not
completely convincing, but in considering languages with constants
We Sa" Str0ng reaSOns t0 exPlaln uses of in ways that did
not rely on the notion of analyticity. In giving an essentialist
semantics for such formulas we have to develop an account of satis-
faction which can also be used in giving a semantics for languages
without constants. Essentialist semantics for QML is at least a
natural outgrowth of consideration of some of the ptoblems we have
discussed.
Essentialism in so far as it is comprehensible at all, will
provide an adequate basis for a semantics for QML. A facile semantics
can be given by allowing that u satisfies if and only if u
is essentially F. This completely removes consideration of analyti-
city from the evaluation of such formulas.
Essentialism is thus suggested as a natural basis for inter-
preting the formulas of modal systems which allow quantifiers to
bind variables "across” modal operators. An adequate understanding
of essentialism would provide an adequate understanding of quantifying
in. But we have tound no. absolutely convincing argument in Quine's
writings that legitimately concludes that essentialism is a semantical
requirement of QML.
Quine's argument is not, of course, an argument in support
of essentialism. His argument is meant to show that we can make no
sense of quantifying into modal formulas—i.e., that the account
of satisfaction that we must give for such formulas is ultimately
inadequate. By showing that the account of satisfaction relies
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upon essentialism, he believes that he has discredited QML. Since
QML makes sense only if essentialism does, QML does not make sense.
Thus, Quine argues, if we assume that essentialism is false
or incoherent, we will be forced to admit that QML has no acceptable
semantics. But
if we do not propose to quantify across the necessity operator
6 USS
_
° x that °Perator ceases to have any clear advantage
over merely quoting a sentence and saying that it is analytic.
^
Thus modal logic without quantifiers is useless; modal logic with
quantifiers is unacceptable.^
Quine gives us two grounds for rejecting a formal system;
that it is useless or that it is philosophically unacceptable. Quine
argues that QML should be rejected because its semantics is based
upon an unacceptable metaphysical doctrine. We shall later see
that a semantics can be given which does not implement essentialism.
But we shall also see that restriction to such a semantics raises
serious questions of the usefulness of QML. We will conclude that,
for at least some purposes, the rejection of essentialism maices
QML worthless.
*+7
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There is another traditional philosophical terminology which
we can use to restate Quine's point in a quite succinct way. By
talking of modalities de dicto and de re and of objects possessing
properties
,
we can make the conflict between quantifying in and the
•
-
.
• 'hianalyticity interpretation of necessity quite clear.
Necessity de dicto is the necessity that resides in words.
2 6
When
’
ln h feCOnd srads 0:' involvement
, was used to mark
the analytic! ty of what followed, modal logic was used in connection
with necessity de dicto
.
De re necessity, on the other hand, is necessity used in
conjunction with a claim that some object necessarily has a certain
property
.
An object satisfies an open sentence if and only if it
possesses the property the open sentence expresses. Tims
,
to give
an account of the satisfaction of formulas of the form W
,
one
must say what it is for something to have the property of being
necessarily F. Such a de re necessity applies independently of how
a thing is designated. Quine echoes the traditional terminology
when he says that when quantifying in occurs, necessity is no longer
"of words" but is now "of things."
me conflict that Quine points out, then, is simply a re-
flection of the fact that when quantifiers are freely combined with
modal operators
,
we no longer know whether the modal operators
indicate de dicto or de re necessity. We graft QML onto unquantified
modal logic, and typically when this is done no new account of
necessity before closed formulas is given, so presumably some uses
must still be de_ dicto
. But to give an account of the satisfaction
of DFx we must, it seems, give an account of a new use of in
connection with de_ re_ modality. A thing satisfies T oFx' if and
only if it has the property of being necessarily F.
The principle problem is that formulas with quantifying in
are linked in important ways to formulas which lack quantifying in.
From r oFa~1 we expect to infer r3xoFx\ But if marks de dicto
necessity in the former formula and de re necessity in the latter,
then there is reason to question whether such a logic can make this
inference work: particularly if de dicto necessity is explicated
as analyticity.
Thas we find the need to give a new account of in
( 3x ) nFx infecting our old account of rnFa“1
. Does W1
,
when tru
tell us something about ’Fa 1 or something about the object that
a du.no
?
The former is what de_ dicto reading would have. But
existential generalization seems to require the de_ re reading.
Quine's remarks can be seen as merely an attempt to show that
if quantiiying in is to be allowed, then we must recognize that
the account of in terms of analyticity is inadequate for the
cases in which occurs before open formulas, and, furthermore,
ohat this account of seems to be compromised even in cases in
which it appears before closed formulas containing constants. The
inferential ties of oFa to (3x)nFx make the de_ dicto reading of
'a' questionable even for formulas lacking quantifiers.
But when de dicto reading is called into question, we must
search for a new account of necessity. As we have already seen,
an essentialist account seems to be the only plausible candidate.
Sentences in which necessity occurs de re_ have traditionally been
tied to essentialist claims, and no other account suggests itself
so strongly.
TtiiS discussion of the do re-de
_dicto distinction may make
Quine's argument more accessible. But continued use of this term
eulogy would, in some ways, impede our efforts to evaluate Quine'
views with respect to formally interpreted versions of QML. For
this reason we will use this terminology only occasionally, when
accessibility seems particularly elusive without it.
i-
s
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Quine’s polemic against QML is based primarily upon a con-
sideration of examples of the behavior of singular terms and the
inference rule existential generalization. While this may provide
a good means for focusing upon the semantical issues that Quine
wishes to discuss, it is misleading in two respects.
First of all, Quine should not rely upon consideration
of inferences involving singular terms. If the problem of essential
ism is to have any force for Quine (or for anyone else) it must
also show up when one considers languages from which singular terms
have been eliminated. Essentialism must be a part of the account
of the satisfaction of open formulas lacking constants
,
if it
is to be a commitment of QML.
recognizes onis and has attempted to argue that the
consideration of examples with singular terms does not affect the
conclusion linking essentialism with QML. But as we saw in section
'/i
,
his arguments ^nat the semantics for QML (without singular terms
requires essentialism are not adequate.
Quine's discussion of QML and essentialism in terms of the
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inference rule existential generalization is also misleading in
another way. It suggests that modes of inference involving modal
operators are the source of essentialist commitments. But the notion
of the metaphysical commitment of a mode of inference is quite un-
clear. Quine should he calling our attention to the commitments
involved in giving a semantics for QML theories. (Of course, the
inferences one is allowed to make are a good indication of the
semantics that we wish to give.
)
Quine has made it clear that his principle interest in formal
languages is as languages for theories^ 8
; so it is reasonable to
view his remarks on EG as attempts to call our attention to problems
which appear when QML is used as the language of a theory. In ad-
dition, Quine makes it clear that he regards QML's commitment to
essentialism as a metaphysical commitment. It is not merely a
feature of inference forms of the same formal structure as infer-
ences involving possibility and necessity. But a metaphysical
commitment is above all a commitment of a theory.
Thus in chapters 3-8 we shall consider the interpretations
of QML theories and the nature of their connection (if any) with
essentialism, and we shall concentrate primarily upon constant-
free versions of QML.
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CHAPTER 2
SOME REACTIONS
m this chapter we will briefly examine some ways of handling
QML Xhat might be thouSht to avoid the problems that Quine has
brought to light. In each case the problem that Quine stresses,
the fact that an essentialist semantics must be given, remains,
even though no formal paradoxes are apparent in the modal systems
suggested.
Arthur F. Smullyan and Frederic B. Fitch have followed a
suggestion made by Church, arguing that QML can be made acceptable
by banishing troublesome singular terms from the primitive vocab-
ulary of the language. 1 By eliminating descriptions in favor of
their Russellian expansions, they hope to remove all appearances
O
of paradox from QML.
Following this line,^ one will require disambiguation of
the statements appearing in the arguments that Quine uses to dis-
credit QML. For example, the argument
(1) Q 9>7
•
(2) The number of planets = 9.
(3) oThe number of planets > 7.
has several renderings in a system which uses contextual definitions
3h
35
• p^iorib
. U) 13 symbolized as above, but ( 2 ) becomes
(2*) (3x)(Px. (y ) ( Py=y=x )
. x=9 )
.
(j) has at least three renderings
(3*) D ( 3x ) ( Px
. (y) (Py=y=x ) .x>7)
(
3
**) ( 3x ) ( Px
. ( y ) ( Py=y=x ) . x>7
)
( 3 * ** ) ( 3x ) ( Px
. (y ) ( Px=y=x ) .
n
x>7 )
,
depending upon what one tai.es to be the scope of the description.
WS Can simPlify our discussion a bit by ignoring the exis-
tence claims made by the desciptions and using logical rules to
derive some consequences of (2) and (3 ) which can serve as an ade-
quate basis for our discussion. We then have
( 2 ' ) (x) (Pxhx=9 )
( 3 ’ ) o ( x ) ( Px=>x>7 )
(3’’) (x)n(Px=3x>7 )
(
3 ' '
' ) ( x ) ( Px=x3x>7 )
.
(3 ) and (3'') both seem to assert a necessary connection
between numbering the planets and being greater than 7 . Everyone
denies that any such connection exists, so we should regard both
(3 ) and (3'') as false. (l) and (2') are both true, so QML would
be in trouble if either (3') or (3") followed from (l) and (2').
But no one , including Quine, has suggested that either does follow,
so there is no problem.
(3'"), on the other hand, does follow from (l) and ( 2 ’).
if
So th
- modal logician must say that (3* 1
1
) is true. But there is
apparently no problem in accepting ( 3 T ’ ’
)
as true, since ( 3 ’
’
1
)
36
asserts no necessary connection between numbering the planets and
being greater than 7 .
This gambit is
,
to an extent, successful. It shows that
an apparent paradox in QML can be resolved. There is no formal
contradiction that can be derived within the system, nor are we
forced to assert any necessary connections that are undesirable.
(We need not say thao being identical with 9 and numbering the planet:
are necessarily connected.) All we need to do is to recognize that
the scope of descriptions makes a difference when modal operators
are used, and that one must make an important decision about where
to place modal operators when he is translating a sentence into his
formal system."’
But as a response to Quine's total offensive against QML,
this move is by itself inadequate. What Quine ultimately relies
upon is not a charge of formal inconsistency, but rather a charge
of semantical incoherence. This charge remains to be met because
the modal logician who uses this method for rescue must justify
his claim thao (3'
'
) is true. Giving truth conditions for (3' '
'
)
requires him to say what it is for an object to satisfy ' (Pxnox>7)
'
A fortiori he must say when an object satisfies 'ax>7'. As we have
already argued, to explain what it is for objects to satisfy formulas
of that form is, prime facie
,
to explain essentialism. 'ax>7 '
is apparently satisfied by anything that is necessarily or essentially
greater than 7- While some natural non-essentialist interpretation
may be available, essentialism is what suggests itself most urgently
as the explanation of the satisfaction conditions of such formulas.
37
To have QML one must explain what it is for formulasW
to be satisfied by an object. Smullyan and Fitch would have answered
Quine if they had given a non-essentialist account of the satisfac-
sncn for^uiab. They ao not do so, so Quine's challenge to pro-
vide a non-essentialist semantics for QML is not met by their responses.
We haVe exPTained the ways in which one might argue that
essentialism arises in systems in which the basic singular terms
are restricted so that for any two such singular terms a and 3 if
r
a=3 is true, then W has the same truth-value as W . One
must give an account of what it is for an object to satisfy an open
formula f°Fx1
; and that is most naturally done by saying that an
object satisfies W if and only if it satisfies Fx and it bears
some special relation to the property that Fx expresses. (We saw
that if Fa is analytic if and only if F3 is, whenever ra=3~ is true,
then we can give an account of satisfaction of rnFx1 in terms of
analyticity. But this is a very special case. Indeed, a language
with two co-referential terms would normally fail to fulfill this
condition
.
)
Jaako Hintikka has supported the other means of avoiding
the conflicts that arise between the explanation of in terms
of analyticity and the use of quantifiers to bind variables "across'
a modal operator. We can view this maneuver as a restriction on
the use of EG, thus altering quantificational rules. 1
"
If Quine's
38
arguments about t v , an,^ -i •v*u etna essentialism are rm^r'an-i-me correct, tnen the seman-
tlcal approach that Hintikka takes must (a) have certain inade-
quacies, (b) amount to a substitutional interpretation of quantifi-
cation, so that Quine's arguments have no bearing, 8 or (c) be committed
to essentialism.
Dagfinn FjJllesdal has argued for (a) and (b ), 9 and Hintikka
has disputed his arguments
.
10
Without entering that dispute, we can
argue for Quine's contention that QML is committed to essentialism
if Hintikka's semantical method is employed, by arguing for (c ). 11
Hintikka's approach is to introduce an altered version of
the rule of existential generalization (or rather its semantical
counterpart). From a sentence r
...a..? we can not always infer
(3x) (
.
.
,X.
.
.
)
. It is only lf a meets a certuin condition that
such inferences are allowed.
As we saw earlier, existential generalization is allowable
if it is restricted to applying to singular terms such that if any
two of them a and B, are such that W is true, then (restricting
consideration for the moment to the case of a single '') ‘‘Fa 1
has the same truth-value as W . A fortiori
, if ra=3
'
1
is true,
then raa= 3"1 is true (since raa=cT is true).
We can also see that if rna=3
~
7 is true then roFa 1 has the
same truth-value as ra?3
"
1
in the following way. If r na=3"T
,
then
a and 0 must refer to the same object, no matter what (in every
possible situation). If we read * as saying that the thing that
a denotes satisfies r ap'x
~
7
no matter what, then we can conclude that
if r ma= 81 is true, then W has the same truth-value as ^ ,
no Mater what. So if Fa is true no matter what (i.e., if ''Fa'’
is true), then so is FB (hence, W is true also).
Hintikka's condition on EG can he justified by a version of
ams argument. What is required before EG can be allowed is that
there be some object that the generalized term must refer to no
matter what. The term must pick put the same individual in every
possible situation. Thus, if W is true, and there is some par-
ticular object u that a picks out in every possible situation,
then rD?a1 tells is that particular object ,u, must satisfy Fx no
matter what. The requirement that there be some particular object
for a to refer to is just the requirement that r(3x)ox=a"1 be true,
according to Hintikka, Thus we can formulate a restricted version
of EG.
Ix is true and r (3x)ax=a"1 is true, then r (3x)...x..
is true.
There are several possible sources of trouble here, 12 but
all we must argue, for our purposes, is that Hintikka's method
is best looked upon as an explicit implementation of essentialism.
we must explain what it is for a sentence like
r
(3x)nx=a"1
to be true. It is true if a bears a special relation to some object
?r ^-ma this seems to be the claim that some ways of designa-
ting such an object "better reveal its essence" than others. The
object satisfies rax=a1
,
i.e., it is essentially (necessarily)
none other than a.
Ho
To see that Hintikka's proposal amounts to an implementation
of essentialism we need to consider what sorts of terms are allowed
and what sorts are ruled out by his condition.
Hintikka's condition is meant to rule out existential gen-
eralization on sentences like ’Necessarily the tallest spy is a
Spy °r ' i<eces sarily the number of planets numbers the planets’.
We could say that these were true, but still hold that the person
who is the tallest spy might never have entered the field of es-
pionage (becoming, perhaps, a basketball player), and that the
number ( 9 ) which does number the planets might not have done so
(if, for example. Mars or some other planet had never formed). Thus,
even if we were to grant the truth of these sentences, we should
not therebj conclude that there is something that is necessarily
a spy or something that necessarily numbers the planets.
Hintikka s version of EG seems to rule out just this kind of
inference. Let a be the singular term 'the tallest spy’ and let
3 be the singular term ’the number of planets'. We could allow
that r aSa
"
1
and foP3 ' are true without being forced to allow that
(3x)ciSx and (3x)aPx are true, if we adopt Hintikka's rules.
r (3x)ox=a and r (3x)nx=31 are not true, because someone else might
have been the tallest spy and some other number might have numbered
the planets, so the illegitimate inference is not allowed by the
EG rule we formulated based on Hintikka's restriction.
On the other hand, from 1 a9>7 it seems that we can infer
r (3x)ax>T~I
,
since r (3x)ax=9' is, apparently, true (since ' 9 '
hi
designates the saume thing in every possible situation).
In thus distinguishing among the ways of denoting an object,
singling out some but not others of the properties it alone has
as crucial to it, we implement essentialism. We accept that the
object which has the property of numbering the planets and the
property of being 9 has the latter property, but not the former,
necessarily or essentially. (In addition, the latter property
is essential to it alone.) We accept this when we say that
r (3x)mx=9' is true but r Ox) Dx=f is false. If anything, the es-
sentialism stands out more here than in the other cases we have
discussed. r (3x)Px=y will be true whenever Y is associated with an
essential property of some object, i.e., whenever some object is
essentially identical to y. The general problem of an account of
the satisfaction of formulas like 'W is merely pushed back to
the slightly more specific problem of accounting for the satisfac-
tion of mx=y
. But the latter problem suggests an essentialist
solution at least as much as the former. 13 Perhaps a non-essential-
ist account could be given, but Hintikka gives none. 1^ His examples
clearly suggest an association of singular terms with properties,
and an association of singular terms y such that r (3x)ox=y*7 with
essential properties.
We will take another look at singular terms and the way they
are connected with essentialism in a later chapter. 1 ^ For now all
we need to notice is that removing the paradoxes from QML hy altering
its inference rules does not automatically remove the problem of
essentialism. The
it seem likely that
"1
essentialism. 10
range of singular terms Hintikka allows makes
'he (.ruth conditions for r (r3x)nx=a~l involve
iii
At this point it should he noted that although Quine takes
the apparent essentialism of QML to he a commitment which condemns
it, he does not argue against essentialism. It is taken for granted
that essentialism is a doctrine to be eschewed. That essentialism
is unacceptable is a given premise of Quine's argument against QML.
We have already suggested why Quine might have argued in
ITthis way. The prevailing philosophical trend when Quine first
argued that essentialism was involved in QML was distinctly anti-
metaphysical. Modal logicians like Carnap would certainly have thought
that commitment to a doctrine with the metaphysical "obscurities"
of essentialism was sufficient to undermine QML.
Nevertheless some people have construed Quine's discussions
of QML as arguments against essentialism.
-i O
Thus we find Richard Cartwright accusing Quine of "a how-
ler. Cartwright asks how, if we adopt the doctrine that necessity
is a property of bearers of truth-value, it can "have any conse-
quences at all with respect to essentialism? To suppose it somehow
implies the meaningless of essentialism is to confound at the outset
IQ
modalities de re with modalities de dicto."
But this demonstrates confusion about what it is that Quine
is arguing. Quine argues that an understanding of de dieto modali-
ties does not provide us with any understanding of de re modalities
.
To understand de re modalities we must understand essentialism.
Quine and Cartwright are in agreement that linguistic necessities
are not adequate to provide an understanding of the de re modali-
ties which ngure in the foundation of essentialism.
0. course
,
Quine and Cartwright disagree about whether essen-
tialism is meaningless. But Quine does not infer that essentialism
meaningless irom che fact that an understanding of de dicto
modalities is Inadequate to provide an understanding of de re modali-
ties. Quine assumes from the outset that essentialism is meaningless.
In an often quoted passage about mathematical cyclists 20
Quine attempts to "evoke the appropriate sense of bewilderment"
about essentialism by asking us whether such a creature is essen-
tially rational or essentially two-legged. Predictably, Cartwright
searches for but fails to find an argument against essentialism
in this passage. But it is clear that none was intended. An es-
sentialxst may have difficulty deciding the issue, hut he will not
find the question bewildering. It is only if one assumes that all
necessity is explicable in terms of linguistic relations that one
will he bewildered. (As is often the case, we find that a close
analysis of Quine's arguments show them to be arguments against
a position held by Carnap.)
One might take Quine to task for not arguing for the important
premise that essentialism is unacceptable. 21
however that he does so argue.
One should not suppose
,
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SECTION II
ESSENTIALISM IN
QUANTIFIED MODAL LOGIC
CHAPTER 3
KRIPKE'S SEMANTICS AND
PARSONS'S RESPONSE TO QUINE
In Part I ve saw how Quine's argument attempts to show that
essentialism is required in interpreting QML; and we hare concurred,
at least in so far as to agree that essentialism is a natural,
if not unique, basis for the interpretation of open modal formulas.
In Part II we will explore the most well-known of the interpretations
for QML, Saul Kripke’s. 1 Kripke does precisely what we have suggested
the modal logician should do in interpreting QML. He explicitly
divorces necessity ('') from analyticity, and he eliminates sin-
gular terms from his modal systems. 2 We will attempt to see if,
in allowing quantifying in and breaking the tie of necessity to
analyticity, one must accept essentialism in order to give a semantics
for QMl. Our question is whether the kind of semantics Kripke
gives is best seen as a way of implementing essentialism, or whether
such a semantics can be used in showing that the interpretation
of a QML theory need not involve essentialism.
i
Kripke allows free intermingling of quantifiers and modal
operators and a uniform semantics is given which handles formulas with
and formulas without quantifying in. He uses the Leibnizian notion of
hQ
h9
a set of possible worlds (K)
, which serve « w .’ as a tasis for giving
truth-conditions for formulae ™ ^i s with modal operators. An object u
Of the domain satisfies raTx at world „ if and only lf u satls_
f-ies Fx m ever, world possible with respect to H. 3 If we say that
every world is possible with respect to every other and we consider
a closed formula. A, Kripke's truth conditions reduce to the familiar
Leibnizian definition of necessary truth: A is necessarily true if
and only if A is true in every possible world, and A is possible if
and only if it is true in some possible world. But it is the case
Of the formulaW with one free variable that interests us most,
because, as we saw in chapter 1, it is the account of the satis-
faction of such formulas that seems to require essentialism.
And Knpke's account does suggest essentialism in the way
that we would expect. To say that an object satisfies rnFx'' is
to say that it is F in every possible world (i.e., in every possible
situation), which amounts to the claim that it couldn't fail to be
F, i.e., that it is essentially F. (We will return to the defini-
tion of essentialism in the next section, and we will discuss it
very fully in chapter 4
.
)
There are just a few things about Kripke's semantics that
we should note before we go on to consider Terence Parsons's evalua-
tion of the essentialist commitments of QML so interpreted. First,
we should emphasize that Kripke's semantics makes no attempt to
explain uses of in terms of analyticity. It is the evaluation
of formulas at the various possible worlds that determines the
applicability of Of course, one might argue (contra Kripke)
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that it is only analytic formula, that are true in every possible
WOrld; then OOUl4 be tied to analyticity after all.
3ut to argue in this way would be to overlook precisely
the point that we emphasised in chapter 1. Even if one accounts
for uses of 'o' before closed formulas in terms of analyticity,
^ still will nave to give an account of its uses before open formulas,
mis Kripke-s semantics does. And Kripke's semantics handles cer-
tain formulas in such a way that there is no evident explanation of
the uses of 'o' in terms of analyticity.
For example, if 'O' is a monadic predicate, then
(1) (x) (y) ( x=ym( oGxsoGy )
)
IS universally valid on Kripke's semantics. There is no evident
way to explicate the uses of 'o' in (!) in terms of analyticlty
or any similar notion. Yet the validity of (1) i s to be expected
because, as we saw in chapter 1,
(2) (x) (y) ( x=yr)( Fxsiy )
)
should be a valid schema, for any one place open formula Fx> The
notion of a possible world used in giving QML its intended inter-
pretation is explicitly metaphysical, and no explanation in terms
of analyticity is to be expected.^
We should also contrast Kripke’s sort of semantics with some
otner mtensional systems, in order to emphasize some features of
Kripke's interpretation for QML. For example, Kripke's semantics
makes no restrictions on the members of the domain Cl\) . In parti-
cular, tne domain need not have any intensional objects. In that
51
respect it con
which requires
rests with Alonzo Church's intensional
senses as arguments in modal contexts.
logic 6
way.
Kripke
'
s
Different
5; ':L also treats variables in a standard
appearances of the safe variable bound by a single
quantifier
of objects
“ a f0rMla are evaluated »ith respect to the sane range
There is no intension-extension
"ambiguity" as in
Rudolf Carnap's systems in Meaning and Necessity 7
The quantifiers of Kripke 's QML also range over the same
domain of objects whether or not they reach into modal contexts.
Thus Kripke's system differs from Hintikka's, which has the so-
called "restricted range" feature
.
8
Finally, we should emphasize that quantification in Kripke's
systems is objectual, not substitutional. Open formulas are evaluated
by determining what satisfies them-not by determining the truth-
values their substitution instances have.^
In all of these respects, Kripke's system reflects the "stan-
dard” semantics for quantifiers, simply extended to modal contexts.
It is really only to such standard semantics for quantifiers that
Quine's argument is intended to apply
.
10
So our choice to evaluate
QML's commitment to essentialism with respect to Kripke's semantics
is not a choice made arbitrarily, nor is it a choice based merely
on the i act that Kripke's semantics is the most well-known and
widely accepted.
We should also mention that in discussing Kripke's semantics
we are not simply discussing the set-theoretic "pure" semantics
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as given in "Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic" We are
concernea with the intended interpretation of QML in terms of possible
worlds and possible individuals. What Kripke does formally is to
say that we can interpret QML in terms of certain objects and sets
related in certain wavs. These could be bean bags and sets of mar-
bles. But it is only the interpretation in terms of possible worlds
that gives the modal operators their intended meaning, and it is
that interpretation with which we are concerned when we evaluate
the alleged commitment to essentialism of QML's theories. Kripke
hints at the nature of this interpretation when he says that, e.g.y
"Intuitively we look at matters thus: K is the set of all 'possible
worlds'; G is the 'real world' " v , ,' *
• Kripke s own views on
the nature of necessity are made more explicit in "Identity and
11
Thus our discussion of
Necessity and "Naming and Necessity."'1'2
the metaphysical issues surrounding modal logic relies also on those
1 otwo papers.
Terence Parsons has evaluated the claim that QML involves
essentialism with specific attention to the sort of semantics that
Kripke gives. Hit, conclusion is negative. Anti-essentialist models
,
. it
can he given for QML.
To understand Parsons's answer to the question of whether
QML is committed to essentialism we need an appropriate definition
of essentialism. As Parsons points out, the schema that Quine
offers as a characterization of essentialism is not adequate to
characterize any troublesome sort of doctrine.
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( 1 ) ( 3x ) ( aFx . Gx , ~aFx
)
(1), Qu±ne
- ^cnema, is supposed to capture the fact that the essen-
tialist favors some properties of an object over others. !„ this
case F is the favored, necessary property.
But, as Parsons argues, consistent with (1), ve might "favor"
only properties like being bald or not bald (to use Parsons's ex-
ample). If only such "tautological" properties are necessary of
objects, perfectly precise, uncontroversial truth conditions can
be given for 'o' which render some instances Qf (l) ^ ^
simply stipulate that IbxW is true in a non-empty domain if
r<X)A" 13 a t
_i
he0rem °f In particular, of A lacks modal opera-
tors, r (3x)oA‘ is true in a non-empty domain if r(x)A
_
' is a theorem
of quantif1 cat ior.al logic. No dubious metaphysical view is presupposed
“ thS faCt th3t Some lnstances of (l) are true, because the truth
conditions for those instances of (l) can be given without resorting
to any controversial explicata. Quine should not object simply
because some instances of (l) are true, since Quine's objection
QilL is that it requires the truth of a mysterious metaphysical
vieu. There is nothing mysterious about the truth of those instances
of (l) in which V is replaced by some formula A which is such
that (x)A is a theorem of quantificational logic. 15
A more important essentialist commitment occurs if the truth
of (3x)nA can not be explained in terms of the provability of
r / \ n
X A • Parsons gives a characterization which is more satisfactory.
He says that a model is essentialist if it makes any closed formulas
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of the following form true
1
6
(2) ( 3x)o?x. (3x)~aJ%;
.
A
-del is essentials if some formulas are necessarily true of
S°“ °bJeCtS tUt ^ °f 0therS
' We no* explain away this sort
Of essentials in the way we explained away Quine's example, since
the second clause of (2) guarantees that W is not a logical
or analytic truth.
points out, criterion (2) also needs improvement.
We shall discuss Parsons's improvement on (2), and some further
refinements of the definition of essentials in chapter U For
now, (2) will be an adequate basis for discussing Parsons's results.
A slightly stronger form of essentials is captured by the
schema
(3) ( 3x)aFx. (3x) (Fx.~dFx)
.
^
If instances of (3) are true, then it is not merely the case that
objects differ m their essential properties, there is also no sharp
distinction of properties into essential and non-essential proper-
ties. Some properties are essential to some thing but not to others.
Typical models are essentialist according to Parsons's defi-
nition. Some examples of instances of (2) that essentialists have
traditionally upheld are the claims that Aristotle is necessarily
(essentially) a man and that Lassie is not necessarily a man, and
tha. nine is nec
- : oily greater than seven although this apple is
not. Most recent work in modal logic has, at the very least, assumed
this much essentialism.
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It even seems that the stronger form of essentialism will
be incorporated into most models (i.e. for at
^
’
I least one open sentence
?x, '( 3x ) oFx
.
( 3x ) ( Fx . ~a?x ? w,-n 4} Vl11 ‘r® m s* voxld). For suppose
that seven is necessarily odd. Then there is something (seven)
that is necessarily odd or red, and there is something (this apple)
that is odd or red, but it is not necessarily odd or red.
To implement anti-essentialism in QML we must adopt the denial
(2). (To deny (2) is also to deny (3), s lnCe (3) entails (2).)
Thus the anti-essentialist must hold that if anything is necessarily
F, then everything is necessarily F. All instances of the following
schema must he true in every world:
(*0 (3x) aFxm>( x ) oFx .
Th^re are basically two sorts of properties that have tradi-
tionally been treated in ways incompatible with anti-essentialism.
Categorial properties-those corresponding to the broadest sorts
of "natural” classifications of things-are generally said to belong
necessarily to the things to which they belong; but such properties
(e.g., natural kind properties) would not classify things at all
if they belonged to everything. Thus it has traditionally been
claimed that Aristotle is necessarily a man, although not everything
is. Certain derivative necessary properties, that of being rational,
for example, are treated similarly.
,
certain properties which are contingently true or false
of the objects of certain broad categories are often held to be
necessarily lacking in objects of other categories. Although this
apple is not necessarily non-red,
necessarily non-red. QML provides
such claims.
the number seven is held to be
a formal system for representing
At the core of Parsons's contention that QMT G +.rn is not committed
to essentially is a proof that we can construct Kripke type models
VhiCh ^ eSSentialis t sentences (instances of ( 2) ) necessarily
fSlSe
- ttiS “OUntS t0 ShOWl
"S that ve can implement anti-essen-
tialism in QML, making (k) true in every possible world. The prin-
eiple examples Parsons gives are called 'maximal models'. He con-
cludes from the existence of such models that QML is not committed
to essentialism, at least in one important way in which it might
be thought to be so committed,
the formulation of essentialism,
least to its coherence.
)
(As Parsons points out, QML allows
so it seems to be committed at
Maximal models implement only the broadest, most strictly
logical sort of necessity. In a maximal model, for each object
and each primitive predicate, there is some possible world in which
that object belongs to the extension of that predicate. If being
a number and being a billiard ball are both among the primitive
properties, then everything in the domain is possibly a number and
possibly a billiard ball, since no strictly formal considerations
rule out such possibilities. A maximal model makes both of the
sentences 'Kripke could have been a billiard ball’ and 'Kripke
coiua nave been the number nine' true.
19
But maximal models axe not the only anti-essentialist models
that Parsons discusses. Maximal models provide a convenient basis
proof that there are models which make no formulas of the form
Of (a) true, but there are other models in which ( 2 ) is necessarily
false
.
By restricting a maximal model to just those worlds in which
a particular set of closed, non-modal formulas are true, we pro-
duce another anti-essentialist model which melees at least a partial
accomodation to some common intuitions about what is necessary.
In such a model it can be true that nine is necessarily greater
than seven without its being true that everything is necessarily
greater than seven, because we can restrict our models to those
worlds in which
(5) (3x)(3y)(x is nine.y is seven. x>7)
is true. Such a restriction validates
(6) a (3x)(3y)(x is nine.y is seven. x>y)
Without making any essentialist sentences true in any world. On
the other hand, such a restriction does not validate
(T) (3x)(3yj(x is nine.y is seven. nx>y)
or
(8) ( 3x ) ( 3y ) o (
x
is nine.y is seven.x>y).
Both (7) and (8) entail essentialist sentences.
We can add analogues of arithmetical truths in this way.
We can also analytic truths, restricting the set of worlds to those
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in which an analytic sentences are assigned truth. In this way
«e can capture the view that, for example, | is necessary^
-d things are colored. Any waning relations expressible by formas
in which no nodal operators occur governing open sentences can be
made necessarily true in this way.
Similar maneuvers allow us to make concessions to the alleged
necessary connections of certain properties with the broad categorial
properties as mentioned above. We can construct anti-essentialist
models in which 'All men are necessarily rational' and 'All numbers
are necessarily non-red' are true. That is, we can add
°(x)(x is a man 3 x is rational)
and
o(x)(x is a number x is non-red)
to our stock of necessary truths without destroying the anti-
essentialist character of our models.
Since we are considering languages without constants, ve
can also add an analogue of 'Aristotle is necessarily human', viz.
n (x) (x is Aristotle m> x is human ).^^
But there are some noticeable peculiarities of anti-essen-
tialist models. If the anti-essentialist schema is true in every
world, then
( 9 ) ( 3x ) aA= ( x ) nA
is true in every possible world with a non-empty domain (if A
has at most one free variable). There is no important distinction
between uni/_rjhl and existential quantifiers when they reach across
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m°dal 0Perat0rS
' ^ S "Ch one-place open formulas are dl _
Vlu3d lat° t '"'0 Classes
> the necessary ones (necessarily true of
everything) and the non-necessary ones (not necessarily true of
anything). In so dividing up the formulas «n+-n .a
, anti-essentialist models
eeem to be caking only the distinctions allowed in Quine's first
two grades of nodal involvement, avoiding the complications intro-
ed by the third grade of modal involvement. In chapter 5 we
will generalize this point, showing that there is a sense in which
anti-essentialism is won for QML only by a retreat from the third
grade of modal involvement.
This point stands out in a particularly striking way when
we consider only maximal models. For such models each non-modal
formula that is necessarily satisfied by a sequence of objects is
such that its
.universal closure is provable in quantification theory.
Quantification theory seems to make the important distinctions
that are to be made for such models.
These considerations suggest that the full resources of QMI,
are dispensable if only anti-essentialist interpretations of QML
languages are considered. To make this more precise and to demon-
strate it in its full generality, i.e., for all formulas, including
those with modal operators occuring within the scope of other modal
operators, and for all anti-essentialist models, not merely maxi-
mal models and those based on them, we must first examine the deft-
nition of essentialism. more carefully.
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CHAPTER 1;
THE DEFINITION OP ESSENTIALISM
In discussing Parsons's definition of anti-essentialism in
chapter 3, we considered only one-place open formulas. If only
one-place open formulas mattered, the schema we haye for anti-
essentialism
(l) (3x) Fx=>(x)nFx
would not run into any serious difficulties (at least in languages
free of constants). However, following Parsons, we should gene-
ralize our definition to consider formulas with more than one free
variable (formulas expressing relations among objects).
There are several reasons for generalizing the definition
so that it applies to formulas with multiple quantifiers. The defi-
nition of an anti-es sentialist model should rule out the possibility
of there being certain objects that are essentially related to each
other in ways in which others are not, as well as the possibility
that individuals might have different essential properties
. Also,
the formal discussion of essentialist models requires a fully general
account of the satisfaction of modal formulas, and a fully general
definition of essentialism expedites the proofs involved there.
6 3
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- in&lly
9 9, fully cgnoy'rjl rjpf l ^* o — al definition is readily extendable to lan-
guages with constants
.
(That extension win he done in chapter 6.)
We can not extend the definition of anti-esse„tialism simply
°y adding multiple quantifiers and free variables:
(2) (3x)...(3x
n
)cFx
1 ...x^(x1 )...(xn ) DFx1 ...xn
Few models would be anti-essentialist on such a definition, as
the following schemata show:
(3) (3x)(3y)ax=y
. Ox) (3y )~cx=y
.
(M (3x){3y)o(Fxv~Fy)
. Ox) ( 3y )~a ( Fxv~Fy )
.
Both (3) and (U) are true in all worlds with domains of more than
one element, yet they contradict (2). Obvious! v +y.« +•' ' oD x ly, the anti-essentialist
should not be committed to the thesis that it idbJ- b rn is necessary that
at most one thing exists.
Parsons 1 amends the definition (2) so that (3) and (4) can
not be treated as counter-examples to anti-essentialism. One thing
that makes ( 3 ) and (4) troublesome is the fact that (2) does not
allow an object to be essentially related to itself in ways in which
no two distinct objects can be essentially related. But as ( 3 ) and (4)
show, identity and complex logical formulas (and perhaps even some
simple relational predicates such as 'is the same height as') provide
examples of formulas necessarily satisfied by ordered paris whose mem-
bers are identical, but not necessarily satisfied by other ordered pairs
There are also formulas satisfied necessarily by distinct
objects but not satisfied necessarily by identical objects. Thus
the following also contradict (2):
65
(5) (3x) (3y)dx^y • ( 3x ) ( 3y )~aXjfy
and perhaps
(6) (3x)(3y)aRxy • ( 3x ) ( 3y )~aRxy
where 'Rxy' says of two objects that they are never in the same
place at the same time.
In general
,
we can recognize that whether two objects are
identical or not may hare a bearing on whether they necessarily
satisfy a certain open formula. But that admission should not,
by itself, force us to repudiate anti-essentialism. We need a
better schema for anti-essentialism than (2) provides.
What we need to do is to mahe sure that if one pair of
objects satisfies rmA1 and another does not, then before we will
say that that is evidence of essentialism we will require that both
pairs satisfy the same identity conditions. Thus we would have
the following two anti-essentialist schemas in place of (2) (con-
sidering formulas ’Fxy' free in just two variables for the moment):
(7 ) ( 3x) ( 3y ) (x=y . oFxy )m( x ) (y ) (x=y )=»Fxy
)
and
(8) (3x) (3y) (x^y.nFxy)n>(x) (y) (x^y)=)aFxy)
.
((7) s^id (8) are, respectively, the denials of the essentialist
schemas
(9) (3x) (3y) (x=y. nFxy) • (3x) (3y) (x^y.^-aFxy)
and
(10) (3x) (3y) (x^y.aFxy) • (3x) (3y) (x£y.~aFxy )
.
)
To sum up all such anti-essentialist schemas, for any
arbltrary“ °f free
to use a bit of notation
that Parsons has introduced. 2 For My formula A> let n / ^ a
conjunction of formulas ^ or > ^ each^ x
occuring free in A such that j>k, but not including both
“dW f°r ^ k - 3 Parsons's characterization of jti-
essentialism can then be stated in the following way:
(12) (3x
1
)...( aXn )(n. x
F
.oF )c(Xi )... (Xn)(niX
P
=t]F)
must be true in every possible world, for every formula F with
free variables among x . -*• ^l’***’ n* ^ 2 ' ls the denial of essentialism,
the claim that
(13) (^
1 )---(3xn )(ni x
F
.oF).(3Xi )...( 3Xn)(r7iX
F„_
aF)
Is true in some world, for some formula F with free variables among
X!’* * * ,x
n
* ^
But there is an inadequacy in accepting the truth of (12)
m every world as the condition an anti-essentialist model must
meet. Parsons's definition maPes no requirement on possible but
non-actual objects. It allows such objects to have distinct es-
sences. But the metaphysical principle of anti-essentialism should
apply to all possible objects, not merely to actual ones. The
quantifiers of (12) force us to evaluate the open matrices (i.e.,
(rhx .!') and (fhx mnF) ) at each world with respect to the
objects that exist in that world . k Since possible objects which
are non-existent do not come within range of the quantifiers, they
6are not relevant in evaluating the truth of (is). Because of this
we can construct models which mabe (is) necessarily true-models
which fulfill Parsons'S anti-essentialist condition-which are
not as thoroughly anti-essentialist as we should require. There
can still he objects which are possible with respect to a world
which differ in essence from other objects which are possible with
respect to that world.
For example
,
we can construct a simple model for a language
with the one-place predicate ’F' as its only predicate which gives
different essences to the objects which are possible with respect
to each of its worlds. Let K =\ G, Hj7
,
R=K
2
,^= j u , v }
.
ij/( G)={ u *j
^(H) =iv|
,
and u^v. Suppose cp('F', G) = cp('F», H)
= jv] . Each
vorld has exactly one object existent in it, so for any formula with
no free variables except 'x,'
r
(3x)nA3( x )aA
1
is true in both worlds.
So the model is anti-essentialist according to Parsons's original
condition. But in either world, v satisfies ’Fx* but u satisfies
' o~Fx
'
(and, of course, '~oFx'). Thus these two possible objects
have different essential properties. Being F is essential to v
but not to u, and not being F is essential to u but not to v.
de can give a slightly stronger characterization of anti-
essentialism which avoids this difficulty by forcing consideration
of possible objects as well as actual ones at each possible world.
In iacb there are two plausible ways of extending Parsons's defini-
tion to all possible objects.
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Returning for a moment to the simple case of one-place open
lormulas (|n| which n. xA formulas become irrelevant), we can give
a simple formulation of the sort of definition we are looking for.
we want to say that if a model is anti-essentialist
,
then if some-
thing satisfies Vx-> then everything does. Anti-essentialism claims
that all essential properties are essential to every possible
object. But we can take that to mean either of two different things.
It might mean that in each world, if one thing is essentially F
then everything is, or it might mean that if one thing is essentially
F in some world, then everything in every world is essentially F.
Slightly more rigorously, the first of the statements of
an oi-essentialism vs are considering is the following:
(Al) For any world H, ifW is true in H when some
possible object is assigned to x, then 'Fx'1 is true
in H when any possible object is assigned to x.
We can characterize (Al) as making anti-essentialism true at each
world. The Ooher condition which suggests itself is
(A2) If there is some world H and some assignment of a
possible object to x such that dFx is true in H
on that assignment, then for every world H' and every
assignment of a possible object to x, roFj? is true
in H 1 on that assignment.
We can characterize (A2) as taking a more global look at the model
structure
,
making anti-essentialism apply to the model taken as
a whole, not merely to each individual world separately.
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But for at least one sort of model (Al) and (A2) are equi-
valent
-
^
If a model q> on a modal structure <G, t, B ,?> is such
,
.her. o sa isfies (Al) if and only if it satisfies (A2).
So if we were to assume that in every suitable model for the
alethic modalities, every world is possible with respect to every
other, then it would not matter which of (Al) or (A2) we employed
as our definition of essentialism.
In order to show the equivalence of (Al) and (A2) with re-
spect to models on model structures such that R=K^
,
it is convenient
to work with a fully general definition of anti-essentialism, one
which considers formulas with more than one free variable. Doing
so lnvolvss the use of n.xA formulas, as Parsons has done. In
addition, it is helpful to introduce notation which makes the role
of the assignments to free variables clearer, since our generaliza-
tions of (Al) and (A2) will explicitly refer to such assignments.
Instead of employing the notation that Kripke uses
cp(Ax^.
. .x ,H)=T with respect to an assignment of a ...a to
1 n
Xl’“ Xn'“" WS Vl11 say
,
<P(A,H,I_
l
)=T'
,
where each I
±
is a function
which assigns some ux'Uto each variable of the language 5 (and thus
to each free variable of A). If A is a closed formula, the assign-
ment 1^ to free variables does not matter, so we may write ’cp(A,H)=T*
.
It is now a relatively easy matter to extend Parsons's defi-
nition of anti-essentialism to all possible objects (in accord
with (Al) and (A2).) We get the following two definitions:
(Bl)
on a model structure
( B2
)
45 is an anti-essentialist model
<G
’
K, R
, if and only if for any formula A and
any HEK, if cp(
r
n x
A
DA*
1
w tWt ^v
i ’ I ^~T some assignment
I, then (
r
n.x
A3oA
n
,
H, l)=T for any assignment I.
^ is an anti-essentialist model on a model structure
<G, K, R,'j/ > if and only if for any formula A, if
tp( n.x .OA
,
H, I )=T for some HeK and some assign-
ment I, then cp( rn
i
x
A
=)qA
1
,
H, l)=T for any HEK and
any assignment I.
Both characterizations (Bl) and (B2) of anti-essentialism
require all sequences of possible objects that satisfy the same
identity conditions (i.e., that satisfy the same T7.xA formulas)
to also satisfy the same modalized formulas. They differ in that
(Bl) requires, in each possible world, that they satisfy the same
modal formulas, whereas (B2) makes a global requirement that what-
ever modal formula is satisfied in one world is satisfied in all
worldb. Both are preierable to the characterization based on (12)
because they take into account all possible objects, making the
metaphysical principle fully general. Indeed, all of the examples
of anti-essentialist models that Parsons suggests conform to (Bl)
and (B2), not merely to (12). Any maximal model cp (or any sub-model
constructed from it by considering only those possible worlds of
the maximal model in which all members of a certain consistent set
of closed, non-modal formulas are true) is anti-essentialist
/T
according to all three definitions.
The argument to show
( 14 ) If tp IS a model on a model structure ^G, K, R,f)
such that R=K
2
,
then cp satisfies (Bl) if and only if
it satisfies (B2).
can now he given fairly easily. It is obvious that if „ is anti-
essentialist according to (B2) then cp is anti-essentialist accord-
ing to (Bl). So suppose that <p is anti-essentialist according to
(Bl). I.e.,
Suppose that for any H'
,
if some I is such that
4>(
r
n
i
x
A
.QA’
, HM)=T s then for any I
tp(
r
n
i
x
A
3QA
,
H', I)=T.
Suppose also that there is an H and an I such that
,
H, I )=T.
It follows that for any I, cp( rJ7. x^maA1
,
H, l)=T.
So for any I, if <p(n.xA
,
H, I)=T, then <p( ruK‘
,
H, I)=T.
Also, for any I, if cp( ‘"oA^
,
H, I)=T, then for any
H', ip(A, H', I )=T (since R=K2 ).
But then for each I', tp(W
,
H'
,
l)=T (since R=K2 ).
In addition, for any H tp(n.x l)-T if and only if
for any H'
, wiTT^, H'
,
l)=T.
So for any I and any H', if cp(n.xA H’ l)=T
i * 5 * ^
then cp( rdA I
,
H'
,
I)=T.
Hence, for any H' and I', tp( ' tLx^A1
,
H'
,
l)=T.
this result is of some significance for us
,
because the
results of chapters 5 and 6 rely upon our taking (B2) as the appro
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on
priate definition of essentials. If the appropriate structures
for the notion of necessity connected with alethic modalities are
structures <G, K, R,Y> such that M?, then it is a matter of
indifference which of (Bi ) and I'ncO ~(B2) 13 employed. No argument needs
tw given uhat (B2) rather than (m 'I -? <-• +-u‘ m n Blj is the appropriate definiti
of anti-essentialism.
But as the situation now stands, the results of chapters
5 and 6 hare their intended significance only if we assume either
that structures such that R=K2 are the only appropriate structures
for the sorts of necessity we are discussing or that (B2) is a
better definition of anti-essentialism than (Bl). Fortunately,
almost all discussions of the appropriate notions of necessity
argue for or assume that ReK2
,
so our results hare their intended
significance for most QML theories.^
Traditionally it has been presumed that the appropriate model
for metaphysical (or as Plantinga calls it "broadly logical")
necessity is a model on a structure such that R=K2
. The Leibnizian
definition of necessity is captured only in such models—models
m which necessity (at any world) amounts to truth in every possible
world and possibility is just truth in some possible world. ^ In
addition, contemporary discussions of the sort of necessity relevant
to essenciaiism focus on model structures such that R=K2 .^
u.ne remarks of Hughes and Cresswell are typical. 10
• . the semantical models reflect in an obvious way a
familiar philosophical idea which is often credited to
Leibniz, that a necessary proposition is one which is
11
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What Hughes aud Cresswell say is slightly misleading. Ihey
argue for a model structure in vhioh n-v2e w c R-K
,
as the appropriate structure
1 °r tte Lelbnlzlan notion of necessity, and they conclude that S5 model
structures are appropriate. But not all S 5 structures are such that
r=k2-s5 guarantee3 Qnly that R is m equiyalence relat . on oa R> not
R is total on K. But ve ordinarily think of S 5 only in terms of struc-
tures such that R-K2
,
so it is not surprising to find them stating their
conclusion as the claim that S5 expresses the Lelbnizlan idea directly.
Hintikka has also argued for the conclusion that each
logically possible world is possible with respect to every other
(although he also states, as his conclusion, only that S5 is the
appropriate system for logical necessity. )"^2
•
. _
We also see which system of modal logic recommendsitself as the formalization of logical possibility and
w^5
^
Cal necess ity. It seems to me obvious that whateveris logically necessary here and now must also be logically
necessary m all the logically possible states of affairs*
that could have been realized instead of the actual one ...
.Conversely
,
it also seems fairly clear that no new logical
necessities can come about as a result of the realization
of any logical possibility. In short, it seems to me that
whatever is logically necessary in one logically possible
world must also be logically necessary in others
The system. S5 , then, seems to be the best formalization
of our logic of logical necessity and logical possibility.
13Alvin Plantinga has also argued that structures in which
R=K2 provide the approrpiate basis for models intended to capture
the notion of broadly logical necessity with which he and we are
concerned. He argues that since it is evident that whatever is
possible is necessarily possible, "that is, possible with respect
to every possible vorld" it fniinuc +>^ 1-z iollows that every possible vorld is
possible with respect to every other. {Plantings actually makes
tr.e error of assuming that every model structure for S5 is such
that E=K2
, although, as we mentioned, the error is excusable since
ve ordinarily consider only models such that R=K2 when working
vith S5. )
None of these arguments are terribly convincing as arguments
about the structure of metaphysical possibility. They amount to
appeals to authority (Leibniz) or appeals to intuition, neither
of which could persuade those who actually hold an opposing view
(if there are such persons). But there are few arguments that
in considering metaphysical possibility we should examine any struc-
tures other than those such that R=K2
.
We vill choose (B2) as our definition because to do so
makes possible the proofs of the next few chapters. But this should
he kept in mind as an assumption that aids in proving our results.
If R-K
2
,
as many assume or argue, this makes no difference. If
there is reason to suppose that R^K2
,
for some special theory,
then our results do not apply. Whether they could be proved vith
(Bl) rather than (332 ) is left as an open question. 1
*1
It should be noted, hovever, that if ve had an independent
argument for (B2) as the appropriate definition of anti-essentialism,
then ve vould have further evidence that structures such that
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ar„ the appropriate structures for alethic modality. Any model
satisfying (B2) is a model on a structure such that the same modal
lormulas are satisfied in every possible world. Thus if ^p1
(or rpp ) is true in some world H, it is also true in every world,
and so 0$P (or oqP ) is also true in u' xb ° x l This is precisely the
condition that a restriction to models on structures such that
2
R=K imposes
.
iii
Our final definition of an anti-essentialist model (B2)
is merely a generalization of the characterization of essentialism
as the view that all possible objects have the same essential pro-
perties. We have implicitly assumed that an object is essentially
F if and only if it satisfies W . But Plantinga15 has suggested
two other definitions of what it is for a property to be essentially
F, and we shall consider those views.
Our definition is (for the simplest case):
(Dl) An object is essentially F if and only if it satisfies
Fx in every possible world.
^
The other two suggestions are:
(D2) An object is essentially F if and only if it satisfies
Fx in every world in which it exists.
(D3) An object is essentially F if and only if it satisfies
Fx and there is no world in which it satisfies ~Fx.
(D3 ) differs from (Dl) only if we deviate from Kripke's
semantics by saying that objects satisfy formulas only in those
But then (D3)
worlds in which they exist, as Plantings does,
does not allow us to say that sene possible but non-actual object
is essentially F - Yet if Pegasus is such a possible, non-actual
Object, we want to be able to say (even if we do not want to aver)
that he is essentially an animal. So (D3) as it stands does not
suit our purposes.
Nevertheless, we might consider a variant of (D3 ), based
upon the same deviant account of satisfaction, which does not
have the undesirable consequence Just noted.
(Dlt) An object is essentially F if and only if it satisfies
Fx in some world ( in which it exists) smd there is
no world in which it satisfies
~Fx.
me treatment of possible non-actual objects is crucial
to the consideration of (Dl), (D2) and (Dl) and to the question of
whether or not to adopt the deviant account of satisfaction suggested
by Plantings' s variation on Kripke's semantics. (Plantinga does
not say that objects fail to satisfy formulas in worlds in which
they do not exist, but rather that if 'b ' denotes u but u does not
exist in H, then’FV has no truth-value in H. We are considering
only languages without constants, so (D3) is an adaptation of
Plantinga 's idea to such languages.) If we adopt Plantinga's se-
mantics, then only a necessarily existent object can satisfy Fx
in every possible world. So (Dl) is inappropriate for such a se-
mantics since we want it to be consistent to say that an object
has a property essentially even when that object is not one that is
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necessarily existent. If we adopt Plantinga's approach, then (D2)
and (Dh) will he equivalent characterizations of essential properties
we are faced with a choice. We must adopt either the sort
of semantics that Plantings suggests, according to which an object
satisfies an open formula only in those worlds in which it exists,
or the sort of semantics Kripke gives, according to which each
object^satisfies each open formula or its negation in every possible
It would oe nice to stay with the semantics Kripke gives,
since that it is the basis for our discussion so far, and since
Parsons's work on essentialism and quantified modal logic, upon
which much of the work of this dissertation is based, has concerned
Kripke 's semantics. But there is some appeal in the view that ob-
jects have properties only in those worlds in which they exist,
so that Plantinga's definition of essentialism demands at least
some of our attention.
We shall stay with Kripke 's semantics. But we can con-
sider what we could do to make at least a partial accomodation to
the issues Plantinga raises. (Dl), (D2) and (D4) are all equiva-
lent definitions with respect to Kripke 's semantics if we add the
following restriction to Kripke style models:
(E) If an object u satisfies Fx in every world H such
that uE ^ (Pi) , then u satisfies Fx in every world.
Since that equivalence holds, we can employ (Dl) as our definition
of essentialism, with the understanding that those who favor (D2)
or (Tih) should view our results as restricted to those models of
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Whlch (E) is true
- should not be too odious a proviso.
Having adopted Kripke’s convention of assigning even non-existent
objects to the extensions of formulas in each possible world, it
makes sense to assign objects in such a way that if they satisfy
a formula in every world in which they exist, then they satisfy
It in every world. A case for Plantinga's semantical approach
can be made. But once we have decided to stay with Kripke's ap-
proach, it seems reasonable to adopt (E) as a partial accomodation
to Plantinga's ideal.
But it must be noted that there is a difficulty with Plantinga’s
approach and with our accomodation to it. If ve adopt Plantinga's
semantics with (D2) or (D4), or if we adopt Kripke's semantics
with (Dl) and (E), then if we take 'Fx' (as in (e)) to stand for
any one-place open formula, then everything will be essentially
such that (3y)(x=y)
. But that amounts to the claim that every-
thing exists essentially, which seems counter-intuitive.
What is needed is a restriction to atomic formulas, (or
to formulas that "express real properties"). But then our account
of essentialism is incomplete. In particular, we do not have an
account which is general enough to allow us to prove the results
of the following chapters
.
In sum, the best course for us is to adhere to (Dl) as our
definition of what it is for something to have a property essentially,
(i.e.
,
u is essentially such that A (where A has one free variable)
if and only if u satisfies raA
'
)
.
Doing so allows us to retain
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)
sirapl
as our definition of
ifies the formal
-work
an li
-
essential ism, and it significantly
of the chapters that follow.
iv
By making use of some of the technical apparatus intro-
duced, we can see more easily and completely the difficulties with
Quine's criterion of essentialism. In chapter 3 we suggested that
there are non-controversial instances of the schema he gives, so
that schema does not adequately characterise an objectionable
essentialist doctrine. The purpose of this section is merely to note
the relationship between maximal models (and the restrictions
upon them discussed in chapter 3) and Quine’s schema, and the basis
for claiming that Quine's schema is fulfilled even by theories for
which models implementing no dubious metaphysical views can be given.
If Quine’s schema (
' Ox) (Fx.Gx.~aGx)
' ) were the appropriate
characterization of essentialism, then, as we saw, all models
would be essentialist models. 'x=x' and W-Fx"1 must be true
of every object in every world, since the ordinary laws of quantifi-
cation theory are true in every possible world. Even maximal models
are essentialist according to his criterion.
But the truth conditions which are established by maximal
models can be given in an entirely non-controversial way. We can
give the conditions under which a formula '"A1 with free variables
among x^...^ is satisfied in terms of the notion of logical
consequence in first order, non-modal quantification logic.
We can do this most easily if we introduce the notion of
8o
a VOrld'the°ry tMnscriP««19 Of a QML formula. We shall use the
quantifiers (Vx) and (Ex) to range over all possible objects and
all possible worlds
. We shall use a different style of variable
f° r the tV° (
“l’ U2’-"’vi> V" ™a H’,..., respectively)_
tUt tMS Sh°Ula be -ie
-tood as abbreviating longer formulas which
employ the predicates
'O’ and 'V ('is a possible object' and 'is
a possible world') and which employ only one style of variable
< x','y',...). Relative to a base world H, the QML formula Fx^.^x
will be transcribed Fu n h -p^ . . ni ,U
l‘''
U
n
5 for atomic r (except that
rXi=X
j
Wil1 transcribed ru.=u? ). '(( 3x)Fx) H
'
(the world-theory
transcription of 'OxjFx' relative to H) will be '(Eu)(u6 f( H).FuH)'.
' ( oFx
)
' will be '(VH')FuH'' 20 etn y0 „; 5 c * We caa imagine that this is
made rigorous in such a way that for each formula A of QML, there
is just one formula AH of first-order quantification theory such
that A is the world-theory transcription of A relative to H.
Some examples may help to make the notion of a world-theory
transcription clearer.
The following:
( x ) ( FxvGx
)
d(3x)Fx
°( x) (} ( 3y ) Rxy
hecome (relative to H)
:
(Vu)(u€ f (H)io(VH' ) ( FuH ' vGuH
' ))
(VH* ) (Eu) (u£ f(H’ ) .FuH’
)
( VH ’ ) (Vu) (uG Y (H' )3(EH' ' ) (Ev) (vG Y (H- t ' ) .RuvH' ' )
)
,
8i
follows we shall
.assume that the details have been specified.
Haring introduced the notion of a world theory translation,
it as quite easy to give the truth-condition for formulas containing
modal operators in such a way that they correspond to those laid
down by maximal models; and this can be done without introducing
essentialism in the explication of modal operators. Let I.u£
136 a C°njUnCti0n °f fo™ulas 'u.€
^
(H)
' or
’u.£f( H )' for all j
SU.Clfl L>h S,"t Wh p V'p -v" •
- n
the numerically latest variable free
ln A * Z
i
U
H
nUSt include exactly one of u.6 f ( H ) or u .ft f (H ) for
each such u.
. If cp(
r
n I u^ "* H t'I-'p +u r r i1 i i H 5 ’ I '“T » "then cp( aA', H, l)=T,
if and only if r (Vu. ) . .
.
(Vu )((n uA I u^zoaV -? 01 n MV i iUh 3A ' ls a theorem of
quantification theory.
This can be extended to the models «,A21 based on maximal
models <p in the following simple way. simply change the words
’of quantification theory' to
-of the quantificational theory
which has the world theory translations of the members of A, with
respect to each world in id, as its special axioms’. (Such a model
is constructed from a maximal model cp by restricting (p to those
worlds in which all members of a certain set A of closed, non-modal
formulas are true
.
)
ihe fact that we can give truth conditions in terms of
what follows from a certain set of closed, non-modal formulas A
(m the case of maximal models A is empty) shows that we can give
trutn-conditions for quantifying in in terms of analyticity (since
all analytic truths constitute an appropriate set A). Such models
should not be objectionable
hls argument linking QML and
to Quine (at least in the context of
essentialism), even though they are
essentialist according to his
class of closed formulas (A)
criterion. In singling out an elite
one undertakes only the second grade
Of modal involvement. But singling out sueh a class is all that
13 needed to give truth-conditions corresponding to those estab-
lished by the sorts of models considered here (models A where
is maximal ).^
we should briefly note, however, that a complete definition
of essentialism should incorporate the distinction suggested by
Quine's schema as well as the distinction incorporated into our
extension of Parsons’s definition. If essentialism is to be ob-
jectionable it must involve two distinctions. The essentialist
distinguishes sutong objects with respect to their essential pro-
perties; at least some objects differ in their essential properties.
But he must also distinguish among the properties of objects, labelii
some 'essential' and others 'accidental'. A view which purports
to make all properties essential treats all properties on a par.
The labeling of a property as 'essential' to an object can accomplisl
no purpose unless that label distinguishes that property's connec-
tions to the object from the link between at least some objects and
their properties.
fhus a complete definition should append to (B2) 'and
<p(B, H, I )=T and 4>( raB~', H, l)=F for at least some B with free
variables and. so"* H nnrf t 1 t , ,a d 1 • In what f°llovs that will be assumed,
^ ^ has been a matt py nf* i ; + +
1
-
- ier o little controversy that there are
at least some properties true of, but not necessarily true of, at
so._ things. Naturally, any consequence of (B2) is also
a consequence of (B2) extended by the above clause, so our ignoring
of that clause will have little effect other than to simplify
subsequent discussion.
NOTES
...
.
Essentialism and Quantified Modal Loe-i r " 77 ndiscussion in section -i ^ Ud ^ g c
,
77- Our
or Parsons's discussion of the d^Si^Ln^f^ti-LL^tLMs""6
VxA accompanies a “ ghtw S-et"!- 0” *ltar*4 "°^ion
formulating identity
formulas (A). Such a relativi zation turns otl ti ll °
ther
ent m the later formal yn^v „ - ,, , ,°ut o he very conveni-
from Parsons's definition.
’
RJ n ° lng lmP°Etant has been altered
repeated in^ppenS^
10
^
“^ m°St °ther fCOTal defl“tions
,
is
enumeration x f . of If 1 ^ haVe been assumlnS an
continue t n 2’
variables of the language. We willo do so. In addition, we will assume +>, a + -p , _A, the formulas n.xA are enumerated TT^, ^
^ ^
4
if and only®i
S
cp(l
^ semantics «p( r(3x)A\ H)=T
an object u such that
tC SMe assiS“-nt to x of
5
This is repeated in Appendix I, and Kripke's formalsemantics is stated there in tems of such assist f“ns .
6
to in 'W ^ 3 °nS has shown ’ in a set of unpublished proofs referredEssentialism and Quantified Modal Logic," 87 that all suchmodels conform to (Bl). Since all such models are uch1hat R-K?they also conform to (B2). His proof that they conSIm to (Bl) ’given as a lemma for the proof that they conform to his definition.
7
.
Jt
_ should be kept in mind that our results do not applyto theories with appropriate models such that R^K
.
8
Of course Leibniz did not have the notion of relative
r f -f- ^ D 4- -r > .possibility (the R_ relation) at all,
9
-
In °hapter 8 there is a further discussion of the issue
of what notion of necessity is being considered in connection with
essentialism.
10
Modal Logie aofdon"
S
1968K
4
76:
J
' ^ntrodu^^
have to eJJL C?te“:S?afe5n^r=lL%Ve iCh I*" °“ “°UMthe worlds of 'one e qui?SILrcLSs ahe^ynoqUiVal!nCe ClaSS ’ Sinceto those of any oth Z ^ no lmP°^ant relation
an S 5 -model such that R=K? Thus ?+ n- e J ,
S °Self Provides
of an S 5-model with the notion of a mode^h tSat^P
^
"The Modes of Modality," Models for Model it.ro, 8 l-82.
The Mature of Necessity
, forthcoming, 197I4.
12
13
14
no • +.
F°r thS CaSS °f ^quantified modal logic analvtiVnecessity corresponds to (or at least -i Q o-p+ ,, g 3 y lc
pond to) the sort of necessity we ane
of
^
en thought to corres-
taken in a suitably broad sense! r
C °nS1
f„
erinS ^ith 'analytic'
I7l_ 7 ^ F T T
” _ ). Carnap, Meaning and Necessity,ft and E. J. Lemmon, Supplementary Volume XYYTTT
Hois Cf - also "21 Se et De Dicto,"
Ite^ev
. AxiX \mO)1 ^92 !mi ESSenCe ’" 22±l?sophical
l6
conventions vlin^v^8 plantinga's suggestions our quotationalwill break down for a short time, in order to leavesome vagueness about issues not relevant to the immediate dis-cussion. Roughly, F is a schematic letter of the meta-languageto be replaced by the English expression represented in the formalanguage by Fx
. We leave it ambiguous whether 'Fx' must bean atomic formula.
7
Plant inga is defining 'is essentially F in world H'ra er than 'is .essentially F'. On our approach these two are
•
^ sa~u~" n RiSjOnly objects existent in H are essentially Fm H. In particular, objects not existent in the actual world
are not said to be essentially F. We find it more convenient todefine what it is for an object to be essentially F in such a waythat it applies to all possible objects.
Actually there are intermediate positions according
to which objects satisfy some formulas, fail to satisfy others
and are indeterminate with respect to other formulas, at leastm those worlds. in which they do not exist. We shall not discuss
all of the possibilities, but merely hope that our discussion
of the alternatives of Plantinga and Kripke could be extended
to these systems.
19
"p
,
IhiS is based on work done bv T)nln‘HCounterpart Hieory and Quantified Modal T" t S ln ’ e 'g*>spphy
,
LXV (1968), 113-26.
1 Loglc
’ Journal of Philn-
2°
the general i£ o? IZ TZr ^nggestdone, rather than giving the details t„ tran=?rlptlon «°<Hd beof specifying how variables over worlds shoulfb^
’
?
he problem
precise specification of vorld-the^^^X^ou..
79-81 snajZZ'JZlTsTcZTtlTZOf
1
?his
m
disse“
t
at":n.
MOdal LOglC *
"
world-theory°t^crk?ionsgof?o^TPrlate . interpretation fOT
possible worlds and possible objects
-l
r' ,U1
,
res
.
the notions of
indeed. But with resnont
a met aphysical apparatus
that apparatus is idle Quantif
i
S
°+
•
S ° f models J ust considered,
the truth-conditions^for sTh *aSis fOT
interpretation in onder to know that * + ?
6ed n0t know the intonded
need only know which Hu^d l $ f ? " ^ We
But that is merely knowled^ S H. °rmulas the n-tuple satisfies.
identical and which are doers of the domain £ K Wl*"
<» OsitisM, ^ y\lSlfTSA0lefe ?ause an n-tuple
V sJclIha^If^hing^atlsSing n* ?^ to^'
»*•
< v.-: •
-vl-str* V i-ir-isdsu,,,
- 4--U _ ,
the possible worlds
.
(This i! I resul/^TiT ^ ^ re "-LaDeJ
subset u* of tt • sult of the fact that for anyU there is a possible world H' such that U*= f (h“
CHAPTER 5
EoSENTIALISM IN QUANTIFIED MODAL LOGIC:
THE ELIMINABILIT7 OF DE_ RE MODALITIES IN
ANTI-ESSENTIALIST THEORIES
chapter ve shall formulate two claims about QML
which might vindicate Quine's contention that QML is committed to
essentialism. We will indicate how a proof of one of these claims
can be constructed, and ve shall argue that this theorem vindi-
cates Quine at least partially. The other (stronger) claim is
not proved, but an alleged disproof1 is found to be faulty.
Quine's claim is that QML is committed to essentialism.
But this, by itself, is quite vague. To see more clearly what
Quine is saying it helps to consider the use to which Quine would
put a formal language
.
Quine is concerned with our theories about the world,
and he develops formal languages primarily as vehicles for stating
theories in a suitably clear way. It is in this use of a formal
language as a canonical language for scientific theories 2 (where
'scientific' is construed broadly to include the metaphysical)
that we should expect to find its commitments. It is not the
language, but rather the theories stated in it, which may be com-
87
88
mitted to essentialism.
Quine has defended the viev that first-order quantification
theory is adequate as a canonical language for science and philo-
sophy. Thus his charge of essentialism in QML can he viewed as
the claim that if the statement of a theory requires the additional
strength of QML (with quantifying in), then that theory must be
an essentialist theory. 3 hon-essentialist theories can he stated
Without any uses of quantifying in-i.e., in first-order quantifi-
cation theory with at most a way of designating closed formulas
as necessary (with at most de dicto modalities^ 14
As Parsons has shown, however, there are anti-essentialist
models for QML theories. It appears then that there is no incon-
sistency between the use of QML and the acceptance of anti-essentialism.
A QML theory can have an anti-essentialist interpretation.
But, as we noted in chapter 3, there is a certain degen-
eracy in the use of quantifying in when anti-essentialism is adopted.
If tp is an anti-essentialist model on (G, K, K2 *0 ^
,
A is a
formula with only one free variable ('x'), and ^(h) is non-empty,
tnen cp
v (3x)nA
,
d)=cp( (x)nA
,
H). The distinction between the
two quantifiers breads down at least for this simple case.
Whao is more important is that if K contains no world H
such that ^(H) is empty, then cp( r(3x)oA'1
,
H)=tp( r(x)oAT
,
H) =
tp(
r
o(3x)A'1
,
H)=cp( ra (x)A'
1
,
H), for any H<EK. b This suggests that
quantifying in is at least nearly eliminable
, since with these
few restrictions we find that each such simple formula with quanti-
fying in is true in all the same worlds as (i.e., is necessarily
equivalent to) a formula lacking quantifying in. For each such
simple formula there is another necessarily equivalent formula
that is expressible with the resources of only the second grade
of modal involvement.
This suggests a way in which Quine might be vindicated
after all. He would be vindicated if the assumption of anti-
essentialism led to the eliminability of quantifying in, i.e.,
if whenever the resources of the third grade of modal involve-
ment are used indispensably that use of QML is essentialist.
That this would vindicate Quine should be clear. He does
not object to QML because of an aesthetic displeasure at seeing
quantifiers precede modal operators on a line of print. He ob-
jects because he sees a problem (essentialism) in the intended
semantics for formulas in which quantifying in occurs. If the
third grade of modal involvement is undertaken only in ways such
that it is eliminable in favor of the second (i.e., such that
the truth-conditions for a formula with quantifying in can be
given in terms of the truth-conditions of an equivalent formula
which lacks quantifying in), then Quine will not object (at least
not because such a use of QML is essentialist.) Quine's charge
applies only to the ineliminable use of the full expressive re-
sources of the third grade of modal involvement.
Of course the fact that anti-essentialist models exist
for QML languages, as Parsons has shown, does indicate that w<
can give a coherent interpretation to quantifying in even if „e
reject essentialism. To the extent that Quine rejects QML be-
ccherence rests upon the acceptability of essentialism,
Parsons has answered Quine. But the answer amounts to a very
«ah reconciliation of QML and anti-essentialism if the only
anti-essentialist uses of QML turn out to be reducible to uses
of modal operators before closed formulas only-i.e., if the
third grade of modal involvement is reducible to the second under
such conditions. To vindicate Quine we must show that de re
modalities are elimmable in anti-essentialist modal systems.
This would reinstate the connection between QML and essentialism
that Quine has said exists.
What we have said in the previous section has used vague
terms
. We must try to formulate more precisely the sort of result
that would show a connection between essentialism and QML. In
particular, we should try to determine how to make the idea of
eliminability of the third grade of modal involvement (de re
modality) precise.
There are at least two sources that seem to agree about
the sort of result that would show that a certain assumption
(for example, anti-essentialism) would lead to the dispensability
of quantifying in. Parsons attributes the following view to
7Ruth Marcus :
(M) A system oi quantified modal logic is non-essential
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(in the sense in question) if and only if (i) eTery
sentence containing an essential attribute is provably
equivalent to a sentence containing no essential
attribute, and (ii) the corresponding sentence con-
taining no essential attribute is of a sort which
does not raise essentialist objections-in parti-
cular, it is not like the examples which Quine cites
as troublesome.
In discussing a thesis held by von Wright (which we shall examine
closely in chapter 7) G. E. Hughes and M. J. Cresswell say that
de re would be eliminable in favor of de_ dicto if
(HC) for everM wff
,
ot
,
which contains a modality de re,
We should be able to construct a wff ,ot'
,
which
contains no modality de re and which is provably
equivalent to a, i.e., which is such that /-(a=a' )
.
8
Both (M) and (HC) employ the phrase ’provably equivalent’
to pick out the appropriate standard of eliminability
. This phrase
can, however, be taken in at least two ways. In connection with
the thesis that anti-essentialism can be implemented in QML only
if quantifying in ( de re modality) is eliminable, one might say
either
(1) For each A there is an A' such that A’ lacks quanti-
fying in and A=A' is provable from the axioms of
QML together with the anti-essentialist schema taken
as an additional axiom schema. (i.e.
,
h (A=A ' )
.
)
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or
(2) For an;- anti-essentialist model ip and wff A, there
13 " Wff A ' SUCh that A ’ *«* quantifying in A
and A' can be shown to have the same truth-value
m every possible world (i. e rA=A''15 can be shown
to be necessarily true.)
Hughes and Cresswell make it clear that (l) is the result
they have in mind. 9 Although Hughes and Cresswell require (l),
they never directly consider the question of whether (2) alone
fight be adequate, so they never argue for requiring (l) rather
than (2).
(M), on the other hand, is open to either (l) or (2) as
an appropriate interpretation. Ruth Marcus has laid out her
own standards for wh^n a fnvmni " , .n. or ula contains an essential attribute."
We are assuming that a form^a says that things have essential
properties if it employs quantifying in, and that it is viciously
essential if the truth-conditions for quantifying in can not
be given in some metaphysically uncontroversial way.
Thus our version of (M), retaining the ambiguity between
(1) and (2), would say that if a system is anti-essentialist
,
then
every formula with quantifying in is provably equivalent to one
without. Whether this should be taken as (1) or as (2) depends
upon whether we mean to say that for each wff A there is a replace-
ment formula A' lacking quantifying in such that rAwA
,_1
follows
from the axioms of the system (l), or whether we mean to say that
the interpreted system is such that th. •there is a purely de dicto
A' such that r 4=A ' 1 i * ^- H s necessarily true (2).
lii
We snail first examine alternative (2) in + h -KeL > • t is section
“ WiU “CUrately f°“*
< 2 >’ contrast it with another, eyen
weaker result suggested and rejected by Cresswell, and indicate
how to prove it ^ r, , .y -Lj
- in section iv we qhnii osna l argue further that
this provides a partial but substantial vindication of Quine’s
claim that QML is committed to essentialism.
The theorem that we wish to prove (based on (2)) ls the
following
:
Theorem A: If q> is an anti-essentialist model on a model
uctu e <G, K, \~
1 1 ) , then for any closed wff A there
Cl0s_d wfi A such that (a) for any formula B, if r oB'
1
occurs in A’, then B is closed (i.e.. A’ lacks quantifying
in) and (b) for all H6K, cp(A’, H ) = cp(A, H) (so that
4>( (AsA 1 )’
,
H)=T, for all H£K).
Theorem A requires that A and A’ be necessarily equivalent.
It is weaker than (l) only because A’ can be relativized to <p.
Even though A and A’ are necessarily equivalent with respect to cp,
there might be another anti-essentialist model <p’ which assigns
A and A' different truth-values in some world (although there
will be a formula A’ ’ which will be necessarily equivalent to A
with respect to <p-). The difference is precisely the difference
9 ^
betWeen "For ever, model ^ every fornula A thers la ^ &
rr { as Theorem A qp-u C '\ „ j n_Says
' and For every formula A tho^rmui there is a formula
such that for every model...”
( as (i) S avs ifv ' y
’ we reconstrue
it in terms of model theory). (i) anti{} d theorem A differ in the
oraer of their initial quantifiers. (we shall ret1 n i urn to this in
section v.
)
It is helpful to contrast Theorem A with B ,ieu a a weaker require-
ment suggested, and reiectert Utr njectea. by Cresswell. In "The Elimination
°F Fe_ Modalities" Cresaw^ii gives a criterion of eliminability
which is basically the same as h ) t>11+ •Uj. But m a footnote he says
the following:
[i?e?!
in
A
S
«^M Sjfte ^native definition viz /-R(a)
effectiveness on R If 1 without some condition of
let R(a) be a if a’is de dict^M
a
k
condition we <=°uld
nly Cresswell is right to reject such a formulation
of the eliminability requirement. But the requirement made by
Theorem A is much stronger than this. It does not eliminate a non-
theorem in favor of just any de dicto non-theorem; it requires
that 01 be eliminated in favor of a de dicto non-theorem with which
it is necessarily equivalent. In addition, as we shall see, there
is a routine procedure for constructing a replacement formula from
a- This procedure is not based purely on the syntax of a, as
Cresswell seems to want to require. But in Theorem A, and the re-
placement procedure we shall employ in proving it, we have found
an alternative way of handling eliminability-one that is only
slightly weaker than (i ) TrVln- , _(1), which Cresswell would require, but vhlchis considerably stronger thqn >e very weak requirement he reflects
WS UPM A ™ **
-to account the semantic^
f0
:
°Ur f0r"al^ ™ng o„ly~actlca]
axiomatic aspect of our formal systems.
- »«„
.._ nm Jm><
tialist model <p, a new formula A*. We must the v,n show that A and A4
are necessarily satisfied by all e
.
11 the same assignments
,
in any world
of the structure on which * is a model. (Thi _ _ . .unis proof is omitted
from this dissertation. It is inner w +long but reasonably straightforward.
)
From this Theorem A follows easily.
Suppose that A is a wff of QML and <p is a model on a model
structure <G, K,
'A
45
' is defined as follows:
(0) If A is atomic, A4* = A.
(1) If A is r~B'
,
then A4 = r
~(B4 )"1
.
(2) If A is r B
.
C
1
,
then A4 = rB4 C4 ''.
(3) If A is r ( x
)
b"
1
then A4 = r (x )B4
'
7
.
(^) If A is r DB"’
,
then
(A) if 3 contains no free variables, then
A4 is ra(B4)\
(B) if B contains free variables, where x
z
is the numerically earliest variable not
occunng in B (either free or bound), then
A<P is ( ' n
i
xB
- B
' l
)v.
. .v(n
w
x
B
.B
w
) j
1
,
„here
each sentence n.x B is among n.x
B
,... n x
and
^ ) B* is (x ) (x =x ) ifz z z
4>(
r
n.x'
B
.aB43
'
1
n l)-T fnv.i ? ? -L;-i lor some I
and some H£K and
(ii) B* is (3x
z
) (x^x
z
) otherwise.
Lemaa: If <p is an anti-essentialist model on a model
structure <G. K ~
"
' th6n for an^ A, any assignment
function I, ana any HOC, cpCa^, H, I) = lp(A> H> I}
_
Proof, ny induction on the number of truth-functional
connectives
, quantifiers and modal operators in A.
Theorem A: If tp is an anti-essentialist model on a model
structure <G, K, K2,^ , then for any closed
Vff A
’
there ls a olosed "ff A’ such that for any
Wff 3
’
lf
r
°B
'
1 occurs in A ' then B is closed, and
for any H£K, ip(A'
,
H) = <p(A, H).
Proof: Let A' he A4*. A43 is closed if A is, since B43
is free in the same variables as B, for any wff B. A has no
quantifying in, since clause (hB) of the definition of A43 guaran-
tees that o' never occurs before an open wff. By the lemma,
^(A43
,
H) = tp(A, H).
The proof of the lemma rests upon the intuition that since
anti-es sentialism requires that objects be indistinguishable with
respect to their essential properties, quantifying in can not be
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distinguish which objects there are in the domain of a
Objects are indistinguishable with respect to the modal
formulas they satisfy. So quantifying in can be used only to say
which formulas are {or are not) necessarily satisfied by eyerything
and to say something about how many objects there are in the domaj
The construction of from A refW+ c r _eflects this; open formulas raB1
are replaced by wffs which hare - as their sole predicate. It
IS only the satisfaction and non-satisfaction of certain identity
clauses that matters
.
Because of this, the procedure for constructing from
not, at first glance, seem to be a construction which
obviously retains meaning. If B has free variables then
IS a disjunction the only predicate of which is ’ = However,
the seeming complexity of ralP* is deceptive. The complexity
introduced by the fact that we have defined roB
_
’ (p for the general
case, in which B may have more than one free variable.
If B has only one free variable the complexity disappears.
r
°B
'
llP iS elther '*=x.(y)(y=y). or 1 x=x
. ( 3y ) (y^y )
' , depending upon
whether everything or nothing satisfies roB 1 The translation
preserves the intuition that to say that something satisfies i*ob"
1
IS to say something that is either necessarily the case (and thus
equivalent to saying that it satisfies 'x=x. (y ) (y=y )
- ) or neces-
sarily not the case (and thus equivalent to saying that it satisfies
x=x. (ay) (y#y)
'
)
.
f -
,
,
6 C °SPlSXlUeS lntr0duced “ fully general definition
—ere B may have more than one ^
from the neatness of the connection between the satisfaction of
^3 an d. the necessi'fv r* ** n i n ^
, a closed formula. Consider the case in
nas t wo f ree variables (
'
x
’ and 'y') r "up .J ' • °B is one of
.x^y
.(,)(,„))
or
or
or
U x.y y.x y.(z)( z z ))v(x-x.y=y. x?«y.( 3z )( z?f z ))
(x=x.y=y. x=y. (3z)(z^z)v(x=x.y=y. x^y . (z)(z=z) )
(X X ‘ y y * X 7 ’ ( 3z)(z^z))v(x=x.y=y. x^y.( z)(z?z)).
Depending upon whether or not u and v are identical, their
E 13 either necessary or impossible. No internal
features of u and v are relevant. Only the semantical features
of B (whether or not it expresses an essential relation) deter-
mine the applicability of the modal operator.
Since it is only the identity conditions that matter, it
might be thought that if satisfies n.xB
,
then
<u
1 ,....un> satisfies
r OB1 if and only if
. .
.
(xj (n.xBo>Bf
necessa. lly
..rue, so that a more "intuitive" translation of
would be possible, viz
(t) (n
1
x
B
.o(x
1 ) ...(xn )(nlX
B
=,B)v...v(n
w
x
B
.D(x
1
)...( Xn )(nwx
B
=i
But such a translation is not possible. Kripke's formal
semantics does not, per se, lay down any conditions on what objects
can co-exist. in particular, there might be an n-tuple < u
SUCh ^ ± t(H), for every H€K. It might aJ ^
'
“
that <u
,
.
,u > satisfies FT XB and < u \n i < U1S - • • ,u
n
> does not satisfy
B- Furthermore, there might be no other n-tuple satisfying n.xB
.
In that case, ra( x ) Wrr B n
1 " n^
n
i
x ^B) Wl11 be satisfied in every
1'
'” '
'
"i
J
possible world
,
sinee in every possible world every n-tuple whose
members^ exist in that world (there is no such n-tuple, will satisfy
n
i* =B . So < u1 , . . . ,un > would satisfy ( T ) eyen though it does
not satisfy r nB'
.
If we vere to add the condition that ^(h) ='l(
,
for all
H£K, then (T) could serre as the translation of If some n_tuple
satisfying n.xB satisfied then eyery n-tuple would satisfy
niX in every world. That is guaranteed by anti-essentialism.
But since f\ H) = l( for all H£K, it also follows that every n-tuple
satisfies Itn.xW if and only if, in every world, every n-tuple
in that world satisfies rn. x^B1
,
i.e., if and only if
° (x
p
) . . . ( x
^ ) (Ffx ioB)"
1
is true.
Unfortunately, we have no proof of the stronger result
based on (1). The purpose of this brief section is merely to
point out a defect in Creswell's alleged proof11 that a putative
theorem very close to (l) is false. We are left, then, with no
decision as to the acceptability of { 1)
,
since we have neither
a proof nor a disproof of it.
In "The Elimination of De Re Modalities" M. J. Cresswell
attempts to prove that in a certain modal system LPC+S5+Pr (pre_
dicate calculus together with cm
r
b ,,lth S5 axioms and the principle
(x)(DFx v o~Fx) v (x)(0Fx.0~Fx)'
) de re modaliti
— —
es are not elimina-
ble '
_i ' e '’ th6re arS f°rmulaS
-th quantifying in which are
not equivalent to any formulas without quantifying in. LPC+S5+Pr
18 Cl "Saly related t0 an^I~essentialism, and the precise nature
of this relation will be discussed in chapter J. Pr and antl _
essentialism are so similar that if Cresswell ’s proof were suc-
cessful, we would expect it to he readily revisahle to show that
(l) is false.
But Cres swell.’ s proof does not succeed. An important lemma
(Lemma 1 in Cresswell’s paper) in the proof says that if A is
provable in LPC+S5+Pr then C(A) is also provable, where C(A) is
constructed from A by replacing every part rDBd by ro(
X;L ) . . . (x )b\
wnere Xp >••.,*, are all the free variables in B. But that lemma
is not true. Consider
(a) ( x ) ( 3y ) ( Fx v ~Fy
)
(b) ( x ) ( 3y ) n ( x
)
(y
)
( Fx v ~Fy )
.
Tiie first is provable in LPC+S5
• The second is flase unless it
is impossible that there be more than one object. But the neces-
sity oi a unit domain is certainly not provable in LPC+S5+Pr, so
the pair of (a) and (b) constitue a counter-example to Cresswell's
alleged proof of the falsity of this putative theorem closely
related to (l )
.
12
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Even though we have no proof of (i), lt should b0 note(J
that the translation (T) introduced at the end of the preceding
section is a translation of W which hoes not depend upon cp.
Because of this, if we consider only anti-essentialist models
such that for any HGK, f(H) -V
, then the stronger result based
0n (i
;
h0ldS
- FOT
-ere is a formula A^ lading
quantifying in (the translation of A based on (T)) such that for an^
model cp on <G, K X2 V> i-r •
’ >r/
,
if cp is anti-essentialist and for
all HGK, /'(h) =L(, then cp(AT
,
H'
,
I) = y,(A H » r)
]3
5 1
» I
,
for any H*
and I. This proof is also done by induction nn ^J uu cu o the complexity
of A.
In addition, there is another result slightly stronger
than Theorem A but weaker than the strong claim based on (l)
which is readily provable, based upon the way t? is defined. For
each formula A, there is a finite set of purely de dicto formulas
l\
±
A 21
~
" " ’ such that for anji anti-essentialist model <p and any H
and I,
^p( 'a(A=A1 )v. . .yn(A=Ain )'1 H l)-T (m, +\ )
,
ti, . (What m is depends
upon the number of free variable -in a nu naDles m A and the number of modal
operators in A.
)
Certainly if (1) were true Quine would be vindicated. If
we could show that for each formula A there is another A- such
that A' lacks quantifying in and ' a (AeA'f is true in all worlds
in all anti-essentialist models, then we would be justified in
saying that the third grade of modal involvement carries a commit
m.nt to essentialism, since the expressive resources of that
grade would always hp P i ,^ eliminable when essentialisin was denied.
Ine only further requirement tnot
-
- n tnat one mxght reasonably make would
^ t0 rSqUlrS A ' be eff
-«rely constructible from A, so that
a tranSlatl0a Pr0cedure for transforming formulas of the stronger
language to formulas of the weaker language would be possible/
We haye no proof of that strong result, however. All we
lave is a proof of the weaker claim that if we are given a parti-
cular anti-essentialist model «p, then there is, for any closed
formula A, a form^a A* lacking quantifying in which is true in
clll "fcll0 S cUI10 VOTI r? q o q A T T • _i_-ids as A, with respect to that model. In this
section we shall explore the significance of this result, attempt-
ing to determine the extent to which even this weaker result might
be adequate to vindicate Quine. We would like to know whether
Theorem A is an adequate basis for the claim that an anti-essen-
tialist can always accomplish the goals he has in using QML even
if he renounces the use of quantifying in.
As we have seen, Quine’s principal goal in the use of formal
languages is the development of a language suitable for stating
scientific theories Now someone would think that such a language
should be supplemented by modal operators and given an intensional
interpretation if he felt that the ordinary extensional interpretatic
did not reflect important intensional features of language, and if
he felt that such intensional features should be incorporated
info iho language of science.
Consider, for the moment, models for quantificational
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languages without modal operators. The model that He are mQst
-uenesteu an as the model which assigns to each predicate (n-place
relation) of the language the set of objects („ - ,
_
J ^ n-tuples of objects)
° satisfy that predicate, under its int * ,ended meaning. The correct
moael for a theory in which ' F ' v,has the ^teniei meaning
'is blue'
one which assigns all actual blue things touning the extension of »f».
V,S might see a model ip on <G, K R vP>x 5
, / as a model which
that sort of extensional model (for firstv i -order non-modal lan-
guages ) at_ each_ world. But, of course, «p is much more. It also
provides for assignments of truth-values to formulas containing
"0dttl 0Perat°rS> ““ “
- interpretation in ever, possible
world for formulas. In providing an interpretation in ever, possible
world it grves an intensional interpretaion to formulas.
But we are not concerned with just any abstract model <p.
we are concerned with the model * which assigns to each formula
ltS COTreCt “tSnSi0n-i ' e
-* the ^ich at each possible world
assigns to each predicate (relation) the objects (n-tuples) which
satisfy that predicate in that possible world, according to the
nded meaning of that predicate. 15 The correct intensional model
for a language with the predicate 'r is 'is blue', is the model
cp on yne model structure G K r 40 . .\ > ’ —where G is the real world,
K is the set of all possible worlds, B-K8 1(5 and f assigns, to each
possible world, the set of things that exist in that world-such
that (p( 'F'
,
H) is the set of things that are blue in H, for each
possible world H. That model provides the correct intensional
10 U
interpretation of the formulas of the languages_i„ the sajne way
that a model which assigned all
^ tfi wQuid
'
pro _
vide a correct extensional interpretation of th c
17
P e formulas of the
language
.
'
The crucial matter is that each thing which is possibly
blue be blue in some world, that each thing that is possibly not blue
^ blUe ^ S°me W°rld
’ ^r both simple and com-
plex predicates. Once thi=: -? Q adone, the model has been constructed.
These considerations lead us to the view that if we can show
that each formula with quantifying in is necessarily equivalent
to one without quantifying in thpn no .* o m, e we can eliminate quantifying
M without losing the ability to express each intension of the
language. For each formula of the stronger language, which has
quantifying in, there is a formula of a weaker langauge, which has no
quantifying in, which is intensionally equivalent to it. Iheorem
A shows that such an equivalence holds for anti-essentialist
-dels. So if an interpreted theory is an anti-essentialist theory,
then for each formula A with quantifying in there is a formula
without quantifying in to which A is necessarily, or intensionally
equivalent..
If an interpreted QML theory is anti-essentialist, then
that interpreted theory can be equivalently expressed in a language
which seems weaker with respect to its expressive resources, but
in which we are actually able to express everything that is expres-
sible in the stronger language, up to intensional equivalence.
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An^i essentialism nerafp^ .J " tns additional sxDres^iiro . ,cAp ebs ve strength that
third grade of modal involvement has wer the nrst ^
- least with respect to the Use of those
___ ^^
theories
.
"hat is just as important is that we know that the weaker
language can also be interpreted without recourse to the metaphysical
apparatus associated with QML. The necessity operator can be
associated with a special linguistic status for a certain class
of closed sentences true in all possible
attaches to formulae n/->+ + ,
° 16 connection between objects and
their properties.
vi
If our theory of the world is an (S 5 ) anti-essentialist
theory then we shall find no need to employ quantifying in in the
canonical language with which we state it. Theorem A guarantees
that we can equivalently state our theory in a formal language
which allows no quantifying in. Thus with respect to Quine’s
primary goal in the use of formal languages, quantifying in and
essentialism are linked and it is fair to say that any ineliminable
use of quantifying in in a canonical language for science involves
essentialism.
But Qume's goal of developing a formal language for use
as the canonical language for scientific theories is a limited
use of formal language, and what we have said leaves open the
question of whether there are other uses to which one might put
QML which would not inVQlve a comm . tment ^ eS3ent . alls^
di “’1CU“ t0 eValUate the
connection between
ssentialism and the uses of QML without a thorough evaluation of
thS USS " t0 WhlCh °nS might PUt a f°rmal language. One virtue in
attempting to evaluate QML with respect to Quine's use of formal
langauge is that Quine has given n comparatively good idea of
the use to which he would put a formal language.
In what follows we shall not clearly delineate uses for
QML, but we will suggest some general categories of use to which
one might put a formal language and discuss the relationship of
essentialism to such uses of the formal apparatus.
Of course there is at least one use for QML which involves
essentialism but which involves its user in no commitment to
essentialism. Ms is the philosophical use of QML in analysing
others' metaphysical claims If> for example
,
_ ls
to reconstruct Cartesian arguments one might find that a reconstruc-
tion that employs QML makes better sense of his arguments than any
other available means for understanding them. If what we have said
iS riSht> the SSSi to use QML for this could be evidence of Descarte
essentialism. While that may be nothing new, a similar need to
employ the full resources of QML in explicating, e.g., Locke's work,
would be an interesting discovery. In any case, the Kripke semantic,
for QML that we have been discussing might provide a valuable tool
for the analysis of historical material. The fact that it is associ-
ated with essentialism is, in this case, a virtue. Even the anti-
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essentialist might be interests in +\^stea m the exploration of the metaphysical
YleWS ° f MS
predecessors-he commits himself to
no dubious metaphysical views when he employs QML in this way At
B0St he &1Pke ' S
“* « as apparatus explicative
of essentialism and accepts, thereby, that essential'j ism is at least
moderately coherent.
There might also be advantages in using a formal language
- which essentialism is expressible when one does the semantics
for English (or other natural languages), it might turn out that
the easiest way to do such a semantics would be to translate English
sentences into the sentences of a formal language and then give a
traditional sort of semantics for those formulas. And it might turn
out that the best formal language for such a task would employ a
necessity operator which would be used and interpreted in such a
way (i.e., which would be used in connection with non-trivial cases
of quantifying in) that the formal representation of some English
sentences was a non-trivially essentialist claim, according to the
standards we have set so far.
If this were the case, that would show that the best se-
mantles for English must treat essentialism as a coherently expressible
doctrine. One would still have the option, as Parsons points out,
of denying all of the non-trivial essentialist claims. The point
here is that our theorem has no obvious relation to this program
of giving a semantics for Enlgish. Parsons has shown that Kripke’s
semantics can uniformly represent both essentialist and anti-essentialist
°Ur "ne0ram shows that an anti-essentialist need not
Pt QML fo, himself, but in the interest of uniformity, he might
adopt a language strong enough to represent his own claims as veil
as those of others. The coherence of essentials, not its truth
as presupposed vher. one uses a system vith de re modalities in order
to develop a semantics for English.
Of course, the anti-essentialist might argue for linguistic
reform. Since a simpler language is adequate to represent all our
true claims (if anti-essentialism is true), and since that simpler
language avoids the ontological
"excesses" of essences and possible
worlds (and perhaps even possible objects), the anti-essentialist
can, it seems, argue for a linguistic reform vhich will avoid these
ontological indulgences. This, of course, is no longer merely a
matter of doing the semantics for English. It returns us to the
project of developing a canonical language for our theories.
Still another use of QML would be a natural deduction system
reflect ordinary modes of inference. Such a use of QML might
show that ordinary language involved essentialism if it showed (l)
that quantifying in was crucial to representing some ordinary infer-
ences and (2) that the modal operator used to reflect such inferences
represented necessity of a suitably metaphysical sort. Whether or
not (1) can be shown, it is argued in chapter 8 that it is difficult
to show (2). In any case, the person who developed such a natural
deduction system would show at most that ordinary language involves
essentialism. Such a demonstration would not involve him in a
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commitment to essential i cm ? -p v-
-ai s if he were wiliinp- „
- denary language.
e are ju*t a few of the uses one might have for QML
"* '*•* »• •*“•*• »
«
more clearly comprehensibi p ttle
- In the inteUigibility of
essentialism in this way one need not accept essenti i
•
P alism as true.
All of this focuses again on a crucial dif-e _ t dlfierence between
3rgment “* ^ *!». - stressed that QML
is unacceptable because essentialism is an incoherent doctrine.
Our approach, on the other hand, accepts that, tv,’ T: hat he semantics form has clarified essentialism, at least to some extent. We hare
explored whether QML is tied to the doctrine, so clarified. What
We haYS f
:“
d 13 ^ “ * is to be used as a canonical
guage lor theories, does involve a commitment to essentialism,
as Quine has suggested. Whether other uses carrv a ™ - +b y commitment to
essentialism can he evaluated only in light of „ i* lgtl a clearer delineation
of those uses.
But some might argue that the notion of eliminability (of
d£ re necessity) relies upon too crude a notion of equivalence.
It might be argued, for example, that necessarily equivalent formulas
need not express the same proposition, so our demonstration of
the existence of a necessarily equivalent de dicto formula for each
de re formula does not show that de re modalities are eliminate.
There is no doubt that we can draw finer distinctions of
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waning, according to which necessarily equival , ,v lent formulas are
differentiated. Hecessar-mv
stit t , ,
7 e4U1ValSnt f°“ are not intersub-
u aole salva veritate in belief contexts, for exMple
mie-ht u i amp , so someonetereSted in addi
-
t0 ™ics for W a Kay offferentiating among formas with respect to their behavior inbelief contexts. °
such a caoe, differences between dp rP fSI e formulas and the
dicto equivalents might be reflected in a diffem rence m their
semantical treatrr'on+ treatment. In order for this x .s to be detrimental to our
arguments linhing « theories and essentialism this Inference in
semantical treatment would have to be important for the notion of
equivalence of theories. But the relation of believers to theories
should not be a factor in our evaluation of the equivalence of those
theories. Vie want to evaluate whether the theories say the same
thing about the world, not whether they are believed to do so.
We can make this point in the following way. For each
formula a.
, let p(a> be the set of worlds in which 0 is true, in-
tuitively, p(„) is the set of possible states of affairs consistent
Wlth the trUth ° f “• “ U
-ts on what can be by ruling out
all of the members of K-p(a).
For any formula 0, if 0 is necessarily equivalent to a, then
p(e) - p(a). O and 0 place the same limits on what is possible.
They allow (rule out) all of the same states of affairs.
We could expand K to include other, "impossible,” worlds in
which a and 3 differ in truth value. 20 ouch worlds could then re—
fleet a person's beliefs, where a and B can be diff + -p o differentiated by
their behavior in belief contexts.
But such an expansion o f the set of worlds is not important
Bon the consideration o f whether or not „ and 3 hare the same theo-^ imP°rt - “ «>«
-ter of whether „ and
3 are heiiered to hare the same theoreticai lmport. tte identity
" P<0) “d P(B) g"e
- ^
-o are e.uiradent in what they
say about what is possible, and that is what is important in deter-
mine whether they play the same role within a theory. 21
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chapter 6
CONSTANTS
In Kripke
' s philosophical discussions 1 of issues Surrounding
7
" l0elC> thS n°ti0n °f *^ ^ an important role
ri81d deSl8nat0r 13 a SingUl
- *“» **<* refers to the same
thing in every possible world. For examnle 'n- v,p ,
'Richard Bixon' is rigidbut ’the President' is T .a'PUcit in his discussion is an assump-
tion that the semantics n-p > •le of Semantical Consideration on Modal Logic"
is extended to account for such terms, m what follows we will giye
such an extension of that semantics and explore the extent to which
anti-essentialism can be define -p™ g,ined for models which make assignments
to rigid designators. We shall find that with a plausible extension
of the definition of anti-essentialism so that it applies to such
models we can prove Theorem A for models for theories stated in
languages with rigid designators.
i
We can extend our Kripke-style semantics for QML to apply
to languages with constants (rigid designators). Let 'a',
1
te varlables °‘ the meta-language ranging over singular
terms (constants and variables) of the formal language. „e extend
by letting <p(a)£W for each constant a. (
'<p(a ) ' is undefined
11
.
1
+
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if « IS a variable
. ) As before, I(a)£t( lf „ .v ix a is a variable, if
0 I(Q)
- ( “> ^ any assignment function
;
reylse ciause (i) ° f
-—— (of. APPenaix 1} ln
"the following way:
(i') For atomic A:
(a
, . .
.
,a ) , h, I) = m ,1 n ill if and only if
< I («
1 ),...,I(an )> €4>(P
n
, H)>
I. «... V „„
”“ “ «• V
involving constants which would be essential i +u st according to the
definitions given so fm~ -p_ar. For example, if u£^(h), v£lt(H), (P(a ) =
U=1(X) 3113 <P(b)=v=I-(x ), then »('oJ=a ., H I)-T b ,It , ,’ 5
<f( ax=a', H, I' )=F.
Ihus
, according to our definition
,
any model with a world with two
named objects would be an essentialist model.
«e can rule out such trivial examples of essentials. Pirst
“ lntr
A
°aUCe the V’. -i=h is defined analogously
t0
’• ^ 13 ^ ^ or r ^ . for eaoh
variable or constant oc or a occuring free in A rJ k g l l (a constant is said
to occur free if it occurs 0 +
r _ r
Such that J -*' except that not both
°yOk and are conjuncts of n.aA
. (We are assuming an
enumeration of all the singular terms of the language.)
Now we can redefine essentialism as follows. Let J, J',...
be functions such that J(«)£l( for every constant or variable a.
(J is not restricted in the way that I is. It may be that o is a
constant but J(a)*p<c)
. But each I is also among the J functions.)
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We will say that a model <p is anti ^ + .
r
-essentialist if and only ifany formula A, if cp( rn.<A oA
1
,
H j)-T f
(nf r rr An 1 ’ ^ l0r SOme H J, thenn. a rcA
, H jA-m -p1 ’ ’ ,-T for erery H and J. Thls def1n . .n i ition is just
the earlier definition, extended to treat constants like free
variables.
A is defined as before for cases (o) (?)3 except thatn A , -r, ' ' *-"» unn
i
a ^°r ) replaces 17. XA (or 17 xB ) +h1 ‘A ) throughout. Case (4) isQ -Pr\ 1 1
1 i
as follows
:
(A) If A is r aBn
, then
(A) if b contains no free wviomvar ables or constants
A45 is r n(B
tp
r.
(B) lf B contains free terms and x is th„ f +
z
e first variable
not occuring in B (free or bound), then Av is
r (n oh1 ) v„ v /n po o „1 v • B ) , where each 17. aB is
moaB n
a
B
,...,n o
B
andw
(i) B
1
is r (x ) (x =Y r i-p *Vr B (Ol
z
{\ V lf <P( n.a .DBV , H, I)=T
for some I and some HGK.
(n) B 1 is r(3x
z
)( xyx
z
)' otherwise.
Theorem A is proved for models for theories stated with
constants in almost the same way that it is proved for models for
theories^stated without constants, except that n.aA(n.aB ) replaces
n
i
x (n.x ) throughout.
This appraoch to the definition of essentialism formally
isolates so-called
"referential" essential properties, 3 like being
italics! with a Ox=a') and 'Fx v ~Fa', relying upon their sZ^
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larity to trivial essences like 'x=x' or'Fx v ~vx . -^ - • Even though
the objecc that 'a' denotes is the only object that necessarily
satisfies such formulas
.
these open formulas can be treated as on
a par with formulas like ’ x=x' wh-iVh QW ic express negligible, universal
-senses, because every object denoted by some constant has essential
properties which are formally analogous to such properties of the
thing that 'a' denotes.
There are purely formal criteria which we can use to single
out formulas which express such essences (as we have done in this
definition of an anti-essentialist model Just given), and for each
formula there is an analogous formula that is satisfied by every
object. (For examole ' x=x' -i <= on nP 5 X X 13 analogous to f x=a' and «Fx v ~Fx'
is analogous to ’Fx v
-Fa'). Biere is nothing metaphysically im-
portant in the fact that the object that 'a' denotes necessarily
satisfies x-a ( i.e., that it is essentially such that it satis-
fies
' x=a Therefore
,
our definition, which is intended to define
anti-essentialism in such a way that to deny it (i.e., to accept
essentialism) involves one in a metaphysically suspect view, must
(as it does) treat such essences as being identical with a on a
par with being self-identical
.
What we find, then, is that our definition of anti-essentialism
for models for languages without constants, which treats universal
essences as trivial essences, extends quite naturally to include
referential properties of objects. This accords well with the informal
intuition that such properties are trivially essential. That Socrates
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necessarily satisfies , x=s’ (where 's' *is a constant denoting Socrates)
13 ^ 11Ule intereSt
' We ne£d ^ more about him than ls
needed to know that he necessarily satieties Certainly the
°laln he SatlSfleS ' X=S ' 1S ^ the claim that he satisfies
’ X=X ’ than “ 18 Uke thS =lal” for example
, „ecessari ly
human
. latter is an interesting controversial claim about essence,
the other two are true for purely formal reasons
.
Thin is not to say that one must accept the view that such
essential properties are trivial. The important thi +ng to notice is
that these so-called "rpfpypn+id 11e erential properties are formally isolatable
from other essential properties. While any model for a language
With constants (of the type we have considered) will have essential
properties of this "referential " «,«>.+ +»,i l sort, the existence of such essential
P perties in no way afiects the question of whether there should
he any non-referential essential properties. Ihere are models which
make only referential properties essential, so the choice between
models with or without other essential properties remains. 11
Beinv i dentical with Socrates entails all of Socrates's
other essential properties. But nothing constrains us to choose
a model in which any properties other than referential (and universal)
properties are essential to Socrates, so the introduction of constants
does not affect the issue of whether we should regard any of Socrates's
non-referential properties as essential to him.
Thus our definition of 'anti-essentialism' in this chapter
might be seen as a definition of non-referential inessentialism.
a certain limited, formally
It allows for essential properties of
isolatable sort
.
Of course
,
it might be argued that onoe ^
_
class Of essential properties, we need not be hesitant about recog-
to this. First
, the fact that some referential properties must be
essential nan be seen as a result of certain features of the refer-
ential apparatus of the language for which we give models-rather
than a result of any special features of the object referred to.
Second, whether or not we should be hesitant about recognizing that
there may be non-referential essential properties, we certainly
should be hesitant about recognizing any particular candidate as an
essential property without good reason. Nothing about referential
properties giyes any obvious support to the claim that any other
particular property is essential to a thing.
11
At first glance it may appear that a definition of anti-
essentialism that treats W as a formula expressing a
essence of ohe thing denoted by a is inconsistent with our remarks,
m chapter 2, on Hintikka's appraoch to QML. There we argued that
Hmtikka approach does not provide an anti-essentialist semantics
for QML because of the central role played by formulas r ( 3x ) D (x=a y .
An examination of some examples of such formulas led us to the con-
clusion that the most natural interpretation of them seems to involve
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essentialism.
The crucial distinction to be made between our remarks in
chapter 2 and our discussion in this chapter is that here we hare
been concerned only with the singular terms that are ri eid deta-
in Hintikka's system, some singular terms are rigid and
others are not, and the formula ^HxW serves ^ dlstlngulsh
“ " a Sln^lar ter“ Which iS a
-Sid designator. It is in dis-
tinguishing among the designators that Hintikka's approach involves
essentialism.
The essentialist must make two distinctions. He must dis-
tinguish among things in terms of their differing essential proper-
ties, as Parsons has emphasized. But he must also distinguish
among the properties of things, as Quine has emphasized. I„ dis-
tinguishing among the designators of an object, Hintikka makes the
latter of these distinctions. A consideration of the examples he
gives suggests that he would also make the former distinction.
(Being the number nine is essential to nine,but not seven, for
example.
)
In allowing descriptions to be treated on a par with other
singular terms, Hintikka makes it clear that he regards singular
terms as expressions which characterize their denotata. They are
mere labels, been he then distinguishes between terms on the
basis of whether (3x)ax=a is true for the appropriate substitution
for a, he is distinguishing between different characterizing expressions
on the basis of whether they necessarily characterize a single object.
relieving Kripke
,
ve have treated singular terms (constants)
as raere
-els. oar sendee retires a model to assign the same
thlnS tD 3 Sln8Ular
“— “-Id. Singular terms do not
characterize their denotata, they merely label them, so I(3xW
tells us nothing about the essential characteristics o f denota-
(3x)nx=a is true for any denoting constant whenever r
( 3x )x=„
is true, simply because of the sort n-p +of term a is and the vay our
semantics treats such terms. No essential +l Mature of ex's denotation
needs to be considered.
It may see, tempting at first to argue that Hintikka uses
the truth of r(3*W as an indication that « is a mere desig-
nator, which does not link its denotation to any property. !he
rigidity Of a might be seen as an indicator offs lack of content.
Ihen his approach, like ours would make anti-essentialism possible.
But consideration of the sorts of terms that are rigid rules
that out. 'The least integer greater than 8' might be a singular
term b in the normal language. On most essentialist views
'
( 3x ) mx=b 1 would be true, since 9 would be held to satisfy 'ox=b\
b is no mere label— it is an expression that characterizes
its denotation, singling out a property (allegedly essential) of
9. It is clear that Hintikka would include such examples among the
singular terms a such that r (3x)ax=a'7 is true.
The difference between the two approaches is simply this.
Hintikka's Singular terms encompass a broad category of terms, at
least some of which relate their denotations to certain properties.
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He distinguishes among the tents of this tread category on the
tasrs of whether there is something that they necessarily denote.
Typically, at least, some term that necessarily a- +denotes its deno-
tation vill also be associated with an essential- property of that
object
.
Our approach begins with a grammatical category of terms
an Of Which rigidly designate. Terms of this category are mere
labels. A constant is not associated with any non-referential es-
sential properties in the way that one of Hintikka's singular terms
might be.
One can probably consistently adopt anti-essentialism to-
gether with Hintikka's semantical approach, if he makes his models
such that is true only lf a ls a mere labei> or logicaiiy
associated with a mere label, so that a connects its denotation
with no substantive property. Besides a constant, say 'b', a might
be 'The x such that Fx v ~Fb
' ,
etc. But no term a except such a
mere label (or logical constructs of the sort just given) could be
such that f(3x)ox=a 7 was true.
However, whatever reasons there are for adopting such an
anti-essentialist approach are also reasons for rejecting Hintikka's
method for dealing with singular terms. The attraction in Hintikka's
method is that it treats proper names and definite descriptions
on a par. In the formal language they are both rendered as letters
's’, 'b', 'c', etc. But once one has established a semantical
basis for distinguishing them-as would an anti-essentialist approach.
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treating proper nar.es as a separate grammatical category-there is
no longer any reason to treat them on a par inferential^.
To sum up, we can define an anti-essentialist model for
languages with singular terms, whether or not all singular terms are
g d. But to define anti-essentialism, apparently we must single
out a category of rigid designators not associated with any "cha-
racterizing" properties of an obiect tw ,• , .oj
. But m making such a distinc-
tion we undermine the reasons for accenting n +•p a semantics of the sort
that Hintikka favors .
^
m
There is, of course, much controversy about singular terms
and how they should be represented in formal systems. It is not
our intention to attempt to resolve those problems in this chapter
(or this dissertation). We have mentioned a few results here, but
those results apply only to a particular view of constants and their
role in language. The question of how anti-essentialism can be pre-
cisely defined for models for theories which are stated in languages
With constants, where constants receive some different semantical
treatment
,
is left open here.
It should be pointed out, however, that if anti-essentialist
models can not even be given for languages with constants, then of
course theories stated in such languages must be essentialist
.
So other approaches to the semantics for singular terms may vindicate
Quine even more clearly than the results we discussed in section i.
Other approaches which associate constants with properties
12k
or objects would mahe the satisfaction ofW by » but not v
a significant tatter, Ihe properties associate. „ith a are essential
to u but not Y in this case. n wom rtuld express an essence of u .
such systems would be essentialist from the outset. 6
If, on the other hand, singular terms are not associated
with properties, so that the satisfaction of
of the fundamental semantics for the languag
can be defined for models for such theories
But then it can be shown that quantifying in
it was for languages without constants.
x-a reflects features
e
’ then anti-essentialism
(as we have done),
is eliminable in the way
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CHAPTER 7
VON WRIGHT'S PRINCIPLE AND
ANTI-ESSENTIALISM
.
In discussing the strong eliminability of quantifying ln
,m section ill of chapter 5, we mentioned Cresswell's unsuccessful
attempt to prove a related result based on a system he calls
S5thPCtPr. tte principle of Pr ("the principle of predication")
that he adds to QML to produce this system is basedJ wia IS D upon some remarks
made by Georg Henrik von Wright in An Essay in Mod o1 2
Von Wright has argued that adherence to that metaphysical
principle (which he claims is true) makes quantifying in unnecessary.
He says that acceptance of the "principle of predication
. . . would
make a combination of alethic modalities de re and quantification
uninteresting. Although he says nothing about essentialism, his
argument, like Quine's, is an argument that the acceptability of QML
depends upon the acceptability of certain metaphysical views. His
principle and the argument he gives are related in many ways to issues
discussed so far, and we will find that by working out von Wright's
suggestion, we can prove a theorem which is slightly stronger than
Theorem A.
i
Von Wright argues that if the following principle of predi
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cation (PP) i s t~,,0
» en quantifying in is
"uninteresting."
J
:
a Property can be significantly ^ .
viduals of a certain Universe of n
predlcated of the indi-
property is necessarily present 1 Scourse > then either the
ana necessarily absent i' the e T f 311 indirt<^lsy possibly but not necessarily (i’ e *1Sf the Pr°Pertyin some or all individuals and possibiv Ttly) present(i-e., contingently) absent in the’ rest. ^ necessarily
Uhe the anti-essentialist principle. PP implles tlmt nothlng
_
be necessarily true of one object but only contingently true of
some other object. We will explore what other relations hold between
these principles and the arguments based on them.
Von Wright's principle divides properties 5 into just two
groups. He says:
to'underlie'the ^ ^ Said
or "logical" and "material" or"descript^e"
S ’
,f0rmal,,
which is sometimes made.
oriptiv properties
The anti-essentialist principle, on the other hand, divides
properties into three exclusive groups: the necessary, the contin-
gent and the impossible, i.e., those that are necessarily true of
everything, those that are possibly true and those that are neces-
sarily false of everything. The decisive factor is that anti-essen-
tlalism guarantess that if a property is necessarily (contingently,
not possibly) true of one thing, then it is necessarily (contingently,
not possibly) true of each thing.
Von Wright does not explicitly include properties which are
necessarily absent in all individuals in either the formal or material
category. In a discussion 6 of PP and von Wright’s argument, A. N.
Prior attributes to von Wright the view that such logically impos-
sible properties are among the formal properties
.
7
There is at least one reason for including them among the
formal properties (whether won Wright intended to do so or not)
The complements of material properties are * •P material properties
end the complements of all formal properties which are not neces-
sarily true of everything are formal properties. By including
impossible properties among the formal properties we make it true
that a property is formal (material) if and only if its complement
IS formal (material).
Von Wright probably intended to include impossible property
among the formal ones
.
8
Whether a-;
a
he did or not, we will assume that
a correct version of PP would classify them in this way
.
9
The question that now arises is whether this classification
corresponds to the classification that the anti-essentialist prin-
ciple makes
. Are contingent and material properties the same and
do the categories of necessary and impossible properties exhaust
the category of formal properties?
It is fairly easy to see that the material properties of
von Wright's classification correspond to the contingent properties
of the anti-essentialist classification (properties expressed by
open sentences wmch are possibly true and possibly false of every-
thing). Material properties are "possibly but not necessarily (i.e.,
contingently) present in some or all individuals and possibly but
not necessarily (i.e., contingently) absent in the rest." But this
explication is unnecessarily long. To say that a property is possibly
out not necessarily ,15 e<W«alent to saying that it is
possibly our not necessarily absent is. An object satisfies r£Fx ~aFxnif and only if it satisfies r£~Fx^ a
r
x
’ Slnce Q reduces to
and reduces to r~a~ So nmaterial properties are just those
which are possibly but not necessarily present in all objects
But these are precisely the contingent properties, so yon Wright's
category of material nronerti M „p p ies corresponds to the anti-essentialist
’
category of contingent properties.
But von Wright
' s category of formal -n6 ^ i i properties is not eX-
hausted by the anti-essentialist
's categories of neuguri x cessary and
impossible properties. A formal property is 'VP necessarily present
in some or all individuals but necessarily absent in the rest.”
The anti
-essentiali st does not allow the possibility that a property
is necessarily present in some but not all indiyiduals. PP does
not appear to be the same as anti-essentialism, since it allows the
possibility that something is necessarily F but something else is
not necessarily F .
But PP (as we haye reyised it to include impossible properties
among the formal properties) is entailed by anti-essentialism. If
anti-essentialism is true then all non-contingent properties must be
formal. Necessary properties are formal properties, and impossible
properties are formal, (They are present (absent) in all indiyiduals.
a fo^uLoiu
,
they are present (absent) in some or all indiyiduals
and absent in the rest.) Whereas PP aserts that if F corresponds
to a formal property then everything satisfies rmFx y d~ Fx
"
1
,
anti-
essentialism lays down the stronger condition that if Fx co11 t rresponds
oo a iormal property, then either everyth! no- « + • r ni g satisfies 'Fx1 or
everything satisfies Wx1
.
Although PP appears to be weaker than •x anti-essentialism,
S“Ce
“; S £ntSlled * “* “ *>» that at least one for-
13 equlvalent to anti-essentialism. We will show
this by first showing that if PP is formalised as a thesis about
all open formulas, then PP entails the denial of th +a i e strong form
Of essentialism mentioned by Parsons in
"Essentialism and Quantified
Modal Logie." strong essentialism is the position that there is
some formula A such that something satisfies W in SOme world
and something (else) satisfies W ln some world. PP (on oae
construal ) entails the denial of this form of essentialism. But it
can be shown that the denial of this form of essentialism is equiva-
lent to anti
-essentialism as defined in chapter h ( at least it is
if we accept the reasonable assumption that there are some contingent
properties). So (on this construal) PP entails anti-essentialism.
To show clearly that PP entails the denial of strong essen-
tialism, it may be convenient to restate PP in an equivalent form.
The version of PP that we are considering11 can be stated in the
following way.
(X) For any open sentence A, everything satisfies roA v a~An
or everything satisfies r§A.fy~A
tn^t (X) entails the denial of strong essentialism, we will
Show that (X) is equivalent to
(Y) F°r OPM Senten“ A
> « something satisfies W
,
then everything satisfies ^AxA 1
.
The proof that (X) entails (Y) is straightforward. We will
show that (Y) entails (X) by assuming that (Y) is true and (X) is
false and deriving a contradiction.
(1) Suppose that (Y) holds.
(2) Suppose that^A is an open formula such that u satisfies
-(A v n~A) and v satisfies P
~(0A.<>~aT
.
(3) v satisfies ro~A v aA 1
(h) v satisfies r o~A" or v satisfies r oA
1
.
(5) Everything satisfies r$~A^ or everything
satisfies r/)AzW
.
(°) u satisfies 1 msA and r'^o~A~'
.
(7) u satisfies ^ ~A and r(}A .
(8) u satisfiesW and r<>An or u satisfies
r
(}~K' and
r
aA. (from ( 5 ) and ( 7 ))
(9) u satisfies rn~An and A' or u satisfies
n
~aA and ‘ aT'
.
^
r
The denial of strong essentialism is:
(z) For any open formula A, if something satisfies 'A',
then everything satisfies rAmoJ
.
It is easy to see that (Y) entails (z). Since (Y) is equivalent
to PP(X), PP entails the denial of strong essentialism.
We can also show that if we view PP and the denial of strong
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essentialism as restn'o+inne°ns 0n models
’ then they hold of all
™e m0<lel “ SUCh that R=k2
' We "ill generalize (Y) and (z)
“ the
."
ay W
="eaeraliZed °Ur deflnltl“ o' anti-essentialism,
employing ft.x ' formulas and applying the definition to complete
models
, not merely individual worlds. Suppose that ^ ls a moael
on a model structure < o. K, K2
,/ > . aen (y) becomes
(Y ’) “ tP(VA QA^ H, !)=T for some H and I, then
(Z) becomes
<P(
r
n.x
A
3(AA3aA) ' H T'l-rp *1 v J > n, 1J-T for any H and I.
(z*) If cp( rTT.XA
.aA^ H j)- rn no
i > IJ-T for some H and I, then
<p( rn.x
A
3(A=QA)\ H, I)=T for any H and I.
We will now show that if V is a model on <G, K, K2 ,^,
then if (Z*
)
is true of cp then (Y») is also.
(1) Suppose that (Z 1 ) is true of cp.
(2) Suppose that 4>( rn.xA.oA\ H, I)=T. (for some K and I).
(3) then iprn^tAzoA ) 1
,
H-, r)=T for any H' and I'.
(b) Suppose that
,p(
r
n.x
A
. 0 a\ H, I")=T ( for soale x< .
(5) Then there is some H'€K such that <p( rn.xA .A'', H'
,
I")=T.
( 6 ) By (3 )
,
cp(
' A'1
,
H
' ,
I ' f )=T
.
(7) Since R=K'_
,
cp(
r
aA1
,
H, I'')=t
( 8 ) From (7)-
(
7 ) we can infer that for any I, if
<p( H.x
• OA
,
H, I )=T, then cp( raA\ H, l)=T.
(9) So, for any I, cp( rn. x
A
^( <> AmaA )"7
,
H, l)=T.
(10)
So (Z 1 ) entails the conditional of (2) and ( 9 ),
which is (Y').
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-bus
,
i-P P? is true of a model cp then cn pip +n p meets a condition
bas ed on tho donipl nf c-+-Str0ng eSSentlalIs
” is precisely analo-
gous to the definition of an anti-essentialist , a^bo n model developed ear-
liar (on the basis of denying weak anti-essentialism)
.
But it can be shown that the assumption that there are
contingent properties leads to thp ^e conclusion that the denial of
strong essential!sm is eguiyalent to our old definition of anti-
essentialism. If one could deny that strong essentialism is true
without denying that weak essentialism is true, he would have to
hold that there Might be two objects such that one has a certain
property essentially while another does not hawe that property es-
sentially. Thus he must hold that for some open sentence A and
some I and I', «('n.x\aA\ H, I)=T and cpVn.A-oP
, H> r)=T
_ ^
let B correspond to some contingent property such that <p( B ,H, I')=T
but <p( OB
,
H, I
' )/T. If B is independent of A, then
^V' D(A T B)" * H ’ I)=T «P(V-(A t B)n
,
H, 1 1 )=T but
*p( (A V B)
> H, I )1T. But this is inconsistent with the denial
of
-strong essentialism.
In other words, if A is a formal property and u is essen-
lly A but V is not, and B is a material property such that v
is B, then u is essentially such that Ay B, v is such that A v B,
but v is not essentially such that A v B.
This argument shows that if we assume that a model is not
anti-essentialist (as in (l)), and we add only the additional as-
sumption that something has a contingent property, we can conclude
that the model does not conform +n- to the requirement based upon the
denial o, .troog essentials It is> then> ^ a^^
t i0r =«y model q>, if there is some one-place open formula
A such that 4>CoA\ H, I)*! hut <p(A, H I)=T
> ) 1
,
for some H and I
,
then
^ 13 “ antl ~eSSentialist m°del if and only if it is a PP-model.
iii
But at first glance von Wright's principle seems to be much
weaker than anti-essentialism. It seems to be consistent with
doctrines that resemble some traditional forms of essentialism;
the distinction between material and formal properties may be accep-
table to many who hold essentialist views; and we can construct
Is that appear to fulfill the conditions laid down by von Wright
even though they do not have some of the seemingly peculiar conse-
quences of anti-essentialism.
For example
,
von Wright's principle PP appears to be consis-
tent with the essentialist view that to predicate of an object
that it belongs to a particular species or genus is to say some-
thing necessarily true or necessarily false. Some have wanted to
say that each man is necessarily a man and necessarily an animal,
that each thing that is not a man is necessarily not a man, and
that ea-h ching that is not an animal is necessarily not an animal.
All of this seems quite consistent with von Wright’s notion of for-
mal properties, which need not be universal, essential properties.
PP seems weaker than anti-essentialism in several important
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vays. PP allows that things of different ™pecies might have different
It allows that abstract objects might be essentially
different from *aterial objects. (Men are necessarily men hut lions
are necessarily not men. Three is necessarily a number but each
material object is necessarily not a number.) Anti-essentialism,
other hand, forces us to say that if three is necessarily
a number then everything, including the hitchen sinh, is necessarily
a number. ^
All Of this suggests that our previous version of PP, which
turned out to be eoui vai pni j-_ . •q le t to anti-essentialism, may have been
faulty. We shall try to find a plausible version of PP whlch is
not equivalent to anti-essentialism.
way m which we might try to reconstruct PP so that it
vas not equivalent to anti-essentialism would be to formally con-
strue the notion of a property in terms of the primitive predicates
of the language, rather than in terns of the open sentences of the
language. Construed in this way, PP says that for any primitive
Eredicate Pn
,
every n-tuple satisfies 1 ** rn.xPp(oPxr . ,xn v tHPx^.x ?
or every n-tuple satisfies V/l(e Pl ,
.
t Px x 0
Hie reconstrual of von Wright's conjecture seems to preserve
the intuitive difference between PP and anti-essentialism. If
being a man is symbolized by a primitive predicate 'M\ it is now
permissible for one thing to satisfyW even though other things
do not satisfy 'Mx' at all.
This version of PP is entailed by anti-essentialism (and
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hence by the earlier version of PP') v,. ^ery anti-es sentialist model
is such that PP is true at every world But th •* • ere is no apparent
1 68,son "to "think ~"cnat this nev version of PP Pn 4- Q ,--i 0
- e tails anti-essentialism.
The interesting question for us now is .whether this construal
of PP leads to the resnii Tr .ult that von Wright says Toes and whether
that result corresponds to Theorem A (or its corollary). Does PP,
a principle which is apparently weaker than anti-essentialism, en-
tail that quantifying in is unnecessary? Von Wright says that
acceptance of PP
quantification°uninteresting
a
^si^
1C & « and
from a combined use which would not
^
cation alone in conbinp+^r, ?,
follow from quant ifi-
Or material nature of the f°OTal
What von Wright says is quite obscure. But It strongly
suggests the thesis that PP entails that each de re formula is
equivalent to some de dicto formula. 16 0ne thing that is suggested
is that Theorem A (or its corollary) is true for any model q, in which
PP holds in every possible world. 17 If ve can prove this to he true
we will have a stronger result than Theorem A, since PP apparently
applies to more models than anti-essentialism does.
Let us now redefine a PP-model as a model <p on a model
structure <0. K, |, t> such that for any primitive „-place predi-
cate Pn and any assignment I, cp( ' n.x^aP^
. . .x
n
v x ?
,
H
,
l)=T
or ip(
r
n.x
P
iD( 0 Pxi . . . x
n
.
(/~-pXl • • • x
n )
7
,
H, I )=T (for any n.xP
constructible from
> • •
•
)
x
n
)
•
We can then recast von Wright's
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0lalm aS the thesis that— *^ an PP^ (and
not merely ant i
-assentialist models).
„is thesls> then
_
1#
Theorem if?: If <P is a PP-model on <G, K, K2,^ , thsn
for any closed wff A therp ? c Q n^ e is a closed wff A' such that
A' contains no quantifying in and for any HEK,
cp(A', H) = cp(A
,
H).
To prove Theorem APP it is helnf^T +p ul to show that at least
one relationship between PP and the denial ofa -l strong essentialism
holds
• Xf (o j q o pp -i ,
n r p
m°del then for “V Primitive predicate
’
^f>( n .oPx
1
...x
n ,
H, I)=T for some H and I, then
V(V^r
-n^r •V ’ H. D»T for all „ and I. Eyery
PP-model implements the denial of the strong form of essentialism
vhere essentialism is construed as a thesis about the interpretation
of the primitive predicates of the language (rather than a thesis
about the interpretation of all open formulas). The proof is straight-
forward.
Next we can show that any model on a structure ^G, K, K2
,f)
which implements the denial of strong anti-essentialist with respect
to primitive predicates is such that any formula is necessarily
equivalent to a formula without quantifying in. Since each PP-model
fulfills this condition, proving this demonstrates Theorem APP.
We must first define an operation * which constructs, for
each formula A, a formula A* which lacks quantifying in. A* is
construed from A by replacing every wff W in A by Bt, where B+
is r((n
i
x
B
.B
1 )v...v(nI xB .BW )).B*\ where
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as
in
i) B is (x) (x=y) -p m r rn B _pv x I H n.x
. aB H T '1-m ~
i ^
i > IJ-i, for some H and I,
11 ) B is r( 3x) (x^x) otherwise.
* replaces each formula raBn by where is defined
in chapter 5 (and the Appendix). (Naturally if n0 wff W occurs
A, A*=A.
)
cate P
,
if
Lemma 1: If „ ls a model such that for ^ prlmltive pre(J ._
r P _
<P( n.x ,QPx
...X ’ H T'l-m -pi 1 xn ,
, Ij-T for some H and I, then
'
~"“1
X>(
r
n.x
P
=(PXl . . •X
n
=BPx
1
. . .xj', H, I)=T for every H and I,1 1 l n'
~ for any wff A and any H and 1. *A., h> i} .^ H> J}
Proof: By induction on the number of truth-functional con-
nectives, quantifiers and modal operators in A.
Lemma 2: If (p is a model such that R=P and <p satisfies
the conditions of Lemma 1, then for any closed wff A there is a
closed wff A' lacking modal operators such that cp(A-
,
H) = <p(A
,
H).
Proof: Let A' he A*
A* is closed if A is, since for any wff c, C* is free in
the same variables as C.
A' lacks modal operators
.
By Lemma 1, <p(A*, H) = tp(A, H).
Theorem APP follows from Lemma 2, since every PP-model
satisfies the conditions of Lemma 1 (and every formula without modal
operators lacks quantifying in).
We can get a more intuitive picture of the connection between
PP and quantifying in by comparing simplified versions of PP to anti-
essentialism. Thus, if we consider only models such that R=K2 and
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" C°nSidSr °Rly
~ can see more clearly
rhj rcodalitifes are dispensable if pp f s true.
^
The auoi-essentialist holds that all objects have the same
essential properties. That u is necessarily F can not distinguish
u from any other object of the univerqp t-on se. In proving Theorem A we
s^ply constructed W* in such a way that it is necessarily satis-
fied if and only if something is necessarily B. (For atomic one-
place predicate B, r OB^ ls either
'(x)(x=x)' or ’( 3x)(x*c)'. 1„
the former case it is necessarily satisfied by everything. In the
latter it is necessarily not satisfied.) That is enough, because
n anti essentlalist models, whatever is necessarily satisfied is
necessarily satisfied by everything.
But for models of which PP is true we need more. Even if
r
°B^ is satisfied, it may be satisfied by some but not all objects
.
What we do know is that if raB^ ls satisfied at all, then it is
satisfied by u if and only if u satisfies B. So by conjoining B
to^ we get a formula which is satisfied whenever W is satisfied.
(The definition of A* also changes because PP is restricted to pri-
mitive predicates, of course.)
Von Wright's thesis says, in effect, that objects may have
different essences, but any property that is an essence is an essence
Of everything that has it.
1
3
But Prior and Cresswell 19 have objected to von Wright’s
claim that de re modalities can be eliminated in favor of formulas
lacking Quantifying in T-n +>n‘o Sec lon 311(1 the °ue that follows
ve will examine the arguments they give to • -y l determine if they apply
to von Wright
' s claims and if they show any inadequ-v inj -1- aequct.cy m our results
.
Prior interprets von Wright to he saying that if PP is true
,
then the distinction between MsxJa’ and "(3xW breaks down, for’
any wff A. Prior says that von Wright
lated
S
into'
a
modai assert”onfdaTT 0"8 — — ' Can be trans-for example
,
is equivalent
^
t(3x)°^’
^ Prior^produces a counter-example to show that for some A,
r
Ox)DA1 and ‘"3xA1 differ in truth-value.
If we rule out empty domains
a(3x)(~Bx v ( 3x ) ( By )
)
is true for any B, since r (3x)(~Bx v (3y)(By)P is a theorem of
quantificational logic. But if B expresses a contingent property,
and
r
{>((3x)Bx.(3x)~Bx?
,
then
(3x)a(~Bx v(3y)By)
IS false. Prior concludes that either von Wright’s argument that
PP entails the eliminability of de re modality is wrong or PP is
false
.
But Prior's example does not show that de re modalities
are not eliminable. It merely shows that r( 3x )aA1 can not always
be replaced by rD ( 3x)Al But there might still be some other formula
that is true whenever IbxJdA1 is true but which lacks quantifying
in (de re modality } . '‘(BxJda"' could then be "translated into" that
formula.
In the above example A expresses „ „P a property that is not
necessarily true of anything c n r/ 3 ^t . so (3x)d(~Bx v (y)ByJ* is tn
w , w
way/ , for example
,
(3x)((x)(x=x. (~Bx v (y ) By )
)
(assuming that 'B' i s atomic). The cmantif •
in the * f
‘
ln has been elinlnatean ormula, and thp * -p~
ls _
formula is true whenever the original
the
80nera1
’ " °“ 6 *—
-at is true whenever
or-gmal xs, as we have shown in the preceding section.
Pnoir's objection fails because it k .- is an objection to a
translation. ^ Sh°WS that Ve can nob simply reverse
t V
rder °f“flerS
-—— - still have formulas
•a are bivalent. But von Wright never argued that any such
simple procedure for constructing de dicto formulas from de re
formulas would yield an equivalent formula Althux i . ough von Wright
"6S n° SP6CifiC SUSS— *1. ^ard, we have seen that
Theorem APP can he proved, and that theorem seems to capture what
von Wright might have been saying. The construction of A* from A
is not a simple translation procedure based on the switching of
quantifiers and modal operators, but it does allow us to prove the
result suggested by von Wright's remarks.
But Prior's second objection to von Wright's argument is
-ch stronger. It leads us to things that must be considered in
evaluating the significance of Theorems A and APP.
Prior argues that von Wright can show that if PP holds
,
then for each formula A, there are formulas21 A' and A" such that
A' and A" both lack de re modalities and for any u, u satisfies A
1U2
if and onlv if' if- c.^+- .
-
-11 it satisfies A * ov v. „ 4. • ...p a satisiies A i-p ~ jlf and only if u
satisfies A'
' pri-- • P or says that if, for anv „ ,
only if i + . r
' SatlSfied A if andlt satisfied A' v A " 7
n
. ,
5 " 1" n ^°n WriSht ^ould have estab-
ties ( 1 . e
. ,
r
A’ v A’
—0
This would show that de re Modalities- ~ ‘UVUCU.X Li tCo
are dispensable, since a single formula would be necessarily e •n , Tce quiva-
A no matter how A was interpreted.
Prioir's remarks bear some relationship to the results that
ve have established. our construction * does not n
and cn e 7
takS a Tormula
-a construct another which is true in all the same worlds i,^SoiSi- - operates on a form^a A and a model and what formiaa
1
-c constructs as a replacement for a win ic l A ll depend upon features of cP ,
not just on the structure of A Two -Pn i° . formulas with the same structure
ffllS“U" diff6r
;
nt rePlaC6mentS
- In Edition, we can not merely
and A*
,
for two models cp and q>* and expect to have one
single formula necessarily equivalent to A in each model.
T° 366 thlS
’
C°nSlder the blowing example
. Suppose that
' F ' 1S a one-place atomic predicate.
(a) ( 3x ) aFx
will be replaced by
(a r ) ( 3x ) ( ( x ) ( x=x ) . Fx
)
or by
(a") ( 3x ) ( 3x ) ( x^x )
.
Fx
)
depending upon whether 'F' exureqq^Q Q -p
„
p sses a formal or material property.
Neither (a') not (a") is true in nil; b m all of the same worlds
as (a) in
-lOdv- 1
. 1 1 tp i s a model such that 'P'
„ ,
™ F expresses
je m all the worlds of 4). if tp,
property in w ( or a .Qnn .
* ”aterial
(a-) ar d f >
^ h°WS ° f <**•<*), then
a are true in all of the same worids of cp. *at PPguarantees is that these are ,the only two sorts of models.
We have the sane problem that we had with aw i
. ...
a a
. A s neces-
eerily equivalent to A in model cp but 4<P ,U A 13 "ot necessarily equi-
valent to A in every model
.
snown that if we want to develop the theory of a
Structure <0. K, K2
,^>
,
and our model for that the
pp
ory i S to make
rue, then a language which is weaker than QMrL provides, for each
^ “—
-ntifyin, in which is true
- a translation which is true in all of the same worlds as the
Srven formula no matter how that given formula is interpreted
vi
We have shown that for any PP-model cp and any olosed formula
a closed 1 omul a A’ such that A’ lacks quantifying in and
<P(A ’’ H) = ,
'" (A
’
H)
' ?ri °r reluires that a stronger equivalence
hold before we say that quantifying in is eliminable. Oresswell
follows Pr.or m making the stronger requirement that rAsA ' 1 be
prorable “ a f0rr“al SySte” that has Yon Wright's principle of predi-
cation as an axiom. Given that there is such an axiom22
,
this is
equivalent to requiring that for each formula A there u
a i
is a formula
“S 4uantlfy«8 in which is true in all of thJa ° e same worlds* E2fel 2 which makes that axiom necessarily true.
Cresswell has attempted to demonstrate that thi
not ton o ,
ls result doeshold for models which qntic-ey that Somatic version of the
principle of predication. But as vp «,
„ .
o, we saw in chapter 5
, his alleged
demonstration of this i cm s unsuccessful. As °a a result
,
we are left
without a proof or disnroor + u
•
f this stronger result.
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PerhaPS^ than two if A »as more than one modal
(xHCA.^-Ajl^S^bears3 tte aXiC”" SChema r(x)(DA T °~A ) vOf PP that Parsons's anti-essentSim 1^ 0" 3!! 1’ t0 °Ur versl°nof anti
-essential ism. It overlooks ms 77 bears to our version(tf quantification is interpreted as^JpL ilL^L^S).
SECTION III
ESSENTIALISM
CHAPTER 8
essentialism
suggested that users of QML should be careful to evaluate
the extent to which their use of QML Involves linguistic resources
that are unnecessarily controversial if essentials is to be es-
chewed. In particular, we should expect a defense of essentials
and an explanation of the .
.
Ln related notions of metanh^soitap ysical necessity
and possibility from those vho see OMTn Q L as an appropriate language
for the statement of th^or-’Vq p11+ ,^es- But we have not directly considered
the question of whether or not essen+i.rtialism is an acceptable doctrine
in this part we will evaluate the ways in which one might
defend the metaphysical views that we have shown are associated
With In Parti
— - ** to see how some traditional
metaphysical arguments bear on the acceptability of essentials
OW much the apparent need to maAe the verbal distinctions that
are made m QML, with its full apparatus for quantifying in, support
traditional metaphysical views.
we Will find that after the essentialist doctrine associated
With QML is distinguished from other metaphysical doctrines, scant
resources for its defense are available.
1^8
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As we emphasized in chapter 3, we are „
oret-d .
concerned with inter-
p b .
°rieS-ia4—— —^notions of
J
y and ne-lty— “—y realistic interpre-tation. Krinkp ' c r, ^P e S set-theoretic semantics as in "q
. ,
’ Semantical Con-
siderations " rpflo n+P,
blllt
'
°nly the br0adest
characteristics of possi-i i y and necessity so it tq j
„
.
adaptahie to many related notions.
our concern is with a metaphysical doctrine essential
•
ism, and
connection with the semantics for QML theories
( 0f_ IC course,
1 anal°gUeS t0 thia metaphysical doctrine may binn he associated
ith other notions of necessity u +
, ,
' ^ ™ leave that question open
nere.) Our concern is with the necessitySSSl associated with general
theories of reality—with necessity. as a modality of truth. 1
But saying that we are concerned with necessity as it is
incorporated into theories does not pinpoint a particular sort of
necessity. We can think of appropriate notions of necessity which
correspond to various segments of a ™ +
•
continuum of necessity concepts.
Considering only the uses of the modal operator before closed
formulas we can roughly characterise the continuum in the following
At °n- end i, „he notion of bare
, unadorned logical necessity
Only the theorems of first-order logic plus S 5 are designated as
necessary. Even "All bachelors are unmarried" is not necessary
in this bare sense of the word 'necessary'.
We can enric.i our notion of necessity by adding to the stock
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necessary tvn+'he n ,
ruths
, thus addina- "att ^
truths to th
Bre Unmarriea " “4 °th“ "«*
t necessary truths, a stillxJ_ OToadGi' notion nf
necessity would be what we might call '
-
8 C 1 semantical
' or
'linguistic'
necessity.
"All ^ +v, •thlnSs are colored" might hp
c .
n be an example of an ence which is linguistically necessary but not analytic
.
2
^
”” br°ader n°tIOn °f
““““r **** be that of meta-physical necessity. "Goa exists" and
"Socrates is b "
which might be held t a
^ Sentences
s o o be necessarily
analvti c 11
th°u«h th^ are noty i ally or semantically necessary.
A still broader notion of necessity is that of physlcal
necessity (where all of the previous categories are understood to
e sub-categories of the physically necessary). According to some.
natural laws are physically, but not metaphysically, necessary.
Physically necessary that bodies in proximity exert a
onal attraction, even though it is metaphysically possible that
no such attraction exist between proximate bodies
.
3
All or these are legitimate concepts of necessity and Kripke's
8 neral set-theoretic semantics seems to be adequate to capture
the fundamental structure of all of them. In addition, our theories
about the world miAht “ho v,, ,°“ " °Ught t0 invoke any of these notions of
necessity.
These five notions have been presented here as segments of
a continuum. But it has been traditional for philosophers to pick
a point on this continuum and treat all things prior to that point
as on a par with resuect
-n •P' 0t t0
necessitation
.
nor example, Alvin m . .anoinga discusses necessitvit were a
nece y as though
we have describe h
least vhat
as metaphysical necessity. 1* He refers to th'
°ften as "broadly logical" np •.e ecessity and he calls 'o' „ "
operator." Yet he •*
a semantical
cites as necessary truths many tradition i
Physical doctrines whl h
*"
al meta~
semantical •
^ ^ 0"l0USly
Purely
considerations.
Plantings
-s support for the necessity of these met h
truths „ .
b ap ysical
^ nests ultimately on an appeal to + •
about vhat
“ S °rtS °f
“‘Pitions
15 Possible and impossible It. m v
regards th=
' that Plant
“ea
x codj u.s ese aDD°fli « j._ .
.
intuition as appeals to our intuitions
a °Ut what is semantically acc^ntahT^y CCep ble ^d unacceptable. If SOj
then he is assuming that what we have called un the
"semantically’ 1
necessary should he merged T.r?+v, uwith what we have called the "meta-
physically” necessary.
^ 18 thlS C°nCePt ° f metaPhysieal
-semantical necessity
et Plantinga takes as primary 'thisP . Thi concept lies at the base
of vhat he calls the "depraved" semantics for QML, vhere the notion
possible vorld is taken 4uite seriously as a model of vhat is
£SaUy possible (i.e., of a fully realized state of affairs).
11113 °f C°UrSe d0eS n0t pr0hlblt Plentinga from recognizing
that more limited notions of necessity, such as bare logical necessity
can be distinguished from the concept he considers. It is Just that
he takes this metaphysical necessity as somehov characterizing the
152
notion of 7*0 R2. r>p f>p Q Q -] -f-r r m-1
-
-he possible worlds associated with that
=or^ oj necessity are the worlds he regards as ,.,118i a really possible.
In contrast, quite a different view is associated with tradi-
tional positivism. It can be characterized as the view that necessity
13 baSed ia langUage
- ™ «"t taken to encompass logical
truths and analytic truths-truths certifiable by logical rules and
definitions alone. It was found necessarvy to supplement these to
account for the apparent necessity of "Red things are colored" for
example
. The notion of a meaning postulate, a linguistic rule which
is neither a logical nor a definitional truth, seemed to handle
these cases (which we earlier subs^ed cuider the category of seman-
tically necessary truths).
Wo special category of metaphysically necessary truths
recognized. In fact, an attempt was made to rule metaphysical
out of the language entirely.
was
claims
(Physical laws might be regarded as necessary or not on such
a view. The important thing is that if they are regarded as neces-
sary, their necessity must be viewed as necessity of quite a dif-
ferent sort from that of purely linguistic necessities.)
Quine critique of necessity, particularly of this linguistic
theory of necessity, has two parts. First he criticizes the view
that there is a special category of the linguistically necessary.
Ke argues that truths differ in the degree to which they are central
to our conceptual scheme—thus seeming to take a view of such truths
vhich places them on a continuum, and the segment beginning at one
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end of that continuum vould be the o + •
few „
C °ntlnU™ of truths described aPages ago. He refiiboc +uses to apply the word ,nece
ve ha.™
ssary to the truths
nct i. been discussing sinr>~ Vi Q *o mc. he does not believ- tw •
u Inat their truth
J 7.
SPeCial StatUS“
-— determination to retainr Sllef “ "ae"-
-quantified modal logic is eschewed.
*s views on +>%? r, are well known and they are no( .
concern of this dissertation. 5
What IS our concern is Quine's further attack on QML. He
argues that even if ve adopt something like the linguist,'uistic conception
oi necessity favors wby the positivists
,
ve still will not have an
adequate way to give an interpretation to formulas with quantifying
unless we adopt a metaphysical view, essentials. But such
a course should never appeal to positivists, who abhor such doctrines.
If we view Quine's argument in this way, we can see how
diSSertatl °n
’ t08ether WUh
»rk, lends support to
We have found that anti-esse^^ interpretations negate
thS °nt0l0^ Cal impaCt °f
*2. *L -dalities by making de re modalities
Sllminable ^ Vay * ^US
’ taiinS QML seriously and taking
essentialism seriously enough to deny it leads f ny to a retreat from im-
portant uses of the third grade of modal involvement.
In addition, as Parsons has shown, adding analytic truths
to our stock of necessary truths introduces no essentialism, since
analytic truths are, presumably, closed, non-modal formulas. As
have seen, analytic truths also introduce no explanation of
~dUClb1
'-- ^ modalities
,
since a model <p
A
constructed from a
maximal model ip by male-inn- ,
,
‘ all analytic truths necessary •
dunpq ^ . truths introno insliminable de re modalities
.
,ve saw dn chapter 1 essential-
’ l lia- is introduced in the
^ ^ VheD
generalization is allotted on
;;r:
iike
,f,soessariiy
’
s°—
-
b_xng human and beino- e-reate-r +h ^ng gr e than 7 must be treated as
rT
3 ( °f S
T
ateS “d 9 reSPeCt"ely) Wh“ inferences arefreely allowed.
But as Quine recognized we must be able to it v
„i + , n]VIT
M llnk essentialism
QMt theories even when such theories do not have constants
-d definite descriptions in their primitive apparatus, if Quine , s
argument is to hare any force In h tl . chapter 5 we shoved that there
fact, a link between essentialism and QML theories.
What we are concerned with in this section is the nature
Of the necessity that is connected with essentialism. We hare
referred to it before as "metaphysical necessity." tte metaphysical
essentialism says that some things have different essences
1 ' e” ^ ^ th3t °“e th“« necessarily F even though
another is not necessarily F, for some property F.
But there is no apparent reason why this metaphysical doc-
trine is not associated with all of the notions of necessity men-
tioned in connection with the continuum described earlier. 7 A
theory is essentialist if it is a theory about reality which associ-
ates some properties more closely with objects than others and if it
differentiates among objects with respect to these "closely associated"
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The important thing is that essentialism says that
-me, tut not all, of an object's propertles
_^^ ^being of some, but not all, objects.
Consider the continue sketched above. Any one of those
necessity concepts, in so far as it is empl0yed at all ln staWng
a theory, says something about the real status of the truths to
aPPll6S
' Whe" “ “ US6d “
-nnection with quantifyingm it marks a "nrivil "ged connection between objects and some of
their properties
.
However, with the most rudimentary notions of necessity,
~ l0SiCal “d “alytlC
—ssity, the corresponding essentialist
s not very plausible. In general with bare logical neces-
aity, we^ win say that something necessarily satisfies A if and only
If (X)A is a necessary truth. Everything is essentially P or not-F
everything is self
-identical
,
etc. Ho essences peculiar to single
’
individuals are associated with bare logical necessity.
Similarly, if it is a consequence of logical truths and
i ons that F*s ars G's lh<=n i +- , .
'
b 3 5 t e xt 13 essential to each thing
that if it is an F, then it is a r t+ .’ G. It seems implausible to associ-
ate essentialist distinctions with analytic necessity.
It is only broader notions of necessity which are associated
with essentialism. Thus interpreted theories such that Socrates
(but not everything) is necessarily human, or such that 9 (but not
everything) is necessarily greater than 7 admit essentialism.
we shall consider the extent to which the
In what follows
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sentialism associated vith such broader
"metaphysical" necessity
can be defended.
Contrary to common use, physical necessity lnclude(J^
t ^ '“ed. ^ discussions of physicaine.essitj one often finds examples like the following8 given as
a-Ueged examples of physical necessity.
"It is nhve-' n
,
J p ysically necessary
that whoever drinks from that well gets poisoned." Such examples
^e imPlaUSlble *»« they ignore the facts (among others)
that it is physically possible for the well not to have contained
poison, for someone to take a very small, non-lethal drink, for
someone to have taken an antidote prior to drinking, The conditional
linking poisoning with drinking is not necessary in any plausible
Such alleged cases of "physical modality" are better construed
as counter-factuals of some sort or other. Counter-factuals allow
for the defeasibility of the claimed connection between antecedent
and consequent.
Ws, on the other hand, shall not construe physical
modality in any way that lends itself most naturally to such a counter-
factual interpretation. The sorts of examples of physical modality
to keep in mind are more of the sort "For any two physical bodies,
It is necessary that there exist a gravitational attraction between
then” or "It is physically necessary that the total amount of energy-
matter in the universe remain uniform." The necessity here is absolute-
0°" a defeasible link like that asserted in a counter-factual.
It seems most natural to treat physical modality so understood
" °“ a aletWC *« r-Peet to nations about
Are there any Pr°Perties physically necessary to an
oc.ject which are not necessarv +. 0 Qn , .-iv-i.ebsary to all objects’ Thp+ ,*«,0 inat ls the question
OP whether
"physical" essentials holds
, md in terms Qf
_^
system, it is just the question of whether or not there are any i„-
eliminable cases of quantifying Into physical modalities. 9
ii
We haVe COtlSldered SOme 8tric«* formai characterisations
of essentialist models in proving our results. Careful considera-te of the formal apparatus of QML was vhat was needed to allow
OS to prove the results of part IX of this dissertation. But the
formal definition of an essentialist model gives us little feel
for the substantive metaphysical position of essentialism.
In proving our formal results it was useful to generalize
some of the things we considered. Our definitions dealt with the
satisfaction of open formulas of the form rmA° by n-tuples of ob-
jects, rather than considering only essential properties of single
objects. But traditional essentialist views have been concerned
only with essential properties of things, not essential relations of
n-tuples, and it will simplify and clarify our considerations of
these views if we consider only one-place open formulas. 10
In defining essentialist models we quickly passed by the
notion of an essential property, and we have made little direct
use of this fundamental notion in our formal proofs. We should
remind ourselves that an essential property of an object u is one
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that u could not lack, i. e
. one th,+ v,
’ - 1 at u has in every possible world.
-n open sentence A with only one free variable expresses an e + •ssential
property of u if and only if u satlsfies ^ 11
As ve hare seen Preriously, essentialism is not merely the
position that there are objects with essential properties. In order
to characterize a controversial form of essential
•
ism, we must define
it as the view that at least some obiec+qj ts have non-trivial essential
properties, i.e., properties that are not essential to ererything .
Remembering that a possible world corresponds to the intui-
tive notion of a counter-factual qitnn+is uat on or possible set of cir-
cnmstances, we see that a property is essential to an object if that
object must hare it, no matter what situation that object is in.
^ m°tiYatlng
-taphysical notion here is that there are some proper-
ties of a thing which are so much a part of its being that that thin*
could not possibly exist without haring those properties. No matter
vhat could possibly hare happened, it would hare had those properties.
Saul Kripke has discussed the metaphysics associated with
QML the°rieS ' 12 He has distinguished this necessity from sereral
other traditional philosophical notions with which it has often been
merged. In what follows we will compare this notion of necessity
and essentialism to sereral related notions. Based on Kripke 's
arguments and some generally held news about the metaphysics associa-
ted with QML, we will show how this metaphysics can be distinguished
from many traditional philosophical riews. But we should then ques-
tion whether this independence has good or bad consequences for the
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BOdal l0SiCian
' In P ' rtlC— > * -* * hov one can support
a metaphysics which is isolated in this way from otber phllosophical
considerations
. Drawing on Kripke's work, we win construct „ de_
terms of the semantics of ordinary language. But we shall
find good reasons to be skeptical about the efficacy of such an
approach
.
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of the first things we must examine is a traditional
way of separating properties into essential and accidental proper-
ties based upon the changes that objects can undergo. This tradi-
tional metaphysical doctrine c^ls a property an accidental' pro-
perty of an object if that object can change ( in time) with respect
to that property. If an object can be F and then non-F, non-F and
then F, then that object is only accidentally F (or non-F). It is
essentially F only if it would cease to exist if it were to cease
to he F.
The doctrine that objects hare such properties has at least
as much right to be called ’essentialism' as the doctrine we hare
associated with QML; and it seems to haye even more right to be called
'Aristotelean essentialism '
.
13
But it must be carefully distinguished
from the metaphysical view that we hare been discussing.
The doctrine associated with QML distinguishes among the
properties of an object on the basis of what properties it could
and could not have. Socrates is essentially a man if he could not
have failed to be a man—i.e., if he must be a man in emery possible
i6o
s i 1 113,13 i on ( wopld
)
This doctrine has no obvious connection with the considera-
tions of Change and subsistence through change that motivate the
other doctrine which is aXso caiied
’essentialism’
. One might hold
that nothing that is a man can change into an object that is not
a nan. One need not, on those grounds, hold that there is no possible
circumstances m which something that is actually a man could
have heen otherwise ("t-p mroi
' ( If evolution had been slower, we would all
be chimpanzees."
"If he were a pig, he wouldn’t eat any differently
than he does now.") Holding that no man can become a chimp does not
force one to deny that someone (say Socrates) might have been a chimp
rather than a man.
But if one adopts this traditional view about the changes
a thing can undergo, one would probably want to say that there are
certain properties that Socrates has necessarily. One will probably
say that he necessarily has the property of not changing from a man
to a chimp (or from a chimp to a man). But this property will not
distinguish him from anything else. On this view, nothing can change
from being a man to being a chimp. This view may involve arguing that
a certain property is necessary of everything, but it does not need
to involve arguing that some things are distinguished from others
by the properties they can not possibly lack. As we have emphasized,
it is the doctrine that there are non-trivial essential properties,
i‘ e,> ProPer b'ies essential to some things but not others, that is
controversial. Considerations of change lend no support to that
doctrine
.
'hSn
’
a oellef that some properties belong to
Objects throughout all changes the, undergo hoes not force one to
conclude that the metaphysical doctrine we hare linked with QML is true
and arguments based on change can be expected to give no support
to tne sore of essentialism we have been concerned with.
Another doctrine related to change has sir.iilg n m lar consequences
for the metaphysics of Qffi, vis. none. A variant of the doctrine
just discussed gives it an epistemological turn, arguing that each
thing has properties by which we can identify it as persistent
through change. Obviously this variant entails the doctrine discussed.
If there is a property by which we can identify
. thing as persistent
through change, there must be a property of that thing that per-
sists through all of its changes (i.e., the one by which we identify
it).
An argument similar to that showing that considerations
of ohange do not support the essentialism associated with QML shows
that adherence to the epistemological variant of this doctrine does
adherence to the essentialism associated with QML. One
might hold (implausibly) that a man retains certain memories through
all cnangeo he can undergo, i.e., that in every possible world in
which he has those memories, he never loses them, and that we can
identify him as the same man in virtue of those memories. One need
not hold, on those grounds, that he must have those memories in every
possible world. Some quite different property (or different set of
nes) might serve to identify him in another possible world. 15
Of course, someone might hold that some objects have certain
properties with respect to which they can not change, and they are
Identifiable in every possible world, throughout their careers, by
SUCh proPsrtles - Such a doctrine conjoins all thrJ 11 ee essentialisms
discussed saying that: l) a u p uJ is i in every possible world and not
everything is F in every possible world; 2) a can not cease to he
^ “ d ^ WS C“ ideatlfy “ in^ being F. But if the
considerations adduced above are correct, then such a doctrine can
not be defended solely in terms of considerations of change and
identity through change, since a defense of(2) and(3) is not sufficien
to establish (l). A separate defense of fl) ict [ 1 ) is needed to substantiate
such a doctrine.
There may be arguments linking modal essentialism with one
of these doctrines about change. But it should be clear that an
argument would, have to be given before we could conclude anything
about the metaphysics of QML from arguments in favor of these other
theories
. Showing that there is some property that must stay with
a thing through all changes it undergoes
,
or that there is some pro-
perty by which we identify it as the same object persisting through
changes will not be adequate to show that something has an essential
property—at least not a property which is essential in the way
relevant to QML. A modal logician must defend essentialism with
arguments other than the traditional arguments based on change. 1^
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There are many uses of 'essentially.,
'necessarily', and re-
lated terms. As we have seen, different metaphysical doctrines
have been called
'essentialism'
. Similarly, some common non-metaphysi-
cal uses of the words
'necessarily' and 'possibly' can lead to some
eonfusion about the metaphysics of QML and the sorts of arguments
ohat can be used to support it.
Probably the most common ordinary use of most modal terms
is in connection with what has sometimes been called epistemic
possibility. By 'It’s possible that he went', 'He might have gone',
'He didn't necessarily do that', etc., we often mean to say 'For
I know he did &0 1 fin fiv,c+ 4. \° U the flrst two cases) or ’For all I know
he didn't do that' (in the third). 17
This use oi modal terms has no apparent connection with
the metaphysical notions of possibility linked with QML theories.
A typical example of a property that belongs necessarily to each
chimpanzee
, according to most essentialists
,
is the property of being
a chimpanzee. No one should be tempted to conclude anything about
whether I know my hairy friend Ralph to be a chimpanzee from the
(alleged) fact that he is, in the metaphysical sense, necessarily
a chimpanzee. It is possible, for all I know, that he is a gibbon,
even if it is metaphysically necessary that he is a chimp.
A more standard example points out that even though there
may oe, for all I know, an even number greater than two that is
the sum or two primes, Goldbach r s conjecture is necessarily true
l 61i
^ trUe ^ a11
' State °f knOTl^ iB quite independent
of the necessary truth or falsehood of Goldbach's conjecture.
Actually, distinguishing these sects tririal. If the seman_
tics for QML is to he explicated in terms of epistemic possibility
then we are using QML in a branch of epistemology, and the meta-
physical doctrines, e.s nccpntoi' ,,
‘
’ alism, ohat we have considered
would be quite irrelevant. Both Quine and Kripke agree that the use
of Modal terms associated with the sorts of theories we are consider-
ing is Metaphysical and entirely independent of the state of anyone's
knowledge. Quine indicates this when he says.
Used as a logical modality,
’necessari 1 v 1 im-n +.
unconditionally and impersonallv *«=
ly lmputes necessity
truth; and 'pjgsibly'XLT™ “ S’SS* °fthe negation. 18 necessity, m that sense, of
Despite the apparent clarity of the distinction between these
two uses of modal terms
,
the philosophical literature contains in-
stances of attributions of metaphysical necessity apparently based
upon considerations of the extent of knowledge. Such a confusion
seems to be at the basis of some of the essentialist attributions
that Descartes defends. 1^
Descartes's argument that he is not identical with any body20
can be very roughly sketched in the following way. In the context
01 Cartesian doubt, he says,
(1) As far as I know, no corporeal bodies exist.
(2) But I know of myself that I exist.
(3) a) So far as I know I exist and I am not a body. I.e.,
b) I am possibly not a body.
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(k) Hence 1 ^ not essentially a body.
(5) But if something is a body, it is essentially a body.
(o) Hence I am not a body.
(5) seems to be a metaphysical premise. (indeed, if we
suppose that the concern is epistemic possibility in (5), it would
*e ParaPhraSable ' If * * *><* then I hno. that x is a body'.)
But then if (6) is to folio., (U) must also be a metaphysical claim
(l.e., 'essentially' must not be used differently in (It) and (5)),
and if (It) is to folio, from (3b), (3b) must be metaphysical as
veil. Obviously
,
though, if (3b) is a metaphysical claim it is quite
independent of (3a) and not a mere restatement of it, so (l) and
(2) .ill provide it no support. Thus the equivocation in (3b)
between a restatement of (3a) and the metaphysical claim needed
to complete the argument seems to be at the heart of Descartes's
contention that he is not a body.
v
Similarly, metaphysical possibility must be distinguished
from conceivability. Once again ve find Descartes inferring metaphysi-
cal necessity from a non
-metaphysi cal notion.
(1) I can not feign that I am not a thinking being.
(2) So i am not such that it is possible that I am not
a thinking being.
(3) Hence I am a thinking being and being a thinking being
is essential to me.
Here we und that Descartes has again made a metaphysical conclusion
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irom non
-metaphysical premisses, apparently illicitly exploiting
the faCt ' P°SSible ' haS
-«* Of which have no connec-
tion with metaphysical concepts.
(1) seems to say "I can not conceive (imagine) that I am
not a thinking being." But there is no reason to think that Descartes's
Inability to conceive of his own thoughtlessness entails the impos-
sibility of such thoughtlessness. What humans can and can not
conceive ought to be carefully distinguished from what is possible
and impossible. Ihe latter concepts are metaphysical, not psycho-
logical or epistemological.”^
But in discussing conceivability and possibility we discuss
two notions that have been explicitly linked by many philosophers
of divergent backgrounds. In the case of concluding that something
was metaphysically possible from the fact that it was epistemologically
possible we could contend that the inference was based upon confusion.
Mo one had clearly distinguished the two notions and then argued
that they were linked in some way. Descartes's argument simply
proceeded as though they were linked, without any argument that
epistemic possibility guarantees metaphysical possibility.
But the connection of possibility with conceivability has
been explicitly made by many philosophers. Descartes, Hume, Kant,
Popper and Kripke have all employed arguments connecting the two
or argued that the two notions should be linked.
Hume, for example, specifically endorses both inferences—
from conceivability to possibility and from inconceivability to
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impossibility. For example,
iS!sSd!SeSlf “cs • ^ whatever
^lolutely impossible We canT/^T?
mountain, and from thence conclude that
° Z a golden
may actually exist. We can form no ^
a mountain
out a valley, and therefore regard Ua!
° * With ‘
a it as impossible. ^
To form a clear idea of anything, i £ment for its possibility, and is ai
,pretended demonstration against it/
fin undeniable argu-
te a refutation of any
*T>i?LyeS'3 are ade<Juate representations of objects
«« all appHcablftfibe'objec^s ° f "" id*“
/eas
Si
/st“e ^ TOmparlIon fffge
oui a^y contradictory , with-
Hune-S support for the inference from inconceivability to
impossibility is not totally unqualified. In the first quote he
does not specifically state the principle that what is inconceivable
impossible
, although he does give an example employing it. In
the third quote above, he confines the principle within the very
limited sphere of a discussion of extension and division. But his
support for the inference from conceivability to possibility is
clear and unqualified. The second of the passages just quoted is
a portion of Hume's famous argument that laws of nature are not
necessary because their contraries are conceivable (and hence possible)
The inference seems to be important to some of Hune's most widely
known views
.
W. C. Kneale has criticized Hume for making an unwarranted
conclusion in much the same way that we previously criticized the
argument from epistemic possibility to metaphysical possibility,
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arguing that Goldbach’s conjecture is conceivably false even if
it is necessarily true.
Kan Popper26 has made a rejoinder to Kneale. But his re-
joinder amounts lo a total conflation of conceivability and possi-
bility. Thus he says, "We may, roughly, describe as logically ne-
cessary what would hold in any conceivable world,"2 ? and "Logically
possible or 'conceivable' is everything that does not lead to an
obvious contradiction."2®
It may be that Hume simply equated conceivability and pos-
sibility. But if he did then there is no argent here that something
is metaphysically possible. His claim that no natural law is neces-
sary is merely a restatement of the claim1 Ln aira that the contraries of
all such laws are conceivable.
In any case, one of the two following situations holds.
Conceivability and possibility may be two distinct notions that
Hume was linking together. If so, he gives no argument to so link
them. Otherwise, conceivability and possibility were merely variant
idioms for a single notion
.
29
If so, then what Hume says lends
no support to any metaphysical conclusions one might draw on the
of ..on metaphysical claims, and what he says does not consti-
tube an argument at all.
One might, interpret Kant as arguing that vhat is possible
is crucially dependent upon our conceptual abilities. Thus, for
example, it is the fact that space is a "condition of the possibility
of experience of objects" that places limits upon what is geometrically
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possible But we shall not consider Kant's argents for two
reasons. To do so would take us far afield, into complex and ill-
understood territory. Also, the inferences from. l i conceivability to
possibility and inconceivability to impossibility that are ordi-
narily made are not defended by an appeal to Kantian arguments.
USe °f SUCh inferences ordinarily quite independent of Kantian
considerations
.
concei /able is thought to carry an appropriate success
presupposition, then the fact that something is inconceivable will
entail that it is impossible. For example, to say that p is conceiva-
ble might be to say that no a priori considerations rule out its
possibility, i.e.
,
that nothing that can be known a priori to be
metaphysically necessary is inconsistent with p. On this reading,
if P is inconceivable, then something that can be known a priori
to be necessary is inconsistent with p. Thus p is false in every
world that is a priori possible. But the metaphysically possible
worlds are a subset of these, because what is ruled out can be known
a Eriori to be impossible. But if a situation can be known to be
impossible, it is impossible.
If r p is inconceivable' is given the reading 'p is a priori
irrijyOoSxble
,
then what is inconceivable is impossible. But then
the argument that p is impossible because it is inconceivable is
unlikely to be persuasuve
,
since the premise will lack the self-
revealing status that it had on the prior reading of 'p is incon-
ceivable’. One would have to be able to determine that
~p is
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knowaole a ££iori (i.e.
,
that
~p is a jjrlorl necessary) to know
that p was inconceivable (a Priori impossible). Most philosophers
SZ'0 S."bl 0 to 8,P,7'60 that qa° “ a ” a large number °f cases
,
e.g. mathematical
and logical truths, can be known a priory to be necessary. And most
agree that these truths are metaphysically necessary truths (at least
in so far as it is agreed that the notion of metaphysical necessity
has any application at all 1 Rn+ respect to the interesting,
controversial
-? ~ „ 4. ,
5 at least as likely to doubt that p is,
in this case, inconceivable (i.e., that it can be known a priori
that is necessary) as one is to doubt that p is metaphysically
impossible, the success presupposition built into the notion of
knowability a £riori validates the inference from "It can be known
a priori that
~p is necessary' to 'p is metaphysically impossible';
but this success presupposition makes it difficult to see how one
could determine that the premise is true without presupposing the
truth of the conclusion.
In sum, then, we have found no argument to support the
inference from conceivability to possibility, and the inference from
inconceivao j.lit,y to impossibility is supportable only if conceiv-
ability is thought to carry a success presupposition—but then we
can expect to have no insight into any of the controversial cases
m WhiGh the Possibility or impossibility of something is in question.
vi
We have just noted a connection between 'It can be known
— P..rl°ri
.
p is necessary’ and 'p is necessary'. But that is
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a
-very triviar sort of connection. If someth in ,
t
thmg can be known ja priori
then it is true simply because it is true if uu n it can be known at all.
With su.itcibj_0 doctorino- n,-p , ..orxng of use-mention problems, we could have simply
dropped the words 'a nrinm' ' r
__
p ori and necessary' from the above; the
inference would still be valid.
But a more significant connection between the a priori and
the necessary has often been affirmed. It has often been claimed
that p can be known a priori if and only if p ls necessary. ^
with that claim, one often finds it alleged that p can be known
a priori if and only if p i s analytic.
Kripke has been puite explicit in divorcing necessity from
both of these notions, a Bri°ricity and analyticity
.
32
He has argued
that some necessary truths are known only a posteriori fe.v. "This
table is composed of vood")-although, it may be that any necessary
Con b- anown a priori—and that some contingent truths might
known a prion ( This stickfthe standard meter) is one meter long").
He also recognizes necessary truths that are not analytic ("Cicero =
Tully" and "Aristotle is a man"). (A major portion of this disserta-
tion has argued that in recognizing non-trivial instances of de re
attributions of necessity Kripke must divorce necessity from analyti-
city, so it is no surprise that he does so.)
Equating analyticity and the a priori was part of a major
program in twentieth century empiricism. It was thought that if it
could be shown that all a priori, knowledge was knowledge of analytic
truths
,
then the thesis that all important knowledge was based on
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experience could be supported. A priori knowledge was to be ex-
Plained away as knowledge of contentless ^
established merely by the way we use language.
Empiricists in this tradition, of which the logical positivists
are the primary example, also eschewed metaphysics, regarding it as
an attempt to reach beyond experience.
'Necessary- w ,ac and related terms
were to have a legitimate use only in so far as they could be equated
with the epistemological term
-a priori and terms related to it.
Thus metaphysical truths and a priori knowledge were both to be
g ounded m language, m so far as such metaphysical truths were to
te recognized as meaningful at all.
^us we find A. J. Ayer affirming that 33 "The certainty of
a priori propositions depends upon the fact that they are
.
analytic" and that 3 ^ "The validity nf a •a o a priori propositions depends
upon certain facts about verbal usage." He claims that it is the
possibility of going to a dictionary whenever a statement is not
empirical that legitimizes science-in contrast with metaphysics,
where neither experience nor dictionaries can help us . 35
Quine's arguments can be seen as attempts to show that one who
adheres to such a program will have difficulty in giving a semantics
for QML. Necessity must be explicated in an explicitly metaphyscial
way; it can not be explained solely in terms of analyticity if quanti-
fying m is allowed. We have supported the general thrust of Quine's
argument, if not the full force of his conclusion. If someone is
to make us of QML to state his theories about the world, and his
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uses of quantifying in are not to be eliminable, then he must expli-
cate at least some uses of i„ terms of a notion other than ana-
lyticity. Thus Kripke has done what the modal logician must do when
divorces necessity iron the linguistic conception supported by
the positivists. Necessity and analyticity must be distinguished
if quantifying in is not to be eliminable.
But once we have distinguished metaphysical possibility from
epistemological, conceptual and epistemic notions, and isolated
the related metaphysical notions from considerations of change and
from a solely linguistic conception of necessity, we should pause
to attempt to determine what is substantive in the metaphysical
concepts that remain. We must see whether we have not made it im-
possible to argue that these metaphysical concepts have application
and impossible to defend the essentialism that is associated with QML.
The burden of proof seems to be on the essentialist
; he must
defend a distinction among properties, those which are and those
which are not essences, and he must explain why certain properties
are essential to some things but not others. That this load is
actually burdensome becomes even more evident when we take into con-
sideration the reflections that have so far taken up this chapter.
The essentialist must convince us that certain properties and things
are necessarily associated, and it happens that in doing so he
can not effectively appeal to the non-modal things that we know
or can conceive. Similarly, the interesting claims of necessity
17 ^
aSS °Ciated SSSentiali^ and QML can not be based upon analy-
ticity. nor upon the a priori
.
But the essentialist is not at a loss for a basis for his
essentialism, even after the metaphysics of QML has been cut off
from these traditional philosphical doctrines. He can argue that in
ordinary English ve often say truly vhat properties a thing might
or might not have had. In doing so ve assume essentialism; i.e.,
the semantics for such locutions is the semantics for QML, vhich
"e have Seen t0 be related «th essentialism. Essentialism
underlies our claims that a certain thing could not have had (or
can not have) a certain property. Or, when ve say that something
could have had a certain property, ve implicitly contrast that pro-
perty with others that it lacks essentially.
This accomplishes little, since we might just always be wrong
when we make metaphysical claims to the effect that some object could
have been F or at least we might be wrong whenever being F
is not essential to everything. We have already seen that modal
terms have many non-metaphysical uses, which might be confused with
their employment in connection with absolute, metaphysical necessity.
But the argument lor essentialism based on considerations
of ordinary language may succeed in doing one thing. If such claims
are ordinary assumptions of some meaningful discourse then essen-
tialism is at least presumptively significant; and if that discourse
has the ring of truth, then essentialism is perhaps even presump-
tively true. What we say may at least shift the burden of proof
from the essentialist to the anti-essentialist
.
But closer examination reveals that what we ordinarily
say is of little help to the essenti al -i <?+ i\ist. As we have already seen,
'necessary' ,
'possible'
, 'essential' •, and their cognates are used in
many ways in ordinary discourse. The question we must ask is whether
the metaphysics associated with QML theories ever underlies ordinary
claims employing modal terms. In particular
, are there non-trivial
attributions of de re necessity which are both true and appropriately
metaphysical?
Because of the multiple uses of modal terms, the existence
of obviously true claims employing them validates no metaphysical
view, unless their employment can be certified to be a metaphysical
use of the terms. As we have seen, some Cartesian arguments, for
example, fail because such certification can not be made.
In fact, m addition to the traditional philosophical,
but non-metaphysical, notions with which modal terms are connected,
there are other uses of modal terms which can not be appealed to in
the attempt to defend the view that the metaphysical notions associ-
ated with QML have application. We make a distinction in ordinary
language between de_ dicto and de_ re uses of necessity in the follow-
ing sentences :
(1) It is necessary that some horse will win.
(2) There is some horse such that it is necessary that he
will win.
Here we find a de re-de dicto distinction, but it is obvious that
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involved here is a claim about what is determined by the rules
°f hOTSeraClng
- ^ iS
various metaphysically posslble
worlds is irrelevant. Such
the relationship of certain
taken as fixed termporarily
.
a use of modal terms merely indicates
facts to some background assumptions
36
It is also worth noting that the de re assertion of neces-
ty, (2), is false. Usually, when two ordinary assertions of the
for* r Q(3x)Ff U)QFxa ^ ^
it is the apparently essentialist
,
de re assertion that is false.
But when the two do not differ in truth-value, then the claim that
their use involves a distinction which logic must reflect is dubious.
Of course there are instances in which essentialists claim
that the de re but not the de dicto is true. For example, it is thought
that there is something (e.g.
,
Aristotle) that is essentially a man,
even though it is not necessary that there are men. But acceptance
Of such examples relies upon a prior acceptance of essentialism.
and the anti-essentialist will certainly not be convinced by them.
Such considerations as these do not show that the possible
worlds framework is not useful in analyzing such claims as (l) and
(2). We can imagine the range of possible situations in which the
horseo race. In all such situations one horse wins. But there is
no horse that wins in every such situation. Thus the truth of (l)
and the falsity of (2) can be easily mirrored in a structure based
upon the notion of possible worlds.
But what we imagine in such a case is the range of situations
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:°"
sistent witb the ruies ° f hors™- -
-** the raoe is run
.
tSllS US that lf a race iS rUn accor“*>« to the rules, one horse
(2> tSllS “ <falSely) that «»
-les determine which
Heither Snythlng about
-bat is metaphysically
possible
,
nor is any claim about vhat is metaphysically possible
presupposed by (l) or (2).
we hare argued, then, that 'necessary. ,
.possibly.
,
etc. are associated with conceptual, epistemic, epistemological
,
tempera! and linguistic conceptions. Furthermore, they are used
“ COnneCtl °n Wlth attemPtS t0 say *at is consistent with certain
background information. (We might add that they are occasionally
-rely stylistic variants of quantifiers.) We have found no reason
so far to think that their unimpeachable uses are associated with
metaphysical possibility.
The essentialist can still respond that even though
’necessary'
and 'possible, are often used in connection with an assumption of
certain background information, there are certain things that we
hold constant no matter what our background assumptions are. Thus,
we do not say that Socrates could have been a rock, that if he were
a rock, then such-and-such, or that if so-and-so, then Socrates
would has- been a rock. An absolute assumption is that Socrates
must at least be animate. Such assumptions are incorporated in the
semantics of modal discourse. Such a semantics reflects the fact
that Socrates is essentially animate.
The usual semantics for counter-factuals gives some plausi-
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biUt.y to this line. If a is not possibly F, then "If a were F,
then p" and "If a were F, then not-p" haye the saiue truth-yalue.
Counter-factuals related in this way are odd, and that oddity is
due to the impossibility of the antecedent's truth. (When the
antecedent is possible, "If q were , then p would be" entails the
denial of "If q were, then p would not be." When the antecedent
is impossible, both are true.
)
But the oddity of a counter-factual (or its failure to in-
terest us) may be due to things quite other than the metaphysical
impossibility of its antecedent. A supposition is odd when we are
not concerned about its consequences—not merely when it is impossible.
Our intuitions about the oddness of counter-factuals may rise from
sources other than the impossibility of the antecedent.
Even if one supposes that we never do consider the counter-
factual possibility that Socrates is an inanimate object, one might
question whether that is because such an assumption is semantically
or metaphysically incoherent, or rather merely because it is point-
37less. The fact that something is odd to say does not guarantee
its incoherence. Since the essentialist is relying on our intuitions
about what is acceptable English, he has a problem here. We can
have intuitions that a sentence is peculiar without knowing just
why it is peculiar. Our lack of interest in what would happen to
Socrates were he inanimate is sufficient to account for the peculiarity
of che supposition that ne could be inanimate. Wo metaphysical
or semantical incoherence needs to be posited.
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-An appeal to counter-factuals can also be based upon predi-
cations made in the consequent of such a conditional. For example,
"If •
• then a would be an F." If there is no consistent replace-
ment for •' that makes the subjunctive true, then that is used
as evidence that a could not be an F (i.e., that being non-F is
essential to a). Similarly, the existence of a coherent, true
instance is evidence that a is possibly F.
Unfortunately for the essentialist
,
if we are to consider
such evidence at all, we seem forced to conclude that it counts against
most of the common essentialist claims. For example, each of the
following seems to be true (or at least not obviously implausible):
If evolution had been slower, we would all be chimpanzees.
If we were all numbers, then Kripke would be a number.
If everything is purely material, then Kripke does not
have an immaterial soul.
-ne truuh of these statements can not be accounted for merely
by alleging that their antecedents are impossible, since the counter-
factuals formed by taking each antecedent together with the denial
of the consequent seem false.
An essentialist might disagree with the claim made here
about these sentences—arguing either that their truth is the result
of the impossibility of their antecedents or that the conditionals
are incoherent or deviant because of the vacuousness of their ante-
cedents. But to do so he must appeal to essentialism to support
his claims about the antecedents. But then an appeal to his findings
to support essentialism would be blatantly circular
180
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Knpke employs the stratagem of appealing to ordinary locu-
tions in an attempt to capitalize on the essentialism that allegedly
underlies them. We have mentioned the efficacy of this procedure.
What is needed is a direct argument for the appropriate sort of
essentialism.
But there is one passage in which Kripke does give an argument
that if a table is made from a certain piece of wood, then it could
38not have been made from any other.
Let 'A' be a name (rigid designator) of a table, letthe m eoo rs-c m.r—
j
,• a. _ ,
5 'B'
name
name piece of wood it actually came from Let 1
•
another piece of wood. Then suppose A were made fromn the actual world, but also another table D were simul-
mSe°by Itsel? ° V ' ' B^D; henoe > even if D vere
be B
b
rsicl* f
A
™ 4 n
°..
tabBe were made from A, D would not
'
f
l
-* [Apparently there is an error in the textThe^last two’B's should be’A's and the last ’A' shoSd be
This argument begs the question. It assumes that whatever
table is made from C will be table D and not table A. That is, it
assumes that A is essentially not made from C. But that is what
is at issue. What we want to suppose is that A is made from C rather
than from B. There is no apparent reason to think that such a suppo
sition can not coherently be made.
Indeed, facts about the way a thing originates seem at least
— —
as facts about what it originates from. Thus, being
made at a certain point in the history of an assembly line might
be regarded as crucial to A's identity. If C had been fed to the
assembly line at a certain time instead of B, then A would have
been made from C, not B.
But our goal Is not to argue that some other property Is
essential to the table, The purpose of the last example is to
mustrate that we could hold different facts about the table con-
counter-factual suppositions. Neither being made of B nor
having been made at a certain point in the assembly line's history
13 abS°1Ute1
^ metaphysically essential to table A. Different
properties can count as important in different contexts; nothing
need be regarded as essential.
As Kripke has pointed out, ve stipulate that an object is
the same object in a counter-factual situation. We do not need
any properties by which it must be qualitatively recognised as being
the same object (or, as Lewis would have it, a counterpart of the
Object). The essentialist recognises certain constraints on what
”
— SUPUlate - U1 he has a right to do, appealing to ordinary
language, is to recognise that certain stipulations are odd. But
their oddness need not be accounted for by their metaphysical inad-
missability. It might rather be associated with the pointlessness
of certain counter-factual suppositions
.
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APPENDIXES
APPENDIX I
In this appendix there is a formal exposition of the Kripke-
style semantics discussed in Part II of the dissertation, together
with the most important material used to prove Theorem A, the
principal result of chapter 5
.
Our semantics follows that given by Kripke in "Semantical
Considerations on Modal Logic" except that instead of the notation
used by Kripke— 'cp(Ax
1
...x
n
,
H)=T with respect to an assignment of
a
i ’ ’ ‘ an to xr*-V-~we will say ’ cp(A, H, I )=T* where each I1 i
is a function which assigns some UjE^to each variable of the language
(and thus to each free variable of A). If A is closed, we may
write 1 <p( A
,
H)=T’
.
Following Kripke, we define a quantificational model structure
as an ordered quadruple <G, K, R,Y>
. K is a set and R is a
reflexive relation on K. G£K and ^(h) is a set, for each H£K.
We let t(=U
H£K f (H).
The model tp is defined so that if Pn is a n-adic predicate
letter and H£K, then cp(Pn
,
H)c^n
. cp( =
,
H)
= £
<^u,u) J ueU j, for
every KEK. tp gi < es a truth-value to each formula relative to
I
,
as follows
:
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(i) Tor atomic A;
<P
(pn
(Xi,... s x
n
), H, I )=T if and only if
<Kx
1 ),...,i(xn )> £cp(p
n
,
H).
^ » H 5 1 ) =t is and only if cp(A, H, l)^T.
(iii ) ^ A *- 5 H, I )=T if and only if
tPvA, H, I )=T and cp(B, H, l)=T.
(iv) tp( (3x)A
,
H, I)=T if and only if there is some I'
such that I' is like I in what it assigns to the free
variables of r (3x)A\ I'(x)ef( H ), aud cp(A, H, I')=T.
(v) tp( nA
,
H, I )=T if and only if
4>(A, H
' ,
I )=T for every H' such that HRH
' .
If A is a closed formula we may write 'cp(A, H)=T’.
In order to prove the results cited we need several special
definitions
.
A
n.x is a conjunction of wffs of the formx^x" or x 42
j k j k’
for every j, k such that x^. and x^. occur free in A and j<k, but not
including both^' and'Xj^, for any j, k. (if x
n
is the numeri-
cally latest variable in A, then there will be at most 2
2 '
such sentences. We assume an enumeration of such sentences throughout.)
The definition oi PLx is adapted from Parsons's definition of fl x .
n n
"
^ ^ ° ~ -- ^ L -~Ii ^t model is a model cp on a model structure
<C-, K, R/f y such that for any formula A, if cp( r n. xA . a"'
,
H, l)=T
for some I
±
and some H£K, then cp(^x^A*
,
H, I^T for any I. and
any H£n
.
(ihis definition applies to models for languages without
constants
.
)
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Suppose that A is a wff of QML and cp is
structure <G, K, R,V'>
a model on a model
f is defined as follows
:
(0) If A is atomic, A^ = A.
(1) If Ais 'V^henA^V)1
.
(2) It A is B.C
,
then A^* = *
(3) If A is r (x)B~' then = r
( x )B
(pi
.
(^) If A is r oB
,
then
(A) if B contains no free variables, then A^
is
r
n(B(f> )"'.
(B) if b contains free variables, and x is the
z
numerically earliest variable not occuring
ln B (either free or bound), then A^ is
( n
i
x -B )v...v(n^xB
.B
W
) , where each sen-
tence n.xB is among n x
B
,...,T7 x
B
and± "W
(i) B
1
is
rU
z
)U
z=xJ‘ if 4>(
r
n.x
B
.DB<P\ H, IM
for some I and H£K and
(ii) B* is (3x )(x ) otherwise.Z z z
Lemma
. If >p is an anti—essentialist model on a model struc—
2 1ture <G, K, K ,V/ > then for any wff A, any I function, and any
H£K, cpU^, H, I) = cp(A, H, I).
Theorem A: If cp is an anti-essentialist model on a model
2
structure
,
K, K
,
then for any closed wff A, there is a
closed wff A' such that for any wff B, if rnB~1 occurs in A' then B
is closed, and for any H£K, cp(A'
,
H) = cp(A, H).
appendix II
In chapters 6 and 7 the results of chapter 5 are extended
in two ways. In chapter 6, the definition of
' anti-essentialist
model' is generalized in such a way that it applies to models for
languages with constants; and Theorem A is still true. In chapter 7
PP-models are defined. The set of anti-essentialist models is a
subset of the set of PP-models; yet Theorem APP, the extension of
Theorem A to this class of models can be proved.
The formal material of these two chapters is summarized
below.
Let 'a', '3',... range over singular terms (vairables and
constants) of the formal language, cp and I are redefined in such
a way that cp(a)€ ij
,
for each constant a. ('cp(a)’ is undefined if
a is a variable.) l(c<)€ LI if a is a variable; l(a)=<p(a) if a is
a constant. Clause (i) of the truth-definition (cf. Appendix i)
is altered:
(i
’
)
For atomic A:
<-P(P (a_^ , . .
.
,o<
n
) , H, l)=T if and only if
<l(a
1
),...,i(a
n
)> £cp(p
n
,H)
.
To redefine anti-essentialism we introduce ’ If aA| the
i ’
conjunction of or ra^a^
,
for each variable or constant
°j and “k occurinS free in A > such that j<k, except that not both
r
a =a ' and ra.^cc ' are conjuncts of FT.aA
.
(A constant is said to
J ^ J K 1
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occur free in A if it occurs in A.) I„ addition, let J
Q , jbe functions such that J.(a)ell, for every constant or variable a
<Jl 13
—
reStri =ted
’ “ h ^ ^0 functions K such that KtcO^a).)
-An anti-essentialist model is a model <p on K> ^
such that for any formula A, if cpfn.oAoA1
, H J )-T f„ ,i 1 n > or some J.
and some H€K, then <p(
r
n a
A
=xtA' H T \_-pV i. zn
,
, J.)_T for any J. and any H£K.
To prove Theorem A, a slightly revised definition of 'A*'
Is required. Case (0)-( 3 ) are the same as in the definition of
Appendix I. Case (M is as follows;
(^) If A is
r
db"
1
, then
(A) if B contains no free variables or constants, then
is rn(B^) '
.
(B) if B contains free terms and x
2
is the first
variable not occuring in B (free or bound), then
A IS (n.0
. B )v. . .r(n
v
a
B
.B
V
) , Where each n.aE
is among n a
B
,. .
.
,n a
B
and
-f- v
(i) fil is (x
z
)(x
z
=x
z
)
n
if 4)(
r
n.a
B
.DB
tp\ H, I )=t' ' i
for some I and some H£K
(3x )(x ) otherwise.
^ z z
The proof of theorem A is precisely analogous to the proof
"based on the definitions of Appendix I.
In chapter 7 a stronger theorem, Theorem APP, is proved.
First, a PP-model is defined as a model cp on <G, K,
for any n-place predicate Pn
,
any H£K, and any assignment I,
<p(
r
n.x
P
o( aPXl . . .
x
n
v ~Px
1
. .
.
x
n
)\ H
,
I )=T or
such that
19
or <p(
r
n x
P
=>( Q px x v A
~Px Y f* u p
n '1 n 5 ’ ’ I/-T (for any n.x1^ con-
structible from x
.
.
.
y
)
1
’
‘
n
; ‘
A* is then defined as the formula which results frQm
each formula foB ' ln A by B*t (If there is no formula W
in A, A* is A. )
n
.
E
7
ry
p
PP-“del *«° "** that for any primitive predicate
’ Thx
• apx
1 ...xn . H. I )=T for some H and I, then
<p(V
P
-(^r-.Xn^Pxr ..xn )\ H, I)=T for every H and I. Given
this it is easy to prove
Theorem APP: If <p is a PP-model on <G, K, K2
, ,
then
for any closed wff A there is a closed wff A' such that
A' contains no quantifying in (i.e.
,
every wff 'W i„ A '
IS closed) and for any HOC, cp(A'
,
H) = <p(A, H).
A* is such a wff.
Every anti-essentialist model is a PP-model
,
so Theorem APP
is stronger than Theorem A.
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